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Despite the glamour of Hollywood, the crux of the motion  
picture industry is the theatre.  It is in the brick-and-mortar  
branch of the industry that most of the money is invested and 
made.—Mae D. Huettig1
The movie business—this phrase usually evokes visions of Hollywood glitz and 
glamour as orchestrated during the studio system by film moguls and public relations 
departments, fueled by the growing popularity of fan magazines.2 The fabled status of 
film stars continues today with the Oscar ceremonies and entertainment news 
programming on television and the Internet, as well as traditional print publications and 
supermarket tabloids.  In the history of movie production, Hollywood may well have 
been the creative outpost of the business, but control of film financing (with the notable 
exception of A. H. Giannini of BancaAmerica in San Francisco) remained in the hands of 
East Coast financial institutions and New York studio offices, until the globalization of 
the industry with the entrance of the likes of SONY and other international corporations.
The movie industry began in New York and New Jersey and fiscal authority remained 
there, but the colorful lifestyles of studio heads and film stars caught the attention of a 
film-loving public.  Likewise, the picture palaces of the largest metropolitan areas around 
the country and the large theatre chains of Paramount or Fox have received the bulk of 
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the study by film scholars.  In 1992, Douglas Gomery, in his seminal work, Shared 
Pleasures, called for an examination of local film exhibition as a business influenced by 
both technology and historical context; local ventures that influenced and were affected 
by social change.  He was the first to call for expanded study, writing:  
The material history of the movie show in the United States [which] 
provides a … look at a vast array of changes.  How and where citizens of 
the United States watched films rarely remained static; such 
transformations were always affected by outside forces.” (Gomery, Shared 
xix)  
To date, Gregory Waller has been the most prolific in answering Gomery’s challenge 
with Main Street Amusements, examining exhibition in Lexington, Kentucky, from 1896 
to 1930.3 Many fine dissertations have also explored local film exhibition but have not 
found publication.4 Most of these studies examined studio-owned theatres in well-
established cities of larger population such as New Orleans or Providence, Rhode Island.5
Unlike these preceding investigations, this work centers upon film exhibition in a 
young, less populated area—Oklahoma, and more specifically, a large theatre circuit 
founded by three brothers in 1917.6 These Griffith brothers, Louis Clyde (L. C.), Henry 
Jefferson (H. J.) and Rupert Earl (R. E.), began, with the help of their father, by 
purchasing a small, storefront “opera house” in San Marcos, Texas, in 1915.  Thus began 
the Griffith Amusement Company, which by 1939 grew to well over 200 moviehouses 
controlled by the brothers through a complex network of corporations.  Unlike the film 
exhibition chains of Paramount or Loew’s, the Griffith brothers had no first-run theatres 
until the late 1940s, long after this regional, independent circuit was prosecuted on 
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antitrust violations along with the major Hollywood studios.  Only three independent 
theatre circuits were targeted—the Schine Circuit in the northeast, the Crescent Circuit in 
the southeast, and Griffith in the southwest, with theatres in Oklahoma, Texas, and New 
Mexico.  Although much has been written about the 1948 Paramount Decision handed 
done by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v.  Paramount Pictures, little 
attention has been given to these non-studio controlled chains.  If mentioned at all, these 
corporations generally earn a brief footnote in film histories, and only Simon N. Whitney 
offers any real discussion of the Griffith, Schine, and Crescent circuits with a few pages 
in Gorham Kindem’s anthology on the movie industry, perhaps because they appear to be 
such large exceptions to the standard historical paradigm in film exhibition studies. 
In many ways, the Griffith organization achieved a “vertical integration” similar 
to the companies named in the Paramount case.  Through aggressive theatre purchases 
and centralized distribution practices, this independent chain grew powerful in the 
southwest with holdings in Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico.  The Griffith brothers 
even dabbled in film production for local consumption, as well as state-sponsored booster 
films.  Their filmmaking activities indirectly provided revenue through civic good will 
and clever marketing.  Many operational policies of the Griffiths parallel the practices 
outlined in Fox and Paramount management manuals, but this southwestern circuit 
adapted these practices to suit the local communities, few of which were large, and some 
of which survived only as long as unpredictable oil fields continued to produce.7
This work will focus primarily at the Griffith theatre business in Oklahoma, a 
young state without the history or entertainment traditions of the cities or areas examined 
in previous investigations.8 Three Oklahoma towns were named in the federal antitrust 
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suit, United States v.  Griffith Amusement Co.—Stillwater, Enid, and Chickasaw.  
Stillwater, Oklahoma, will be used as a historical microcosm of Griffith film exhibition 
dominance.  This county seat and college town—home of Oklahoma A & M—stands as 
representative of the type of community into which this circuit most often expanded.  
Stillwater illustrates well the role of the movie theatre in small town Oklahoma.  Unlike 
the picture palaces of a New York City or Chicago, Oklahoma movie houses functioned 
as magnets of civic activity, and offered much more than amusement; they supported the 
cultural, social, and economic life of the community.  Although the Griffith brothers were 
in the entertainment business, the presence of their theatres enriched towns far beyond an 
afternoon or evening’s diversion, and, as the circuit’s company history and corporate 
records indicate, involvement in local events became a company mandate. 
Fortunately, this study can be informed by an unpublished narrative of the Griffith 
circuit written by longtime company employee Roger Rice who worked in the chain’s 
corporate headquarters in Oklahoma City.  Rice managed to save Griffith documents and 
photos from being destroyed in 1983 by representatives of the new owners, the Carmike 
Theaters.  The Oklahoma Historical Society archives house Rice’s company history 
written in 1991, which his widow later donated.  Primarily the minutes of stockholder and 
board member meetings, these records contribute to this study by revealing both what is 
left unsaid and what can be found on the record.  During the years of federal prosecution, 
litigation is never mentioned; the minutes reflect business as usual.  To better understand 
the local importance of the circuit, newspapers preserved on microfilm at the Oklahoma 
State University Edmon Low Library offer a context for the larger, corporate decisions 
outlined in official company records.  Books by area historians and articles from the 
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Payne County Historical Review provide additional accounts of film exhibition in the 
area.  Secondary sources on the movie business and the studio system help situate the 
Griffith circuit within the wider study of film history and exhibition. 
Chapter Two begins this history of Oklahoma film exhibition, with a brief sketch 
of early moviegoing experiences in this territory from 1889, the time of the storied land 
run, to 1915, the year the Griffith brothers first became theatre owners.  Unlike eastern 
showmen with access to a transportation infrastructure and established entertainment 
venues, prairie entrepreneurs followed the settlement of the area in wagons loaded with 
projectors, combustible nitrate film, and sheets for outdoor theatre screens when no 
buildings offered a suitable wall for movie viewing.  Although many of the early itinerant 
exhibitors visited small communities with only a few timbered structures, the desire to 
cast off a wild, frontier image soon inspired local leaders to erect “opera houses” as 
cultural centers to serve both town and rural residents.  The Griffith brothers, young men 
in their twenties, witnessed the rise of successful theatres in their home state of Texas and 
saw their future. 
Chapter Three, spanning the years from 1915 to 1926, charts the progress of the 
brothers from traveling drummers to states rights film salesmen to owners of a growing 
circuit, expanding from one small site in Texas to sole proprietorship or partnership 
participation in at least thirty theatres.9 During this rapid growth of Griffith Amusement, 
these young men developed an aggressive business strategy and established a locally-
based management philosophy providing the foundation for corporate success.  This 
chapter looks at company policies as practiced in the Stillwater, Oklahoma theatres, as 
well as tracing company expansion throughout the region.  Griffith bought many smaller, 
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independent theatres and circuits during this period, suggesting a comparison with the 
contemporary expansion strategies of studio chains.  Unlike many of the studio 
acquisitions, the brothers often offered Class B company stock to former theatre owners, 
allowing them voting rights at annual stockholder meetings; theatre managers often 
retained their positions creating both company loyalty and continuity in community 
relations.  As the organization grew, the brothers took on specific corporate management 
roles as operations were consolidated in a central office.  The success of the circuit 
caught the attention of Universal Studios.  Chapter Four continues the discussion of 
Griffith circuit community service, theatre amenities, and local promotions, examining 
these efforts within Douglas Gomery’s template for film exhibition success based on the 
methods of the Balaban and Katz theatre chain. 
In 1926, Universal pictures came to court the Griffith brothers.  This relationship 
was mutually beneficial: the studio needed lucrative theatres and the Griffiths needed an 
increased cash flow to continue expansion.10 Chapter Five covers the company’s growth 
and development from 1926 to1939, detailing internal disagreements and a subsequent 
reorganization to allow further theatre acquisitions.  Conflicting reports on Universal’s 
role and later withdrawal from the circuit underscore the turmoil among stockholders 
during this period, yet throughout these years company records indicate healthy dividends 
for stockholders and increased employee benefits.  Paul Liebmann, a Griffith family 
member, in a personal interview, narrated a David and Goliath-like account of 
Universal’s departure from the chain.  By 1936, the Griffith circuit, now operating as 
several companies with continued centralized control, had enlarged to include 125 
theatres in 58 towns in the southwest.  This astonishing growth precipitated ill will 
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among smaller, independent theatre owners in many locales, resulting in federal scrutiny 
of the Griffith operations. 
Chapter Six examines the early antitrust litigation from 1939 to 1941 that resulted 
from the complaints of showmen in Stillwater, Enid, and Chickasaw.  Griffith corporate 
records are disappointingly silent on the lawsuits facing the circuit.  Accounts of this 
period come, therefore, from the Rice history, local newspaper accounts, and federal 
court records.  There are, however, some clues to the organizations’s response to the 
threat of charges revealed in the sudden appearance of booking arrangements within the 
minutes of stockholder and board meetings beginning in 1935. Clearly, the chain wanted 
to put on public record how theatrical showings had been negotiated with the studios also 
facing prosecution at this time.  By 1939, reorganization of company holdings established 
a separate corporation in control of all Griffith real estate.  Should the Griffith circuits be 
forced to sell out theatre interests, the company would become the landlord of those who 
purchased the exhibition businesses lost by court order.  Additionally, the centralized 
operations favorably situated the business to become a dominant distribution company in 
the region.  In 1939, the Griffith organizations were charged with violations of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act; federal documents specify 243 theatres in 93 towns in the 
southwest.  However, all of the fears of legal difficulties temporarily disappeared after 
December 7, 1941. 
As America went to war, film production companies and personnel quickly 
reacted.  Many books have been written on the role of the studios and the stars in the war 
effort, but far fewer studies exist about the local activities of film exhibitors.11 Chapter 
Seven, covering the years from 1941 to 1945, looks at the contributions made by small 
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town theatre managers in the sale of war bonds and in the sponsorship of scrap drives and 
other measures to conserve resources.  Perhaps most importantly, the local theatres 
offered newsreels and patriotic programs.  Again, using Stillwater as a representative 
example, local newspapers document increased war bond participation after movie 
theatres began sponsoring special screenings for bond purchasers and other, sometimes 
elaborate, events held outside the theatres to drum up bond sales.  Until the moviehouses 
began to promote bond sales, neither Payne county nor the city of Stillwater met sales 
quotas.  On a larger scale, L. C. Griffith headed state committees during the early years of 
the war, and by 1943 he was leading the Third War Loan Drive for the National War 
Activities Committee of the Motion Picture Industry from offices in New York City, 
working closely with studio distributors and Hollywood stars on a nation-wide campaign.  
Both the Griffith organization and the Hollywood community actively aided the success 
of bond drives, but such national service was soon forgotten as federal prosecutors 
renewed their lawsuits for antitrust violations at the end of hostilities.   
The following chapter, on the years from 1945 to 1949, returns to the litigation 
brought before the United States Supreme Court.  In Chapter Eight, court documents and 
Rice’s company history provide insight into the legal problems of the circuit; once again, 
corporate records provide no mention of the process.  Initially, the Griffith concerns were 
not found to be in violation of the Sherman Act, though independent theatre owners and 
federal prosecutors soon appealed this judgment.  A second trial resulted in the Supreme 
Court ruling against the Griffith businesses with the punishment phase referred back to 
the circuit court system.  The consequences of the conviction were surprisingly lenient.  
After years of costly litigation and dogged pursuit by federal attorneys, the penalties were 
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more form than substance.  Film exhibition in towns like Stillwater remained virtually 
unchanged.  Rather than the divestiture of theatres demanded of the studios, Griffith 
companies were ordered to negotiate contracts on a theatre-by-theatre basis.  It can be 
argued that the close ties L. C. Griffith maintained with many influential Oklahomans, 
including government officials, favorably affected the final outcome of this case. 
Although the Griffith organizations escaped possibly disastrous federal 
prosecution, the business would experience a devastating blow in 1946.  In September of 
that year, L. C. Griffith suffered a debilitating stroke and was no longer able to lead the 
company he had helped to found.  Chapter Nine looks at the changes brought about after 
the “Skipper,” as L. C. was affectionately called, left corporate management in the hands 
of long-term company attorney, Henry S. Griffing.  This chapter reviews the years of 
1946 to 1960, the year Griffing died.  Griffing’s leadership shifted the emphasis from 
creative showmanship to corporate balance sheets.  A formalized sales quota system was 
established for employees at every level from theatre manager to booking managers.  In 
part, these changes were due to the temperament of the men at the helm, but the shift 
from wartime to peacetime economy probably posed the larger reasons for corporate 
retooling.  Survival meant setting aside family business for more formalized 
management.  Company documents demonstrate this transformation, as board meetings 
became governed by committee recommendations with decisions often deferred to future 
meetings.  The problems of declining theatre attendance required corporate officers to 
sell unprofitable theatres while trying to locate sites for new development.  As attendance 
slackened and theatres closed, company morale suffered.  Board meeting minutes of this 
period list numerous resignations.  Although the Griffith companies had not been forced 
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to sell theatres after being judged in violation of antitrust laws, the postwar years were 
equally unkind to both this large circuit and the studios.  Consumer spending shifted to 
other entertainments, as well as to purchases of merchandise not available during World 
War II.  Studio divestiture of the exhibition sector did provide the Griffith chain with one 
milestone, the opening of the circuit’s first first-run theatre in 1947 in Tulsa.12 
Chapter Ten scrutinizes the specific attempts to counter slipping box office 
receipts from 1949 to 1983, the year the chain was sold to Carmike Theatres.  Like many 
other movie companies, drive-in theatres provided a prime area for expansion.  Often 
after purchasing land, signs announcing a drive-in were erected, but no theatre was ever 
built.  For example, in Stillwater such a sign stood for years.  The corporation explored 
other entertainment activities including “putt-putt golf” and an interest in an amusement 
park.   The company applied for FM radio licenses, but once granted, no action was 
taken.  A possible production collaboration with Paramount Pictures was never finalized.  
Community antennae television (CATV) proved unpopular; airing pay-per-view first run 
films was unappreciated in 1955.  When the organization was finally sold, theatre 
holdings had shrunk to 85 screens in 56 four-wallers and 29 drive-ins in 25 towns: a 
circuit that had rivaled studio chains disappeared (Rice 26). 
 The concluding chapter provides a final analysis of both the successes and failures 
of the Griffith organization, begun in earnest in 1917, within the larger context of film 
history.  The early entrepreneurial acquisitiveness of the Griffith brothers closely 
parallels the early risk taking of future studio heads.  The brothers’ determined expansion 
to secure regional dominance is not unlike the power struggles among rival film 
production companies.  Both the studios and this southwestern circuit spent many years 
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defending their business practices against federal charges, and although Griffith 
companies lost no theatres, this chain experienced the post-war decline that transformed 
the movie industry suggesting that divestiture had less effect than sometimes indicated in 
historical commentary.  And although the number of first run theatres owned by a circuit 
has been the measure of success in many exhibition histories, the Griffith brothers 
prospered with none for over forty years.   
 The aggressive purchase of existing theatres and the persistent efforts to expand 
into new towns throughout the southwest produced a large and successful independent 
Griffith chain at a time when most large and successful moviehouses were controlled by 
the Hollywood studios.  In some ways the conditions that existed in the early days of 
filmmaking in the East were in place in the new territory of Oklahoma (later achieving 
statehood in 1907).  Despite the efforts of Thomas Edison to control the earliest years of 
the film industry in New York, young men with the courage to go into business and to 
invest their limited funds, and with the drive to “make good,” succeeded through 
ambitious expansion and creative promotions from nickelodeons to larger and larger, and 
grander and grander theatres.   Oklahoma offered an untapped market for movies with no 
competition from previously established music halls or vaudeville theatres.  The young 
communities eagerly welcomed motion picture exhibitors.  A movie theatre on any Main 
Street indicated a progressive and prosperous town, increasing the profitability of local 
businesses by drawing customers from the surrounding rural areas.  With the rapid 
expansion of Griffith Amusement’s theatre holdings, the brothers wisely centralized their 
booking, distribution, and advertising activities making the circuit more competitive.  
But, although, many Griffith business functions were controlled from a central location in 
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Oklahoma City near studio distribution offices, theatre managers were encouraged to 
become active civic leaders sensitive to local community needs.  This combination of 
centralized buying and distribution power with attention to small town concerns resulted 
in an exhibition circuit that managed to grow and provide corporate dividends even 
during the Great Depression.  The brothers never tried to compete with studio controlled 
first-run theatres in Oklahoma City or Tulsa, choosing instead to bring picture shows to 
smaller county seats and towns that sprang up as oil fields were opened.  They were 
content to share the second run business in the cities and quick to close theatres in towns 
where the oil boom went bust.  Griffith Amusement’s success grew out of an 
entrepreneurial understanding of sharp business practices and good community relations 
in an Oklahoma business climate that celebrated rapid commercial expansion.  In many 
ways, the Griffith circuit history parallels that of the studio system, with antitrust 
litigation and with post-World War II declines in box office revenue, yet this 
southwestern chain continued in the exhibition business, albeit on a smaller scale than 
prewar years, into the 1980s while scrambling to diversify into other entertainment 
properties.  The lack of the earlier strong leadership provided by the brothers, particularly 
after the war, contributed to the eventual sale of the Griffith holdings in 1983, but the 
circuit deserves a more prominent place in film exhibition history. 
 
Notes: 
1 In Economic Control of the Motion Picture Industry: A Study in Industrial Organization (Philadelphia: U 
of Pennsylvania P, 1944).  Huettig’s study favorably viewed industry practices as sound business, but 
Justice Department prosecutors disagreed in their pursuit of the studios on anti-trust violations. 
2 See Fuller’s At The Picture Show for an excellent study on movie culture created by the rapid growth of 
fan magazines. 
13
3 Like many studies of movie industry history, Waller’s work ends with the arrival of “talkies.”  Waller has 
also edited Moviegoing in America, a compilation documenting film exhibition history. 
4 See for example, Thomas, Lewis, Potamianos, and Testa. 
5 According to 1930 census bureau data New Orleans had a population of 458,762 and Providence residents 
totaled 252,981.  In that same year, the population in Oklahoma City had reached 185,389 and in Tulsa 
141,258.    
6 Stillwater, Oklahoma, representative of a Griffith town, had reached a population of 7,016 by 1930. 
7 For examples of studio management instruction, see Barry and Sargent.  Also,in Shared Pleasures,
Gomery provides frequent references to a 1926 Balaban and Katz publication.   
8 Oklahoma gained statehood in 1907. 
9 Rice’s history includes a long list of theatres owned by the Griffith circuit but notes that records for 
theatres included in the business prior to 1926 are incomplete.  The brothers may have had holdings beyond 
the documentation of the thirty plus moviehouses located by Rice.   
10 Later in the company history Triarko, a post-Paramount decision satellite of RKO, also approached 
Griffith with the hopes of purchasing at least partial ownership in theatre holdings. 
11 For works on the Hollywood war effort see books by Manvell, Brownstein, and Doherty.  For a less 
scholarly and more titillating discussion of the Hollywood movie stars and bond sales, see Hoopes. 





Early Film Exhibition in Oklahoma: 
From Territory to Statehood (1889-1915) 
Many men, through many years, searched for ways to make  
pictures appear to move.  No one can be said to have been the 
first to conceive this idea.  . . . For thousands of years, people  
have been interested in pictures, and the desire to see representations  
of figures in motion is indicated by the drawings of the hunt,  
discovered on the walls of pre-historic homes.—Benjamin Hampton1
Moving pictures captured the imagination of both amateur and professional 
inventors but probably not out of a primal desire, as film historian Benjamin Hampton 
and others might have believed.  It is safer to say that once photographic images could be 
captured for the delight of the general public, resourceful men compelled by curiosity and 
visions of fame and fortune began to dream of transforming static images into depictions 
of the world in motion around them.2 Some were more visionary than others.  Thomas 
Edison, the wizard of Menlo Park, rejected the idea of moving pictures.  Working from 
1881 until his 1889 demonstration for his skeptical employer, William Kennedy Laurie 
Dickson developed the Kinetoscope to exhibit motion pictures inside a large wooden 
cabinet; he was told to “Scrap it.  […] Edison had wanted action pictures merely to 
provide illustrations for his sound recordings hoping that sales of the phonograph, 
patented by him in 1887, might be enhanced” (Jobes 3).  Dickson’s accomplishment left 
Edison unimpressed until others began to develop their own moving pictures.  The threat 
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of competition renewed Edison’s interest in movies, culminating in the first public 
showing of the Kinetoscope at the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences in May 1893 
with the first Kinetoscope Parlor opening later in April 1894.  For twenty-five cents, the 
curious could peep into five machines (Robinson 39, 45-46).  Once the excitement of the 
peep show began to wane, the race was on to develop a device for projecting life size 
images onto a screen.  Many entrepreneurs envisioned commercial success for screening 
motion pictures, demonstrating their own models in 1895 including Woodville Latham’s 
Panoptikon, Antoine and Auguste Lumiere’s Cinematographe, and Thomas Armat’s 
Phantoscope.  By the end of the year Armat partnered with Edison and “Edison’s” 
Vitascope was introduced in February 1896 (Robinson 59).  Adding the famous 
inventor’s name to Armat’s machine guaranteed public appreciation of this new 
entertainment, setting into motion the scramble for dominance in the uncharted territory 
of moving pictures. 
 Other business interests were developing in the midwestern plains in the 1880s.  
Approximately two million acres of prairie were known as “The Unassigned Lands” 
following an 1832 expedition into the area, headed by Secretary of War, Henry 
Ellsworth, who determined “this was not a proper place to relocate eastern tribes.”  These 
lands were deemed too inhospitable for Indian allotment.  Oklahoma historian, Robert 
Cunningham notes that the Secretary’s overreaction to the hardships of his journey and 
his groundless fear of Indian attack ultimately “opened the door to final and total 
settlement of all the land once set aside for relocation” (4-6).  Because these unassigned 
lands were too attractive to both farmers and businessmen, “boomer” groups formed in 
Kansas to force settlement in the area even though an 1866 treaty mandated that the area 
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was to be used for future Indian resettlement.  These “boomers” were preceded by 
cattlemen who freely moved their herds throughout the unassigned lands without tribal or 
federal permission.  In 1884, a group of ‘boomers” led by Captain William Lewis Couch 
illegally established a town of approximately twenty “houses” on land near present day 
Stillwater, Oklahoma.  The “boomers” were soon routed with the threat of artillery attack 
from cavalry troops and the squatters retreated back to the safety of Kansas.  Encouraged 
by railroad and other business interests, and supported by Kansas newspapers, Couch 
shifted his efforts to Washington, bringing the settlement issue to national attention 
(Newsom 4).3 In March of 1889, President Benjamin Harrison announced that the 
“unassigned lands” would be opened to homesteaders on April 22.  Just three months 
after Dickson’s Kinetoscope demonstration in Menlo Park, New Jersey, Stillwater 
became one of the many towns to flourish in the newly settled Oklahoma territory.   
 From a community of three tents, Stillwater experienced a steady growth, 
boasting its first permanent store by June of 1889 (Newsom 17).4 “The Swiler Brothers 
in ‘The First Store in Payne County’ dealt in hardware and carried a ‘full line of staple 
and fancy groceries, flour and feed.’” Threatened with the loss of claims that showed no 
improvements within sixty days, makeshift homes and business buildings were erected 
quickly on city lots offered by R. A. Lowry.  A claim on a business lot could be 
“jumped” if no building worth at least $25.00 had been erected.  By the end of its first 
year, Stillwater could boast of “50 business houses, and more than 150 homes, not 
counting barns and outbuildings” (Cunningham 18-20, 65).  With the closest railroad 
station twenty miles away in Alfred (now Mulhall), many questioned the survivability of 
this community.5 The efforts of town boosters such as Lowry won both the county seat 
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and a college for Stillwater.6 The towns of Payne Center and Perkins both hoped to 
become the county seat; Payne Center conceded defeat with a compromise to name the 
county Payne.  Perkins citizens were less easily mollified.  Robert Cunningham describes 
a colorful armed standoff between men from Stillwater and Perkins to hold the county 
records but notes, “Planning and perseverance may be cited as the reason why Stillwater 
maintained an edge over its rivals” (24).  Through shrewd political maneuvering Payne 
County was named as the location for a college.7 When county residents refused to 
contribute to the mandated $10,000 building costs, Stillwater leaders re-valued city 
property to support the bond funds needed (Cunningham 140).8 By 1890 an infant hub of 
commerce, government, and education had been born on previously unassigned lands. 
Some of that same perseverance and “boomer” belief in new opportunities were 
evident in the young men who became “an army of perhaps forty thousand keen, money-
hungry human beings . . . engaged in a mad-house scramble to acquire fortunes through 
[the] . . . fascinating new business of selling cheap entertainments” (Hampton 59).  In 
Stillwater, the volunteer fire department opened a moviehouse to support their activities; 
profits benefited the local community.  Film historians like Benjamin Hampton and Terry 
Ramsaye provide striking and often romanticized portraits of some of the thousands of 
early showmen who ignored the warnings that moving pictures were but a fad like 
cycling, that movie equipment would soon be gathering dust alongside forgotten bicycles.  
And, they also chronicle all the failed attempts.9 Until Edison realized early 
manufacturers and exhibitors were making profits in what he saw as “claim jumping,” 
young entrepreneurs operated in a wide-open, unregulated new business world, what 
Ramsaye calls “The Lawless Film Frontier” (xx).   
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By 1908, after many years of litigation, Edison and other manufacturers formed 
the Motion Picture Patents Company to control further loss of film and equipment sales 
needed to meet the public demand for more and more movies.  Licensing fees imposed by 
the MPPC irked exhibitors and resulted in antitrust lawsuits and even more competitors 
ready to provide projectors and movies.  The importance of the exhibition side of the 
business became preeminent; the success of manufacturers and film production 
companies relied on theatre operators or itinerant showmen to get product to the 
consumers who had caught movie madness.  These new businessmen, without old family 
wealth or alumni connections, “came from small retail stores, work benches, . . . garment 
factories, school teachers’ desks . . . from all sorts of modestly paid positions” (Hampton 
47).  More established businessmen scoffed at the idea that picture shows could be a 
sound investment.   
Ambitious, but under-financed, dreamers pooled savings with like-minded co-
workers, friends, or family members and began opening storefront theatres by 1896 with 
future moguls like Marcus Loew and William Fox entering the exhibition field in the 
early 1900s.  In a trade publication of 1915, David Hullfish outlined both the startup costs 
and the weekly expenses involved to open a small two hundred-seat neighborhood 
theatre.  For renovation of the space (primarily to accommodate a ticket booth), chairs, 
and screening equipment, the costs were tallied to be no more than $600.  Weekly 
expenses including rent, utilities, and payroll were estimated at approximately $60 with 
the cost of film and song slides adding $22.00 more to the budget.  A weekly profit of 
over $30 could be anticipated (Waller, Moviegoing 54).10 For those who could not afford 
these costs, other opportunities to cash in on the movie craze were available.  For around 
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$300, one could become a traveling lecturer.  For that investment, the fledgling showman 
received all the necessary equipment and films, plus preprinted lecture notes (Ramsaye 
392).  For those hesitant to seize this opportunity or patiently timing their entrance into 
the movie business, used, reduced-cost equipment became available as earlier traveling 
exhibitors tired of the road or failed in their efforts.  America’s wish-book, the Sears, 
Roebuck catalogue, advertised film exhibition equipment in 1898 which included “a book 
of instructions which tells in the plainest and most simple way how to handle the outfits, 
how to advertise, how to secure halls, churches, opera houses and everything that is 
necessary for the exhibitor to know or that would contribute to success” (Fuller 7).  
Hampton sees the early itinerant film exhibitors as former snake oil salesmen and spielers 
familiar with the showmanship needed for rural or small town audiences; men who were 
ready for a “quick clean-up,” riding the popularity of “genuine new novelties” until the 
tide turned to other crazes (25).  For these men, it was all about the movie business 
although they might promote their programs as educational or theatrical art.   
 Some of those traveling showmen found their way to Stillwater in the 1890s 
(Pearson 31).  Reaching this young town was no easy task; although train service would 
bring the itinerant exhibitor within twenty miles of Stillwater, the balance of the journey 
would be made by wagon over undeveloped, rutted paths across sod fields or along 
poorly maintained county roads that only reached ten miles from the city limits.  One 
early resident described the conditions in these words: “The road north of Stillwater got 
cut and washed so much high wheeled wagons got caught on the center.  . . . Some roads 
got more like ditches, so deep you could not see out the sides of a buggy as you drove it.”  
Farm neighbors organized wagon “pools,” “with two or more families hooking teams in 
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tandem for the difficult pull through the road” (Cunningham 173-74).11 The early 
showmen making this difficult journey profited on the novelty of moving pictures 
reaching such a remote area.  The projectors used by such intrepid exhibitors were likely 
Lumiere Cinematographes, hand cranked machines that required no electricity, an 
example of lost revenue for Edison who patented only machines that used his earlier 
electrical inventions.12 Because the Lumiere equipment could both project and film 
images, resourceful exhibitors sometimes shot local footage to the delight of their 
audiences.   
 Local audiences enjoyed more opportunities for entertainment, when in 1899 a 
spur of the Santa Fe Railroad reached Stillwater.  As with so many communities across 
America, an Opera House signaled a town of culture and progress.13 By 1900 Stillwater 
had begun construction of just such an edifice.  In a business district of predominately 
small wooden storefronts, an impressive three-story brick and sandstone building added 
much civic pride.  The OPERA HOUSE officially opened on 1 July 1901 with the Noble 
Dramatic Company, Band, and Orchestra performing The Strategists at popular prices 
ranging from ten cents for gallery seats to fifty cents for balcony seating; box seats 
flanked the stage.  Commercial space occupied the first floor with access to the theatre 
through a central entrance and a six-foot wide staircase.  Measuring 57 feet wide and 100 
feet long, the theatre was designed to seat 1000 patrons.14 Stillwater’s GRAND OPERA 
HOUSE drew 4,000 for a Fourth of July celebration just after the grand opening, 
illustrating the economic magnetism of this structure for downtown merchants in a city of 
approximately 2500 residents.  Owned by Louis J. Jardot and James Blouin, the OPERA 
HOUSE was often used for events to benefit local churches and schools since its “sole 
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function was to please the public” (Dellinger 1-3, 6).  Gregory Waller describes the role 
of the small-town opera house as serving “as a medium for . . . exposure to 
cosmopolitanism and the au courant” (Main Street 33).  In a few years into the future, 
movie houses would introduce the pleasures of the latest film technology to the 
community. 
 The youth and size of Stillwater did not limit the quantity of entertainments 
presented at the OPERA HOUSE. Dellinger reports, “whatever was popular in New York 
or Boston or Kansas City found its way to Stillwater”(7).  From touring companies 
performing Shakespeare to the Gus Sun American Minstrels, “said to have been the 
largest of its kind in the United States,” area residents were offered a variety of dramas, 
musicals, and lectures (Dellinger 10).  The formation of the Oklahoma Circuit provided 
the incentive to draw national touring companies to the dusty streets of Stillwater (street 
paving was not begun until 1910).  This group booking arrangement included Jardot, J. 
M. Brooks of Guthrie’s BROOKS THEATRE and the DELANEY THEATRE in Perry (Dellinger 
5).  While the OPERA HOUSE drew stage shows, movies were still a part of the early 
entertainments of the community.  Ralph Pearson recalls his first personal experience at 
the movies in 1904, viewing Melies’ A Trip to the Moon shown in a street carnival tent.  
Both Cunningham and Pearson speak of the first movie house being established by the 
volunteer fire department to purchase needed equipment including the acquisition of a 
horse-drawn fire wagon in 1901, replacing the department’s man-powered cart.  Pearson 
locates the theatre, know as “THE FIREBOYS,” in the 900 block of Main Street.  Across the 
street an open-air theatre provided plank seating and technical problems “when the full 
moon shown on the screen, and made the show rather dim” (32).  These “airdomes” 
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lowered the costs for itinerant exhibitors and provided more comfort for the patrons in the 
years before air-cooled or air-conditioned theatres.  Kathryn Fuller notes that trade 
journal suggestions for nickelodeon operators during the summer months included white 
slip-covered seating with decorative arctic scenes, as well as “spraying perfume . . . to 
quell body odors.”  It was also suggested that only comedies be screened “in the hope 
that the audience would laugh and forget the heat” (63).  In the heat of the Oklahoma 
summers “airdomes” may have been the favored movie venue. 
 The first movie screening at the OPERA HOUSE occurred in 1907; unfortunately 
there appears to be no record as to whether the film was the main attraction or part of the 
program of a “10-20-30” vaudeville show (Cunningham 208).15 Movies had apparently 
caught the public’s fancy.  With waning interest in stage entertainment and the growing 
popularity of film, Jardot, Tom Hoyt, and C. H. Berry formed a new company and the 
OPERA HOUSE became the HOLLYWOOD. This transformation may have occurred around 
1913 based on Ralph Pearson’s recollections of public reluctance to climb stairs to the 
balcony in the flickering light from the movie screen (33).  Pearson recalls an early 
“talkie” at the OPERA HOUSE in 1914 in the form of a “photo-drama of creation” 
sponsored by his bible class.  Describing this program, he wrote, “While the 
synchronization of the sound and scene had not been perfected at that time, there was an 
attempt to match the pastor’s introductory gestures with a recorded voice, and through the 
skill of the operators, was very successful in causing some of those present to declare that 
the reel had become real.”  He continued by describing hand-tinted short subject films as 
the earliest color movies exhibited (33).  This free entertainment provided many rural 
families with their first night at the movies; presumably donations were welcomed.  This 
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description, in addition to the introduction of movies to the uninitiated, underscores the 
role of the theatre as a civic center supporting community activities (Pearson refers to the 
OPERA HOUSE although at the time it had become the HOLLYWOOD) and the importance 
of the projectionist for the success of a screening.  By 1919, Jardot and his partners 
abandoned their movie business and the building was leased to J. W. Whipple and C. W. 
Wakefield and renamed the ISIS THEATRE, part of the Egyptian fad (Dellinger 11).  At 
some point this leasing arrangement must have been terminated as the Stillwater 
Directory of 1926 lists the HOLLYWOOD once more.  Before the OPERA HOUSE turned to 
“all movies-all the time” other theatres had joined the FIREBOYS.
In 1910, the Stillwater Directory lists the ALAMO at 914 Main and the PASTIME 
THEATRE at 612 Main, as well as the GRAND OPERA HOUSE on east Ninth between Main 
and Lewis.  The CAMERA opened at 719 Main in 1913 in the first brick building in 
Stillwater, formerly the Youst Saloon.  The 1922 directory adds the GARDEN at 716 
Main.  A Stillwater Gazette article indicates the GARDEN was formerly the ALAMO,
moving to the 700 block of main, directly across from the CAMERA (Jul 27, 1945).16 The 
GARDEN would later become the ABBOTT THEATRE, then the MECCA, and eventually the 
CREST. By the time the Griffith organization built the AGGIE and LEACHMAN theatres on 
Main Street, the FIREBOYS and the PASTIME were defunct.  A 1945 Gazette article reports 
that the failure of these theatres was affected by their location, implying that the 700 
block of Main Street had become the hub of the business district and a movie row.  
Stillwater had its own “great white way.” That this small town could support four theatres 
in the first decade of the century, mirrors the popularity of motion pictures throughout the 
country.  By 1910, estimates on the number of nickelodeons stood at about 10,000, of 
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which 7,000 were outside metropolitan areas (Fuller 28).  As in other areas, smaller 
operations closed due to poor management in a competitive market or were purchased by 
studios intent upon expanding outlets for their product.  In Stillwater, as well as other 
areas of the region, it was not Hollywood corporations but rather a homegrown exhibition 
circuit that came to dominance.  Only one Stillwater theatre, the CAMERA, managed to 
compete with the circuit, and would prove to have a significant role in the exhibition 
history on Main Street as the sole independent moviehouse to survive the 1926 arrival of 
the Griffith circuit in Stillwater.  The next chapter will begin to chronicle the rise of the 
powerful Griffith Amusement Company in Oklahoma.   
 
Notes: 
1 From History of the American Film Industry from its Beginnings to 1931 (New York: Dover, 1970) 3.  
This film historian offers an insider’s view of the movie business. 
2 For discussion of early photographic and film cameras and projection equipment see Fulton and 
Hendricks in Balio’s anthology, The American Film Industry and, Robinson, Hampton, Jobes, and 
Ramsaye. 
3 “The land booms of the ‘seventies and ‘eighties in Southern California were essentially railroad 
promotions” (McWilliams 125).  Prior to that time, Spanish settlers had long held large tracts of fertile 
California property.  In the first decades of the 1900s a new influx in population created a second land 
boom for the state; many of the new California settlers would be movie people. 
4 This tent city occupied land which is now Eighth Avenue and Main Street (Cunningham 8).   
5 Although these were “unassigned” lands prior to the 1889 land run, railroads crossed the area serving as 
military supply line support and transportation to cities in Texas.  A congressional act in 1866 authorized a 
right of way for the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company that followed the southern bank of the 
Cimarron River.  In 1884, the Southern Kansas Railway Company received congressional permission to 
extend its rail lines from Kansas through Oklahoma into Texas (Chapman 2-3).  As noted, the railroad 
interests strongly supported the boomer efforts to settle the area.   
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6 Five months after the land run, Stillwater had opened a public school with 73 students.  By 1891, 
enrollment had risen to 127 (Chapman 107, 125). 
7 Payne County representatives traded their support to Oklahoma City as territorial capitol for the right to 
establish a college; this deal defeated those who hoped to keep the capitol in Guthrie.   
8 The next problem city fathers faced was finding students.  “Every adult agreed to enroll [but] . . . Lowry 
reminded them that all were too old to be accepted as regularly enrolled students in a tax supported school.”  
In probably one of the first early admissions plans on record, students who were “big for their age” were 
moved from the public school to the college (Cunningham 141). 
9 There is the particularly sad, penniless end to Major Woodville Latham, whose invention, the Latham 
Loop, became an industry standard (Ramsaye 290-98).   
10 With the exception of weekly film rental costs, the largest outlay went to the projectionist; without a 
skilled operator screening quality would suffer and the audience would go to a competing theatre.  By 1896 
in areas beyond eastern metropolitan cities, William T. “Pop” Rock in New Orleans and Thomas Tally of 
Los Angeles had established picture parlors. 
11 Around 1890 a poll tax was levied to begin roadwork in the county requiring “a person to work four days 
on the roads or pay $4.00 into the county fund.  The majority preferred to work out the tax.” Automobiles 
were first sold in Stillwater in 1913 but travel was confined mainly to city streets; a trip to Oklahoma City 
could easily take half a day (Cunningham 165, 173-74). 
12 Because there was no electricity, calcium lighting was transported as well.  A calcium light created 
illumination by using a flame aimed at a lime cylinder with a lens to concentrate the light. 
13 Waller in Main Street Amusements: Movies and Commercial Entertainment in 
A Southern City, 1896-1930 admirably traces the history of the Opera House in Lexington, Kentucky. 
14 Located at 116 East Ninth Street, one block east of Main Street, the building is now the site of an 
antiques mall.  Renovations and modernizations have obscured the original grandeur of the Opera House, 
but the flies for stage equipment and curtains are still visible. 
15 “10-20-30” refers to ticket prices of ten cents to thirty cents for touring vaudeville troupes.  A typical bill 
might include a one-act drama, several musical offerings, jugglers or acrobats, and movies. 





The Griffith Brothers: 
From Traveling Salesmen to Theatre Owners (1915-1926) 
 
In small towns and large cities, the movie house had become  
a permanent part of the American scene by 1910.  Because  
New York City is too often used as the sole vantage point, the 
nickelodeon is seen strictly as an urban phenomenon.  It was  
more than that.  The nickelodeon wave washed over small-town  
America within a couple of years of its urban influx.—Gomery 1
The Griffiths witnessed first-hand the wave of nickelodeon expansion as the 
brothers traveled dusty Texas roads in the early years of the twentieth century.  They 
began “as early-day drummers . . . selling grocery staples,” and L. C. Griffith spent time 
on the road representing “Weelaka non-alcoholic extract,” and “tobacco for the American 
Tobacco Company.” Later the Griffiths began selling movies (Rice 1).2 Based out of 
Dallas, the brothers sold films across Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.  They learned 
about film exhibition, the market situations in different areas, and the profitability of the 
movie business, while making contacts with many in theatre ownership and management 
(Rice 2).  Film distribution was handled in a number of ways in the early days of film 
production.  Producers could sell their movies to a distribution exchange that in turn sold 
sub-franchises as states-rights or territorial rights for a given area.  Only the largest 
studios with a quantity of pictures to sell could afford to open exchanges in distant 
locations like Dallas or Oklahoma City; smaller companies were forced to sell exclusive 
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rights to local exchanges losing potential profits for these studios with limited resources.  
Regional distributors would negotiate with circuit exhibitors as well as owners of single 
theatre sites.  In rural, small-town locations the weekly rental could be as low as $7.50 
while a sales call might easily cost the exchange $10.00; block-booking became a way to 
maximize those sales visits by signing rental agreements for a number of films for an 
extended period of time (Lewis, Harvard 233, 295-97).  Throughout the early days and 
the studio system era, block-booking remained a contentious practice for theatre owners.3
The Griffith brothers first exhibition venture was a storefront theatre purchased in 
1915 in San Marcos, Texas.  The youngest brother, H. J. managed the GRAND THEATRE 
while both L. C. and R. E. continued to sell movies for a Texas exchange until 1919 
(Rice 1).  Neither Rice’s company history nor the Griffith corporate records indicate for 
which distributor the brothers traveled.  Howard Lewis notes that an unnamed Dallas 
exchange established a group of 140 sub-franchises in the area and that one E. H. Hulsey, 
in addition to owning seventeen theatres in Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, distributed 
moving pictures for First National (a 25 year contract was the standard agreement).  By 
1919, First National reorganized as Associated First National Exhibitor’s Circuit, 
centralizing operations with a buyout of the regional exchanges; salesmen on the road 
were shifted to this new corporation’s payroll (Lewis, Harvard 14, 18, 21).  There is no 
documentation that would indicate that the Griffiths worked for a First National 
exchange, but with the coincidence of the changes made in 1919, it is tempting to 
speculate a connection because the brothers partnered in 1920 with W. C. Underwood of 
Dallas establishing the Oklahoma Specialty Film Company, a states rights distribution 
organization for independent films with capital stock of twenty thousand dollars (Griffith 
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Brothers Documents Box I, Volume I).4 L. C. and R. E. opened exchange offices in 
Oklahoma City, while H. J. continued as theatre manager in San Marcos (Rice 2).5
Incorporation documents for Oklahoma Specialty Film Company indicate the wide range 
of activities these young entrepreneurs hoped to accomplish: 
To manufacture, buy, sell, rent, lease, exhibit and exploit motion pictures, 
films, accessories, supplies, motion picture theatre equipment, appliances, 
etc., and to engage generally in the motion picture or theatre business, 
including the manufacture, sale and handling of all equipment and 
supplies necessary or incident thereto; and to buy, own, sell, lease or 
otherwise handle and dispose of such real estate as may be necessary for 
the carrying on of said business; and to do any and all other things in 
connection with the conduct and management of said business not in 
violation of the law.  (Griffith Box I, Vol. I)6
To some extent all of these goals were met during the growth and expansion of various 
future Griffith corporations.  While the brothers continued their film sales, they also 
expanded Griffith theatre holdings as well.   
 Incorporated as Griffith Brothers, they acquired additional Texas theatres in 
1917—the STRAND in Honey Creek and the Queen in Mart.  The first theatre partnerships 
in Oklahoma also formed in 1917 with the REX in Fairfax and the REX in Yale; the 
theatergoing experience was probably not as regal as the names might imply.7 By 1925, 
the brothers had purchased stock in the Oklahoma City Rialto Theatre Company with R. 
E. becoming director of the business, with H. J. the secretary/treasurer, and L. C. elected 
president.  Records for this company in 1930 indicate a net surplus of $28,570, of which 
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$28,000 was distributed as a cash dividend (Griffith Box I, Vol. II).  In 1933 this 
corporation was dissolved, but by that time Consolidated Amusement Company, formed 
in 1917, had grown rapidly from an initial purchase of the PALACE theatre in Ardmore.  
Described as a location “suitable for a first class picture show,” the board approved 
$22,500.00 for improvements to the PALACE. The minutes of the Board of Directors 
indicate steady dividends beginning in 1918 paying from 5% to 15% per share (Griffith 
Box II, Vol. III).8 The board’s discussions provide an understanding of the company’s 
business practices to centralize, standardize, and economize its operations.  Board 
meetings in 1919 dealt with establishing a uniform payroll policy including a $15 per 
week salary for ticket sellers.  That same year the company began a search for a reliable 
engine to supply power for the PRINCESS and the PALACE; it was decided that these 
theatres could be used for Sunday Schools if the churches agreed to share the “light bill.”   
In 1920, H. Lowenstein became the chief booker for the theatres because of “the 
difficulty of securing good pictures.”  Lowenstein was assigned  “to visit Dallas and 
Oklahoma City once a month and endeavor to make the best arrangements possible and 
secure the latest pictures.” A permanent office was established in Oklahoma City in 1927 
(Griffith Box I, Vol. III).   Other concerns in the 1920s included crowd control when all 
seats were filled and how to cut costs “during the hot months.”  The PALACE and 
PRINCESS were to be open only on Saturday and Sundays, while in other theatres 
matinees were limited to the weekends.  To lure customers during the summer months, 
admission prices were lowered to ten and twenty five cents for matinees with evening 
shows charging twenty and thirty-five cents; to cut overhead, music was not provided at 
matinees.  The board discussed the possibility of tent shows but there are no records that 
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this step was taken, although, as noted earlier, airdomes were one way to beat the heat for 
exhibitors.9 To enhance the experience of moviegoing, plans were made to remodel 
some theatre fronts and the purchase of a $2300 organ for the Princess was approved.   
All managers were advised that “no one should be permitted to call out anything for sale 
or to make noise in passing popcorn, candy, etc.”   These early records demonstrate the 
transition from storefront amusements to theatres designed to maximize a customer’s 
enjoyment and to increase profitability for the exhibition circuit.   
 With centralized offices, company policy could be drafted and enforced for all the 
theatres in the circuit.  Douglas Gomery writes:  
It took an organized set of theatres, operated from a central office, to 
realize the benefits so well known to Sears-Roebuck, Woolworths, and A 
& P. . . . Chains kept costs low by taking advantage of economies of scale.  
Fixed costs were spread over more and more operations.  . . . Each 
department of the modern chain store enterprise was simply asked to 
perform its specialty at maximum speed and minimum cost.  (Shared 
Pleasures 35)
The Griffith brothers soon divided responsibilities according to individual talents:  R. E. 
became the primary buyer and booker of film, H. J. focused on equipment purchase and 
maintenance, as well as theatre upkeep; L. C. affectionately became known as “The 
Skipper,” piloting the expansion of the circuit(s).  As theatres were purchased, former 
owners and managers were offered Griffith stock and a role in the operations of their 
former businesses, often serving on the board of directors.  This policy maintained 
management continuity at the community level while increasing profits for circuit 
31
theatres.  Although a centralized operation, corporate officers had input from those best 
able to understand local conditions, the theatre managers. 
 Gomery describes a “five-point strategy” for Balaban & Katz, a partnership that 
began with one nickelodeon, grew to regional dominance, and eventually became part of 
the Paramount theatre expansion.  Balaban & Katz became important contributors to the 
successful operation of Paramount which grew to hold almost half of all studio owned 
theatres (Huettig 134).  The “five-point strategy” Gomery describes includes location, 
theatre building, service, stage shows, and air-conditioning (“The Rise” 93-100).  
Although the Griffith brothers may not have been aware of the business practices of 
Balaban & Katz, it is a certain that they read one of the trade publications available to 
exhibitors as outlined in Allen and Gomery’s work such as Moving Picture World (which 
eventually became Motion Picture Herald in 1930) or Motion Picture News. By 1927, 
John F. Barry, director of the Publix and Paramount managers’ training school, and W. 
Sargent Epes of Moving Picture World had published their guide for film exhibition 
management and merchandising to boost theatre profits.   
As to Gomery’s first point, in reviewing the five pages of Rice’s theatre listings, 
the location strategy of the brothers becomes apparent; the majority of towns into which 
the Griffiths expanded were either county seats or oil production towns (134-38).  This 
choice positioned the theatres in bustling commercial centers while avoiding head-to-
head competition with studio-controlled theatres, similar to the course that Balaban & 
Katz chose.10 Instead of attempting to compete with other theatres in a central 
entertainment district, these Chicago exhibitors located their theatres in outlying business 
districts of the city that were served by public transportation (Gomery, “The Rise” 93).   
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In Stillwater, for example, all the Griffith theatres were located on Main Street, the 
commercial hub of the town and only one block east of the county courthouse until a 
1939 theatre was built directly across from the entrance to the Oklahoma Agricultural and 
Mechanical College.11 The Griffith circuit meets the first of Gomery’s criteria.  As for 
stage shows and air conditioning, these may not have been as commonly used as in the 
urban Chicago setting.   
Although the Stillwater OPERA HOUSE at one time engaged both stage shows and 
movies, showmen in Oklahoma entered the business when movies were the dominant, 
crowd-pleasing amusement of the territory.  Exhibitors might include an occasional road 
company for live performances but the films being screened were the main attraction.  As 
Barry and Sargent pointed out in 1927, “the well-managed theatre is an evidence of the 
community’s progressiveness” (35).  Movies were the new, up-to-date entertainments.  
Stage performances in the Griffith theatres were usually limited to local talent shows, 
community little theatres, or school plays.  Some theatres provided neither movies or 
theatrics during the summer months; moviehouses sometimes closed on the hottest days 
of the year.  Air-conditioning in Oklahoma theatres was hampered by the slow 
electrification of the state.  Oklahoma City first tried to provide electricity in 1902, but 
the lighting ceremony went dark quickly and the crowds went home to read by gaslight.  
By 1904 a more reliable system, steam power fueled by natural gas, was introduced (OG 
& E).  In a smaller location like Stillwater, bringing electricity to the town was 
controversial and contentious.  “As early as 1894 a foreign company sent a representative 
here [to Stillwater] to offer the town electric current provided it could get a franchise that 
spanned two generations.  The council took no action.  The town was too poor and too 
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small for such new fangled ideas” (Cunningham 79).  Local newspapers editorialized on 
the need for electricity, but no action was taken until 1902.  The August 27 debate over 
the selection of a dynamo took so long that sleepy councilmen headed home to their beds 
and a quorum was not present at the end of the meeting.  Finally an order was placed in 
November, but when the equipment arrived in December contractual disputes arose; to 
some it appeared the dynamo was second-hand.  Cunningham quotes an incident reported 
in the Gazette: “It appears the city electrician and some of the men representing some 
electrical company had a few words, and nearly came to blows” (81).  Finally, in 1903, 
the dynamo was accepted but it was not until 1905 that the first electrical power plant 
was operating in Stillwater (Cunningham 83).  Early power plants had limited capacity 
and small town theatres were budget conscious (as noted with the concern that churches 
share the electrical bills if using a theatre’s facilities).  Edward Kinsila, self-described 
“architect and theatre specialist,” advised in 1917, “additional comfort may be afforded 
by an efficient heating and ventilating system.  Clean fresh air, introduced in proper 
quantities at the right temperature, is always appreciated by the public either in winter or 
in summer.  . . . Other things being equal, the house affording the best ventilation and 
most comfort will have the largest audience” (103-04).  Not until the 1948 Stillwater 
opening of the Leachman theatre in the 400 block of South Main did announcements of 
new construction include “Cooled by refrigeration” (Leachman).  Proper ventilation, a 
public health issue, certainly played a part in Griffith management, but air-conditioning 
came much after air-cooled theatres were the norm in Oklahoma.12 
Theatre building grew as the Griffith circuit grew.  Early theatres were storefronts 
quickly converted with rudimentary screen and chairs.  By the 1920s those storefronts 
34
were being remodeled to suggest a better class of moviehouse, but the building boom for 
this circuit came in the late 1920s through 1939, the time during which federal 
prosecutors began antitrust litigation against the Griffiths.  Throughout much of their 
moviehouse building, the Griffith circuit(s) employed only one contractor, Gates Corgan.  
He built or remodeled almost 100 theatres for the chain by 1939.  In that year, his 
architect son, Jack Corgan, designed Griffith’s CAMPUS THEATRE located directly across 
the street from Oklahoma A & M (Campus).  Safety was one of the major building 
considerations because of the high flammability of cellulose nitrate film stock and the 
public’s fears often fueled by anti-movie civic activists.  Providing a safe theatre earned 
good public relations.  For the Stillwater opening of the AGGIE THEATRE in the 600 block 
of Main Street, the Stillwater Gazette reported on 2 July 1926 that this moviehouse had 
been built with a fireproof projection room.  However, because Griffith growth relied 
more upon buyouts of existing theatres and circuits, buildings were often renovated rather 
than erected from the ground up.  These buyouts and the inclusion of former owners and 
managers under the Griffith corporate umbrella is an element of the circuit’s success that 
Gomery does not include in his list for profitable theatre chains.   
Much of the success of the Griffith enterprises rested upon employee loyalty, 
assuring a cohesive transition from the ownership of one company to another.  Local 
communities probably barely noticed any changes to the entertainment they enjoyed 
beyond, perhaps, the improved quality of the pictures they could attend that resulted from 
the buying power of the larger organization.  Beginning with the equitable 
standardization of payroll and pay scale, the Griffith organization established additional 
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employee benefits through the years that inspired dedicated service from long-term staff.  
A company manual opens by emphasizing:  
The founders of this company have consistently, from the beginning 
recognized the value of happy, satisfied and permanent employees.  They 
recognized the duty of management to care for and help the people who 
made this company their life’s work.  . . . Promotion from the rank has 
been an iron-clad rule.  No outsider has ever been moved over the heads of 
worthy men or women who were working for advancement” (Griffith 
Theatres, n.p.).   
This in-house publication, printed sometime after 1940, outlines programs established for 
the benefit of Griffith employees.  An “Employees Benefit Trust Fund” required “a 
contribution of 1% of salary made by each employee.”  A board of trustees manned by 
employee peers administered this fund to help “defray a portion of the expenses of 
medical care, surgical operation, and hospital confinement.”  Although an employee 
contribution was required, medical expenses of an individual employee could far exceed 
the money invested on an individual basis.  The next section of this company employee 
manual describes the “Salary Deduction Insurance” plan.  An “exclusive franchise” with 
the Houston-based Great Southern Life Insurance Company offering low, group-rate 
annual premiums provided “more than one million dollars of life insurance” for 
employees and their families.13 Again, employees contributed to this plan with weekly 
deductions, but the rates negotiated by the Griffith companies benefited staff with higher 
coverage.  An accidental death and dismemberment policy was provided through the 
John Hancock Life Insurance Company to supplement the life insurance already in place.  
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The company paid premiums for five thousand dollars per employee with more insurance 
available for employees who wished to pay additional premiums.  After 1932, to 
supplement Social Security payments, a retirement pension plan was put in place to 
guarantee retirement income at age 65 equal to two-thirds of an employee’s highest 
annual salary.  Griffith paid premiums over a 4% contribution from those on the company 
payroll.  A 1940 balance sheet shows a total value of the retirement pension trust at 
$47,836.38; by 1941 the value had risen to $66,135.05.  Managers and department heads 
were also given employee-controlled company stock.  By 1946, a profit sharing plan had 
been put into place for corporate office staff and theatre managers.  Except in particularly 
lean years, Christmas cash bonuses were distributed to all employees from custodians to 
upper level corporate department heads.  These generous benefits, even during the 
Depression, fostered employee loyalty to the circuit and its goals including customer 
service.    
Gomery lists service as the third consideration for success but in the case of the 
Griffith exhibition circuit the attention to theatre patrons was important but service to the 
community was considered essential.  The company mandated local community 
involvement for Griffith theatres across southwestern American towns.  The relatively 
stable theatre management, even after incorporation into the larger theatrical 
conglomerate, greatly contributed to success.  The many ways that local managers and 
other theatre employees interacted with and contributed to their towns deserves the 




1 From Shared Pleasures: A History of Movie Presentation in the United States (Madison: U of Wisconsin 
P, 1992) 29.  Gomery calls for increased study of film exhibition in this work. 
2 Film historian Benjamin Hampton was a vice president of American Tobacco and worked to merge 
Paramount and VLSE, a corporation combining Vitagraph, Lubin, Selig and Essanay studios.  When that 
plan failed, he resigned from the tobacco concern “and entered the production of motion pictures” in 1920 
(Hampton 150, 289) 
3 For accounts of exhibitor-initiated litigation to stop the block-booking policies of film distributors see 
Howard Lewis, Hampton, Ramsaye, and Jobes. 
4 The Griffith Collection, housed at the Oklahoma Historical Society, includes six cubic feet of corporate 
documents, primarily stockholder and board of director’s minutes.  (OHS also holds photographs of 
Griffith theatres.)  Parenthetical citations will be formatted to indicate both the box and the volume referred 
to in the text as for example: Griffith Box I, Vol. I. Because not all volumes include page numbers and 
because the dates of documents will provide access to materials, page numbers are not included in the 
citations for these materials.  These materials, rescued by Roger Rice and donated to OHS by his widow, 
enhance his recollections and reflections on the Griffith organizations.  Both Roger and his wife, Fern Rice 
were long-time employees of the circuit. 
5 L. C. and R. E. Griffith, and Underwood, as states rights distributors, would have been the sole Oklahoma 
distributors for the independent companies from which they had purchased films.  Film producers made 
states rights or territorial rights agreements as incentive to distributors to invest in the studios product.   
6 In 1926, OSFC consolidated with the Liberty Film Distributing Corporation, which served Louisiana, 
Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, and North and South 
Carolinas (Griffith Box I, Vol. I). 
7 See Kathryn Fuller and Barry and Sargent on the rationale and importance of theatre names. 
8 In addition to the Palace, the minutes mention the Princess, the Theatorium, and the Adelphos 
9 Edward Kinsila’s 1917 theatre construction guide includes a section on the airdome with specifications 
for size, seating, and architectural embellishments; “a touch of the bizarre and fantastic is by no means out 
of place.  A design of the conventionalized Egyptian, Byzantine or Chinese styles would, of course, be 
preferable to a mistaken attempt at originality leading only to triviality or vulgarity” (105). 
10 Griffith theatres in Oklahoma City and Tulsa did not compete with first-run studio venues, showing 
second or third run films in those cities. 
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11 Founded in 1890, Oklahoma A & M became Oklahoma State University in 1957. 
12 Early air cooled systems used a fan to blow air across blocks of ice into ductwork.  First used in 1917 in 
Balaban & Katz’s Central Park Theatre in Chicago, this system was modeled on one used in the 
meatpacking industry. 
13 The Great Southern Life Insurance Company played a major role in financing Griffith expansion, as will 





Serving the Community, Serving Theatre Patrons: 
Strategies for Local Exhibitors 
 
If there is no theatre competition, other amusements will attract the  
public.  There is no substitute for the hard-working, hard-thinking  
showman.  . . . The motion picture theatre manager should be a  
representative citizen.  He should be a showman.  He should be a  
keen business man.—John F. Barry and Epes W. Sargent1
In Douglas Gomery’s template of theatre success, service ranks third, after 
location and theatre building, but employee loyalty added considerable success to the 
Griffith organization.  That continuity of personnel helped to create the image of the 
theatre manager as a “representative citizen,” someone who cared about his community.  
“A changing management is a poor management.  An organization regularly recruiting 
lieutenants from the outside confesses weakness” (Ricketson 94).  For a big city movie 
chain like Balaban & Katz, good service for their paying customers in Chicago may have 
been sufficient to insure results at the box office, but for small town venues the 
manager’s role within his community directly affected attitudes about and attendance at 
his showplace.  And, as Barry and Sargent indicate, there were many other opportunities 
for leisure activities even in locations with but one theatre.2 Where competition for film 
fans existed, civic activities and creative promotional campaigns became even more 
important for profitable results.  They also created a safe, comfortable, and aesthetically 
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pleasing environment.  Film historians like Benjamin Hampton have chronicled the shift 
from novelty attraction to narrative form in filmmaking, noting that guaranteed early 
attendance rested upon the curiosity and wonderment of moving pictures; any subject 
could draw in the pedestrians from neighborhood sidewalks or central shopping 
boulevards.  Once the unfamiliar spectacle of viewing the cascading waters of Niagara 
Falls or the shapely ankle of Carmencita in a darkened storefront became an ordinary 
event, exhibitors needed new ways to entice customers into the theatre. 
Movie patrons, in general, grew tired of disconnected short subjects and film 
producers met the public’s waning interest with plays in digest form and hastily written 
original scenarios.3 “The insatiable public demand for films led to a ransacking of the 
available literature from stage and fiction” (Jowett 44).  Benjamin Hampton describes the 
rush of news reporters to cash in on the need for movie scenarios (30).  “Tens of 
thousands of eager amateur writers across the country . . . joined the silent film scenario-
writing craze, which rivaled only the writing of advertising jingles for contests as a 
national passion during the 1910s and early 1920s” (Fuller 126).  Although some have 
reported this shift as a means to lure a more refined middle class audience away from 
“legitimate” stage productions or vaudeville houses into the movie theatres, others 
indicate that business center locations always included a classless clientele.  The 
perception of early nickelodeon patrons as primarily of the lower classes or immigrant 
populations probably stems from the predominance of studies on metropolitan areas like 
New York City tied to the low cost of these entertainments.  As Russell Merritt points 
out, women and children on shopping expeditions soon became regular moviegoers, 
disproving the theoretical socioeconomic or ethnic composition of early audiences.4 In 
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Stillwater, with the exception of the OPERA HOUSE, theatres charged one admission price 
and there were no special seating areas; it was the “Democratic Art” that Jowett 
describes.5 Farm families sat along side bankers, judges, and store clerks enjoying the 
picture shows.  In addition to photoplays of better quality, the conditions within the 
movie houses began to improve, as much to maintain a competitive edge as to elevate the 
class or social status of customer traffic. 
 The first improvements centered on the theatre environment in terms of safety and 
comfort to dispel public concerns about the physically and morally unhealthy atmosphere 
of early exhibition sites.  Fire protection and ventilation were two important concerns.  In 
addition to fireproof projection booths, construction expert Kinsila recommended aisles 
“on each side of the auditorium . . . [should] empty into a street” and be five feet wide for 
theatres seating less than 600 “with six inches in width added for every 100 seats until 
1000 is reached” (97).  Such construction calmed the fears created by frequent news 
reports of theatre fires.6 Fires are always newsworthy and Oklahoma City’s The 
Oklahoman frequently gave prominent headlines and front page coverage to theatre fires 
and panic-related deaths; most, however, reported on locations around the globe with 
only a few within state borders.  During labor disputes with stagehands and projectionists 
in 1929 and 1930, arson attempts received coverage.  A storage room of the AZTEC 
THEATRE in Enid was chemically torched on 27 June 1930.  “Patrons in the theater during 
the fire were not disturbed; smoke from the chemicals did not reach the auditorium” 
(Oklahoman 4).  A similar incident occurred at the PALACE THEATRE in Oklahoma City 
on 26 July of that same year.  Griffith Amusement Company was one of the sponsors of a 
$1000 reward for information on the firebombing; the “Open Shop Division” of the 
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Chamber of Commerce also supported this effort (Oklahoman 15).7 Although projection 
room fires frequently occurred (usually through projectionist negligence), causing 
concern for public safety, many theatre fires were caused by faulty wiring as well.  In 
either case, the threat of a fire in a crowded public space was a serious concern and safety 
measures in new construction were effective marketing tools for cinema owners.   
Health issues were raised long before the fire dangers of nitrate film were 
understood.  For some reformers, this was a paternalistic attempt to protect the poor, 
perceived as the majority of the audiences, but for many the dire warnings of disease 
masked a fear of moral not physical decay.  However, the Spanish influenza pandemic in 
1918 did provide a real health reason for closing movie houses across the country, 
including some in Oklahoma.  By October 5, with servicemen at Fort Sill a primary 
concern, “all theatres and other places of amusement” were closed and civic and church 
meetings were postponed in the area (Oklahoman 31).   On October 9 The Oklahoman 
reported: “Every public school, theater and church in Oklahoma City will be closed 
today, and all public gatherings will be prohibited .  .  .The closing order . . . will remain 
in force until all danger of contracting the disease in public places has passed.”  Early in 
December, the epidemic had subsided in Oklahoma City but the state health 
commissioner, Dr. J. W. Duke, warned, “Pictures shows should be regulated.  No 
crowding should be permitted and precautions taken to insure the purity of the air” (The 
Oklahoman, 7 December 1918, 5).9 To maintain safe conditions, managers at a Fox 
Inter-Mountain convention in Colorado were advised to personally inspect the entire 
theatre facility on a weekly basis with written reports to document the condition of 
equipment and furnishings.  A “theatre inspection [should be as] rigid and thorough as on 
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shipboard” (Ricketson 176).  Once these concerns for the public welfare had been served 
(and compliance with local codes had been met) exhibitors turned to the comfort and 
aesthetics of their theatres, and the earliest picture palace prototypes began to appear.  
Even in small towns theatre décor became grander and more exotic.   
Themed theatre facades and interiors became the norm, displaying Moroccan or 
Italianate splendors of fabric, tile, and stucco.  Kinsila advised, “The decoration of the 
motion picture auditorium may be more ornamental than that of an ordinary theatre, the 
better to satisfy a more general taste.  The exposed front and entrance lobby should, 
however, be the most striking feature” (99).  Modern design elements also came into 
play, as theatre seating became not only plush, but also ergonomic.  Griffith theatres 
could hardly compete with the luxury of a ROXY or a Fox movie palace but the circuit’s 
facilities offered a taste of more metropolitan locations.  10 The 1926 opening of the 
AGGIE THEATRE in Stillwater created excitement in the Stillwater Gazette. With the most 
up-to-date design, the fireproof projection room was flanked on one side by a special 
room for crying babies.  Mothers could remove themselves and their cranky infants to a 
soundproof glass-fronted room to continue their enjoyment of a film without disturbing 
the general audience.  On the opposite side of the projectionist’s booth a private box with 
seating for up to 27 was available for groups and parties.  The presence of dressing rooms 
indicated that other entertainments were to be included at the AGGIE (2 July 1926).  
Commercial office and retail space occupied the remainder of the building, typical of 
theatre sites at the time.  “Increased competition in .  .  .many small-towns brought a 
second generation of permanent theaters . . . Many [exhibitors] invested in new structures 
that combined theaters with rent-producing retail shops.  Interiors and exteriors of movie 
44
theaters became more elegant, organized, and spacious” (Fuller 73).  The much-
anticipated grand opening of the AGGIE with city and county notables, and studio 
representatives from Oklahoma City’s “film row” in attendance occurred on 17 
September 1926.  In 1948, as Griffith Amusement was preparing to open a fourth theatre 
in Stillwater (the LEACHMAN), the AGGIE burned at a loss of about $100,000 including 
equipment for the new theatre that had been stored on the floor above the auditorium.  A 
much-expanded fire department since the days of the FIRE BOYS responded with six fire 
trucks, saving adjoining businesses from the inferno (Stillwater Daily Press, 19
January).11 Until the restored and improved AGGIE could reopen, the CAMPUS THEATRE 
changed its student-oriented program from “B” to “A” feature films (The Griffith’s 
MECCA on Main Street screened “B” films).  The new AGGIE would seat 900 with a 
modern façade and interior, and a “Confection Room” just off the lobby.  Circulating heat 
and air-conditioning were to be installed for the audience’s comfort.  Once the AGGIE 
was again in operation, plans were in place for the expansion and technical upgrade of the 
CAMPUS. The 1948 LEACHMAN souvenir program described the improvements for the 
CAMPUS to include an additional 300 seats, as the theater was to be “completely re-seated 
with correct posture easy chairs.”  “New sound and projection equipment” were also 
scheduled for installation.  The lobby was to be expanded for a “more majestic 
appearance” and a larger, more convenient concession area was planned.  “At the time of 
its [1939] opening, it was listed as one of the nine best theatres erected that year.”  The 
program does not explain what geographical area that “best of” included.  A 600 car 
capacity drive-in was also announced in the LEACHMAN opening night program.  “Like 
rival department store owners, managers of competing picture palaces vied to introduce 
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more and more luxuries for their clientele” (Fuller 111).  The Griffith theatres were to be 
well-appointed and dedicated to customer comfort. 
Along with grander more comfortable theatre facilities, came attention to 
customer service.  Trade journals, like Motion Picture World, emphasized that any 
amenities that would make the moviegoer feel pampered would improve customer 
loyalty.  A uniformed doorman armed with a large umbrella to approach arriving 
automobiles during inclement weather was considered a valuable asset.  For patrons 
departing the theatre on a rainy night, umbrellas loaned on the honor system sent 
customers home both dry and well disposed to that particular cinema.  Clean, 
comfortable, and spacious men’s and ladies lounges, preferably with solicitous 
attendants, made a theatergoer feel more important.  Writing desks were suggested but 
exactly what one might write while at the moving picture show was not made clear.12 
The most important service for the success of a theatre was the courtesy and 
efficiency of the staff.  Trade publications and management manuals outlined both 
military style dress and demeanor with specific, silent hand signals to communicate 
among the ushers where empty seats were located.  Ricketson advised Fox employees to 
“study your hand signals and perfect them so that seating may be accomplished rapidly 
and without confusion” (131).  For the small town theatre, the staff had the extra 
advantage of addressing patrons by name, asking after family members, and 
remembering personal details, while treating moviegoers with respectful regard for their 
comfort.  Barry and Sargent outline general rules for theatre employees, noting, “too stiff 
and too formal a bearing makes the democratic patron feel that there ‘is something 
wrong.’ A simple sincere welcome is desired.  . . . Courtesy, consideration, interest, and 
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helpfulness should be cheery and pleasant” (63).  They continued, “Employees should be 
on the alert to tender every possible service, such as holding coats, opening doors, 
assisting children and the infirm, etc.”  For theatre staff, these showmen created a nine-
point list for effective conduct.  In addition to the ban on chewing gum, tobacco use, and 
snacks, Barry and Sargent stressed the value of knowledge about both the current feature 
and coming attractions.  They recommended that both the manager and the cashier should 
read fan magazines regularly to be “up to date.”  Theatre cleanliness and safety practices 
were to be a consideration for every employee.   Cashiers provided a first impression; 
therefore, “The box office should not be a makeup booth.”  For ticket takers and ushers, a 
smile, careful attention to dress, and good posture were essential (Barry and Sargent 64-
65).  Griffith exhibition sites located in twelve college towns employed students as ushers 
and usherettes, as well as cashiers and many went on to join the management ranks of the 
Griffith chain (Rice 10).  In a special edition of the Stillwater Daily Press welcoming 
students to the city, the LEACHMAN manager (Claude Leachman) emphasized “cashiers .  
. .trained to make . . . change quickly” and that every employee was “schooled to meet 
any emergency” (30 August 1942).  The opening night program boasted that “many 
young men and women received their education in the Stillwater schools and in 
Oklahoma A. and M. College through their employment in the Griffith-Leachman 
Theatres.”  With the help of these student employees, the program could promise, 
“Courteous attendants will look after your every want . . . in every way your comfort has 
been provided for.”  The efficiency and demeanor of theatre staff directly affected local 
success.  Once improvements in both facilities and staff were in place, customers needed 
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to be reminded that no expense had been spared to provide a safe, luxurious environment 
and deferential theatre personnel—particularly in small towns with rival theatres. 
Towns with competing theatres tested the promotional and marketing skills of 
management to attract customers.  Exhibitors traded news of successful bookings and 
effective sales gimmicks in publications targeted to theatre management.  Advertising 
was, of course, the first step to promote the theatre and its offerings—to alert the public 
to both the quality of programs and the quality of service.  As Barry and Sargent 
emphasized, advertising required careful planning to earn the best return on investments 
with newspapers often charging “amusement rates” as much as “290 percent higher” than 
standard rates (330).  In Stillwater one independent theatre, the CAMERA, competed with 
the Griffith theatres for market share.13 Both the CAMERA and the circuit’s theatres 
regularly advertised their thrice-weekly program changes as well as special events in their 
auditoriums.  Ads for the CAMERA usually measured one to three column inches; the 
three Griffith theatres (MECCA, AGGIE and CAMPUS) bought three to six column inches.  
Special screenings for films like Snow White at the CAMERA in May 1938 and Gone With 
The Wind in March 1940 (with all seats reserved) doubled in column space.14 Usually the 
film announcements shared the page with society notes detailing the locals’ travels or 
visits by out-of-towners.  Occasionally the Gazette printed studio puffery on Hollywood 
stars or starlets.  Beginning in March of 1940, the CAMERA, along with local merchants 
such as grocers, car dealers, and feed stores, bought almost full-page space titled “Talk of 
the Town.”  The CAMERA program occupied the central area surrounded by promotions 
for other businesses, each of which included the name of an area resident.  If “Pete 
Volmer, East of Stillwater” or some other lucky reader spotted his or her name, they were 
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instructed to “cut out the ad and present it to the merchant for FREE admission to the 
Camera Theatre” (Gazette, 13 March 1940).  An earlier CAMERA promotion tied the 
opening of Wednesday’s Child with a coupon giveaway for Lux soap to be redeemed at 
participating grocery stores; the film’s star, Karen Morley endorsed the product (Gazette,
22 February 1935).  The CAMERA also screened “public service” road shows on occasion.  
In 1939 a large ad in the Stillwater Daily Press announced “The Picture That Belongs to 
Humanity,” The Birth of A Baby, sponsored by the American Committee on Maternal 
Welfare, a national group of gynecologists and obstetricians (7 March).15 A more 
dubious road show presentation played in December of 1948.  Mom and Dad, a Hygienic 
Productions film, was “shown to segregated audiences only” with two screenings for 
women and one for men.  Elliot Forbes, a “Famous Radio Commentator,” lectured on 
“secrets of sensible sex.”   This was a “fourwaller;” Kroger Babb the producer/promoter 
rented the theatre for the run of the show, which in small towns was usually two or three 
days.  The CAMERA owner was paid rent for the use of his auditorium and Babb pocketed 
all the profits, including the lucrative sale of two books pitched by Forbes.  With road 
shows scattered across the country, “there were actually 26 Elliot Forbses” (Briggs).16 
The educational value may have been dubious but the show kept the town talking for 
weeks. 
The MECCA (formerly the ABBOTT prior to Griffith purchase) had taken another 
sensational route, concentrating on true crime.  On 6 April 1934, ads appeared for Sucker 
Money billed as “Greater than a Motion Picture: A True Life Story of Today,” which 
dealt with a banker’s daughter manipulated by a sham spiritualist.  The real draw, 
however, was the personal appearance of Geraldine Arnold describing “her own true 
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story of how America’s two most desperate criminals, George (Machine Gun) Kelly and 
Kathryn Kelly, whisked her from her parents, and used her as a ‘FRONT’ to elude the 
officers of the law” (Gazette).  With the Kelly’s kidnapping of Charles Urschel in 
Oklahoma City in July of 1933, Miss Arnold’s engagement at a local movie house would 
have been a popular ticket.17 Cooking school shows also took center stage as special 
women’s events.  Instructional films were accompanied by food preparation 
demonstrations and merchandise for sale at Griffith cinemas.  The Motion Picture 
Cooking School produced films such as Star in My Kitchen, thin domestic narratives that 
featured aspiring studio starlets providing “suggestions for efficient home-making . . . 
[and] beauty secrets” (Daily Press, 19 April 1930).  In addition to announcing film 
offerings, the Griffith theatres often ran large institutional ads reminding the public of 
“our every day service” which included “personal courtesy,” “quiet and pleasant 
surroundings,” “health and comfort,” and “safety;” these ads usually also pitched the 
Mrs.  Stover’s Bungalow Candy Concessions attached to the theatres (Daily Press, 30
August 1942).  During the summer months of 1936, program announcements were 
headed with icicles and polar bears and accompanied with copy extolling the theatres as 
“always cool,” “where the cool breezes blow,” and where “Jack Frost is working for us” 
(Daily Press, Gazette June, July 1936).  On at least one occasion the AGGIE boasted that a 
film was “a guaranteed money back picture” if the moviegoers were not satisfied (Daily 
Press, 4 April 1939).  The Griffith offices in Oklahoma City provided advertising copy 
and layout, an example of one cost-cutting benefit of centralized operations for the 
circuit.   These competing advertisements were designed not only to inform the public 
about coming attractions but also to indicate that customers were receiving more than a 
50
moving picture from these theatres.  These establishments that could provide educational 
programs, however questionable they might seem in retrospect, as well as courteous 
service for their home town patrons. 
Small town theatres could connect with local movie madness by producing films 
on city streets or at public events to draw the curious into their movie houses for a 
glimpse of themselves on the big screen.  By 1915 Sargent was recommending that 
theatre owners make their own movies and advised that the film editors should allow 
enough time for audience members to identify local players in each scene (248).   Both 
the CAMERA and the Griffith theatres used this activity with success.  By 1938, the 
competing movie houses were often going head-to-head on the same evening, screening 
films shot in Stillwater.  The CAMERA manager was the first to initiate homegrown 
movies and won bragging rights for producing the most films locally.  A Daily Press 
article of 2 February 1938 announced that “chief cameraman R. Miller and a crew of able 
assistants” would be “on the downtown streets taking movie pictures” at no charge to the 
public.  Locals, ready for their close ups, could rest assured that this was a professional 
undertaking because “Miller has filmed many of the famous stars of stage and screen.”  
By March 3rd the CAMERA advertised these films for Thursday and Friday screenings as 
“Real Hollywood Home Town Movies,” advising the Daily Press readers that “The 
whole town will be at this theatre to look at your pictures.”  Attendance meant “see[ing] 
yourself as others see you!”  As an added incentive, patrons could also “see the No.  1 
Carl Wetzel Well Come in at Paradise, Okla.” along with the regular feature (3 March 
1938).   
51
Advertising for the next hometown movies were a bit more titillating.  CAMERA 
ads challenged the audience to “Decide—Are College Students or Local Romeos and 
Juliettes The Best Lovers? . . . Stillwater’s Own Screen Lovers In Action! . . . Learn The 
Truth About College Love! . . . See Actual Uncensored Movies Scenes Filmed at Theta 
Pond on Campus,” fueling some good-natured town and gown rivalry (Daily Press, 5
April 1938).  Late in April, the CAMERA ran a small ad for new “Home Town Movies” to 
include a recent “89ers Parade.”  Next to this announcement, Griffith’s AGGIE THEATRE 
topped the competition with an ad four times as large promoting “Local Movies of 
Yesteryear . . . Local Events of Today” implying that this organization had been involved 
in film production long before its rival.  Local events were tied to international news with 
an “Extra! March of Time!” and a national expose on “Crime and Prisons” with the “first 
authentic pictures of life behind United States Prison Bars.”  The Aggie also received 
press coverage in an article about the upcoming local films (Daily Press, 28 April 1938).  
Three days later, the Camera placed a large ad reminding the public that this theatre now 
had “Hometown Movies No.  3,” offering a double feature of local coverage.  “Notice: 
Our Last Home Town Movie will also be Shown on the Same Program Along with Our 
New Local Movie!  See your own Close-up on the Screen, Together with 5,000 Laughs!”  
Along with this larger advertisement came a news report of the latest CAMERA 
contribution to the “movie wars” in Stillwater, advising the reader that “the film was 
tested in a special preview . . .  .  They include a comprehensive study of Stillwater from 
the air, having been made recently by Al Guthrie’s Searcy airport plane.”  Not only were 
there thousands of laughs to be had, but also this production was educational (Daily 
Press, 1 May 1938).  It appears that items were newsworthy in direct proportion to the 
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amount of revenue the press earned in advertising dollars.  Although the Griffith theatres 
produced fewer Stillwater films, they recycled them effectively.  Originally filmed in 
1931, they were screened commercially again in 1938 and privately for the Rotary Club 
in 1947 (Gazette, 1 April 1947).18 Traditional charity events probably gained more civic 
good will but local scenes drew inquisitive small town audiences eager to see themselves 
in the movies. 
Regardless of advertising dollars, activities for social programs or communal 
amusement received news coverage.  Sargent describes some very elaborate “schemes” 
(his term) to involve townsfolk.  The give-away-a-baby-promotion surely raised 
eyebrows and drew both the curious and the outraged to the show to learn that a piglet 
was the prize.  In the name of public health, probably the oddest publicity campaign was 
the “Swat The Fly Club.”  Theatre owners provided cheap fly swatters to local children 
who earned points for weekly, monthly and seasonal cash prizes.  Card-carrying members 
of this club brought their weekly kill for a weigh-in and once a good collection had 
accumulated the flies were proudly displayed in the theatre lobby.  Sargent suggests, 
“Some night after the collection of flies has become important looking, take them out, 
fasten a cigar box to the bottom [of the display container], covering it with flies.  As the 
collection proceeds you can add a cigar box from time to time.”  This impressive display 
was to be accompanied with public health pamphlets and lectures on the dangers of fly-
borne disease (232-33).  He advised that managers steer clear of the “Catch the Rat” 
campaign because “Women will not want to come to the theatre if small boys with their 
pockets full of dead rats are apt to be hanging around” (Sargent 233).  There are no 
records that a public health promotion such as this ever took place in a Stillwater theatre 
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but other of Sargent’s suggestions like talent or beauty contests and competitions between 
schools or other organizations were often used.  A “Miss Stillwater” won the opportunity 
from the AGGIE to spend a week in Oklahoma City “appearing in [a] production of the 
talking movie, ‘Oklahoma Sweetheart” (Gazette, 7 July 1933).  The winner of a “Tiny 
Tot Revue” at the CAMERA won an all expenses paid trip to the Pan-American Exposition 
in Dallas for herself and her mother (Gazette 2 July 1937).  Earlier, in 1926, the CAMERA 
owner sponsored a screening of Peck’s Bad Boy to benefit a playground fund for a local 
PTA (Gazette 5 February 1926).  Playground equipment must have been costly; in the 
previous year the ABBOTT had hosted a PTA show for the same purpose (Gazette, 20
March 1925).  A “Spuds Show” was a common good-will promotion to aid needy 
families in a trading area.  A pound of potatoes replaced the cost of a movie ticket.  The 
AGGIE hosted a Christmas show sponsored by a local Boy Scout troop.  “Manager Claude 
Leachman offered the scouts his picture house, gratis” and Scoutmaster Bullock 
expressed his hope that “little folks and old folks who can spare a pound of beans or 
potatoes from the family larder” would pack the theatre.  In exchange for the pound of 
produce, the audience had the opportunity “to see several reels of hilarious movies, watch 
Seymour Davis, local magician, take rabbits out of hats and to get a long look at Santa 
Claus” (Gazette, 18 December 1931).  Later in the 1930s, potatoes were replaced with 
Christmas toy drives for needy children.  New or old toys were accepted with boy scouts 
painting and repairing as needed before the local Goodfellows distributed these 
donations.  Advertisements for this event appeared in the Stillwater Daily Press for three 
successive years (18 December 1936, 3 December, 1937, and 15 December 1938).  To 
keep summer vacationing school children busy and out of trouble, the city provided a 
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playground program and the MECCA offered free safety movies (Gazette, 24 June 1938).  
Leachman also offered free kiddie shows annually at one of the Griffith theatres he 
managed to celebrate his daughter’s birthday.  These benefit screenings created good will 
and new customers who had many movie choices in Stillwater. 
 Even areas served by only one theatre offered many outlets for leisure activity to 
compete with the local movie house.   In Stillwater, there were many non-commercial 
venues for film consumption.   Local merchants used motion pictures to garner positive 
public recognition.  For example, the Roy T. Hoke Lumber Company and the Keystone 
Steel & Wire Company of Peoria, Illinois, sponsored “Talkie Movies” at the Husband 
Street Christian Church showing an “entertaining five-reel farm drama,” “a race track 
comedy,” and an industrial on “modern steel and wire mills,” with “valuable prizes given 
free” (Gazette, 27 September 1935).  The Automobile Department of the Farmer’s 
Cooperative, Inc.  offered a “Free Talking Picture Show;” the evening’s program featured 
“a two-reel comedy . . . of American life,” “a thrilling educational picture, Safe and 
Sound, and a Burton Holmes travel picture, Ethiopia” (Gazette, 24 March 1936).  Later 
that same year, the local fire department sponsored a free showing of Oxygen Therapy 
provided by the Linde Oxygen Company (Gazette, 13 November 1936).  The Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) provided dinner and a show, screening The 
Beneficent Reprobate at the First Methodist Church on 19 March 1937 (Gazette).19 
Teenage entrepreneurs held the first film premiere in Stillwater in 1939.  The Comet 
Amateur Motion Picture Company attracted an audience of fifty for The Temptress 
shown in a remodeled garage; film shorts included a newsreel of a “recent safety parade,” 
“color pictures of the Sullins’ recent trip to California,” and California or Bust which was 
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“simply bursting with clever ideas” (Gazette, 27 October 1939).  Film stars sometimes 
visited the city as well.  The Tom Mix Circus and Wild West Show came to town in 
1935; Tex Ritter brought his cowboy troupe in 1938; and, Jeanette MacDonald headlined 
a College-Lyceum series in 1939 (Gazette, 2 October, Daily Press 14 March, Gazette 12
January).  The perennially active Allied Arts organization sponsored a five event series 
offering a Metropolitan Opera baritone, a Silly Symphonies comic dance team, the 
American Repertory Theatre group, an illustrated lecture by Rockwell Kent artist and 
adventurer, and a guitar recital by Andres Segovia—all for a $3.00 “season reservation” 
(Daily Press, 6 February 1938).  “Monster” vaudeville tent shows and carnivals with 
rides and “clean amusements” like a “colored minstrel show” entertained Payne county 
residents each spring.  More parochial entertainments were often available: Christmas 
sing-alongs with the Stillwater Choral Union, American Legion and fraternal 
organization barbeques, dances, and patriotic displays, and book reviews at the public 
library.  College homecoming and athletic events drew crowds.  For “foreign” football 
games, i.e.  away games, Western-Union provided electronic grid-graph play-by-play 
coverage in the A & M gymnasium; home games aired on the radio (Gazette 1 October 
1926).  Add to this the county fair, potluck suppers, and ice cream socials, to name but a 
few more activities, and it becomes clear that even a small town could provide a busy 
social scene.  With so many pastimes, Stillwater showmen needed to offer services and 
programming that could tempt the townsfolk to spend their nickels or dimes at the picture 
shows.  In later chapters, more of the theatre manager’s community service role will be 
discussed as those efforts relate to government intervention, local reform campaigns, and 
wartime activities.     
56
Notes: 
1 From Building Theatre Patronage: Management and Merchandising (New York: Chalmers, 1927) 34.  
Barry and Sargent provide a “how to” guide for theatre management. 
2 Waller’s Main Street Amusements provides an excellent examination of the many entertainments and 
pastimes available to the residents of Lexington, Kentucky during the silent film era.  Kathryn Fuller 
devotes a chapter to alternative film exhibition sites in small town America, such as churches and schools. 
3 Richard Abel demonstrates that nonfiction travelogues, industrial films, and sporting events remained 
popular through the early 1900s, although these film shorts all displayed a thematic continuity.  See 
especially “entr’acte 4” (171-180).   
4 This does not mean that silent films were not a means of assimilation and acculturation for the immigrants 
newly arrived in America.  This was but one role of early moving pictures.   
5 There are no indications in either Griffith company records or Stillwater newspapers on accommodations 
for African-American patrons.  The census of 1920 lists the total population in Payne County at 36,180 
with a “Negro” population of 1,208, or slightly over 3% of the total.  A Gazette article on 2 December 1926 
indicated a population of six thousand in Stillwater; of 1695 public school students 32 were “Negro.” There 
may have been unspoken rules on where blacks would be allowed to sit but there is no evidence of any 
public policy.  There are several articles about a highly respected African-American projectionist in the 
Stillwater press.  Waller, in Main Street Amusements, details seating and entrance arrangements for black 
audiences, as well as theatres for “Negroes” only that were sometimes owned by African-Americans.    
6 One of the most infamous theatre fires in the United States occurred in Chicago on 30 December 1903 at 
the IROQUOIS where some 600 audience members were killed.  A later investigation determined 
noncompliance with city fire codes, as well as an inadequately trained staff in the newly opened movie 
house (Lest We Forget).   
7 David Robinson notes that with long hours and the youth of some projectionists, attempts to unionize 
began as early as 1907 (98). 
8 With an abundance of patent medicine cures in its pages, it appears that one result of this epidemic was 
increased advertising revenue for The Oklahoman. Liquor became one suggested cure and a 15 October 
header read “’Flu’ Jumps Whiskey to $18 Quart: Police Deal Out Small Bottles on Doctors’ Orders” 
(Oklahoman).  Conspiracy theories also found their way into the press in numerous articles suggesting that 
German spies would release the influenza virus in movie theatres. 
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9 For a classic discussion of picture palaces see Hall.  And for a beautifully illustrated recent work see 
Melnick and Fuchs. 
10 The Stillwater Gazette will be cited as Gazette and the Stillwater Daily Press will be indicated as the 
Daily Press.
11 The equivalent today would be a lobby with wireless Internet service. 
12 The CAMERA, first owned by C. D. Jackson was sold to showman F. M. Tull in 1930 (Gazette, 23 May).  
Tull had operated theatres in Shawnee and the FOLLY in Oklahoma City, a theatre he sold after labor 
disputes in 1917 (Stewart 91).  In addition to buying the existing theatre, this new owner purchased two lots 
in the 600 block of Main Street and planned a new $75,000 movie house.  The new theatre was never built 
due to problems in gaining clear title to the land.  The Griffith brothers purchased the ABBOTT, the other 
independent theatre, in 1926. 
13 These dates give an indication of the clearance time from film release to screening in second-run theatres 
in small town Oklahoma.  Snow White premiered on 26 December in 1937; Gone With The Wind opened on 
14 December 1939.  During the one-week run of Selznick’s blockbuster, reserved seating tickets were on 
sale for Grand Hotel.
15 Produced by Jack H. Skirball, who later produced two Alfred Hitchcock films, Daily Press ad copy 
touted the opportunity to “Hear the screen’s supreme thrill . . . the vibrant beat of a baby’s heart before it’s 
born!” 
16 Two women costumed as nurses to aid women experiencing physical distress from the screening passed 
through the audience selling the paperbacks, compilations of information culled from public health 
department publications.  Briggs reports that this film continued into the 1970s on drive-in programs. 
17 Some accounts indicate that Geraldine’s unemployed parents were paid to “borrow” the child, creating 
the appearance of a family unit.  Some reports credit the twelve-year-old Geraldine as the informant that 
led to the Kellys Memphis arrest in September 1933.  Less than a year later, she was in Stillwater 
supporting her family by telling her version of the story.  In 1929, The Oklahoman reported kidnap threats 
on prominent Shawnee businessmen.  In addition to bankers and merchants, two theatre managers were 
targeted.  A. F. Hornbeck managed three Griffith theatres that were protected by private detectives during 
the kidnap scare.  One banker paid extortion money and was held captive briefly in Kansas City 
(Oklahoman15 October, 1). 
18 The AGGIE provided an additional public service by posting “[November] election returns between short 
subjects” (Gazette, 3 November 1944). 
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19 “The WCTU's Department for the Promotion of Purity in Literature and Art, established in 1883, . . . 
supported the creation of a pure literary, artistic, and leisure culture, as well as legal censorship.”  






The Griffith Brothers Circuit(s), 1926-1939 
 
Past efforts to secure control of the moving picture business  
have been through control of the big stars.  This principle is 
fundamentally wrong.  Control of this great industry is coincident  
with the control of its source of revenue, namely, the theater . . .  .   
It is only fair to assume that, at the present time, the destinies of the  
United States—social, commercial and political—lie largely within  
the power of the motion picture theater.—Alfred S. Black1
Although the commercial survival of the United States never relied upon box 
office receipts, the Griffith brothers and the leaders of the motion picture industry 
understood the financial importance of exhibition sites.  By 1926 the brothers held 
interests in approximately 19 theatres in Oklahoma and Texas, a large increase in less 
than ten years for what might be considered to have been an under-financed venture.   An 
even greater expansion occurred in the next decade; in 1936 the circuit included 125 
theatres in 58 towns in three states with the addition of properties in New Mexico.  In 
1939, R. E. and H. J. each left Griffith Amusement to become independent showmen; R. 
E., operating from Dallas, took with him some 31 theatres located in Texas and New 
Mexico.2 H. J. relocated to Kansas City, Missouri to start his own circuit.  With these 
changes in the late 30s, the original Griffith business consisted of 94 theatres in 39 towns 
by 1940, growing to 156 theatres in 49 towns by 1943 (Rice 130-31).  Throughout the 
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years, aggressive expansion remained a corporate philosophy for the brothers whether 
working together or as leaders of their own companies.   
The rapid increase in theater properties beginning in 1926 arose from several 
factors.  As noted, the circuit had established corporate headquarters in Oklahoma City to 
centralize booking, distribution, advertising, and equipment purchase and maintenance.  
These offices on North Lee were in close proximity to distribution offices for the 
Hollywood studios.  Comprehensive corporate policies had been established and 
management continuity was in place in each of the Griffith towns.  Expansion required 
capital, and when Universal began courting the brothers in 1926, many stockholders 
balked at a partnership with the studio; some felt the company was expanding too rapidly, 
while others were reluctant to share a fifty-fifty partnership with a Hollywood 
corporation.  To take advantage of this opportunity for additional expansion with new 
financial support, the brothers and some like-minded stockholders in the original 
Oklahoma Specialty Film Company started a new movie business entity, the Griffith 
Amusement Company, incorporated in Wilmington, Delaware on 14 August 1926.3
Now able to negotiate with Universal, an alliance with the studio was formed as 
Universal Chain Theatrical Enterprises, Inc.  with an agreement to transfer Griffith 
Amusement stock to this new corporate entity.  During 1926, Griffith Amusement added 
at least fourteen theatres and commercial lots for future movie houses in five locations, 
including purchases in Stillwater and Enid, two of the three towns of importance in future 
antitrust litigation (Griffith Box 4, Vol. I).  It is not clear when Griffith and Universal 
parted ways.  When antitrust suits were being argued, court documents state, “The 
contract with the Universal Chain continued in force and effective until sometime in 1928 
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when difficulty was encountered by Griffith Amusement Company in procuring 
advancement of funds from the Universal Chain, and the contract was terminated” 
(Federal Supplement Vol. 68).  Griffith board of directors’ minutes of 19 May 1927 
indicate that Universal desired a dividend payment on the current $121,128.87 cash 
surplus and profit but it was voted instead to reinvest “in property and equipment” 
(Griffith Box 4, Vol. I).  If Universal held a 50% interest in Griffith Amusement, records 
do not explain how the studio’s demand for a dividend was defeated although an 
amended contract in 1930 indicates that the Griffith Brothers, as a separate entity, were 
also parties in the original agreement.  Universal may have underestimated the loyalty of 
Griffith stockholders and the handpicked board of directors that included at least one 
brother in any year.  These events suggest a schism in the goals of Griffith and Universal.  
Howard T. Lewis claims that Universal’s expansion into theatre ownership rested more 
on profit than on expanding outlets for the studio’s movies.  He wrote: 
 Although the company’s [Universal’s] attention originally had been 
 attracted to the field of theater operation by its need for controlled outlets, 
 its executives considered that its primary interest in the operation of 
 theaters was centered in the profits to be derived from that operation.  An 
 additional incentive for acquiring controlled outlets was the expectation 
 that the theaters so acquired would constitute points of contact with the 
 public which would enable the company to judge public taste more 
accurately.  (475) 
Universal wanted to generate capital from the circuit but the Griffiths wanted studio 
capital to finance further expansion.  Griffith records include amended contracts with 
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Universal that describe the studio’s financial participation in Griffith Amusement and the 
level of indebtedness the circuit had reached in this partnership. 
 On 27 March 1930, two years after the 1928 contractual dissolution described in 
court records, seven amendments to the original agreement of 1926 were signed (Griffith 
Box 4, Vol. I).  This document, in addition to some correction of punctuation, reveals that 
Universal would no longer have an obligation to provide financing to the chain:  
“UNIVERSAL [Chain Theatrical Enterprises, Inc.]  is under no obligation or liability 
whatsoever to make any advances or loans to the Corporation and any claims which the 
Corporation may have heretofore made for such advances are hereby expressly cancelled 
and waived” (Griffith Box 4 Vol. I).  The fourth amendment describes a debt of $247,000 
owed to Universal Pictures Corp.  This agreement indicates that the brothers will be 
retained on a yearly contract with L. C. and R. E. receiving a weekly salary of $300.  A 
non-competitive clause was also added; Universal Consolidated and the brothers could 
not establish competing theatres in towns with existing Griffith Amusement movie 
houses.  To avoid an appearance of possibly illegal movie rentals, anticipating the 
government prosecution initiated in 1939, a final clause explained, “the officers of the 
Griffith Amusement Company shall not be permitted to make any concessions of any 
natures for the purpose of obtaining concessions from producers or distributors for the 
benefit of the houses owned or operated by the Griffiths individually” (Griffith Box 4 
Vol. I).   Earlier in 1928, Griffith Amusement board minutes discussed the need for loans 
from the Farmer’s National Bank and the Liberty National Bank of Oklahoma City to pay 
notes held by Universal Consolidated.    
63
It appears bank financing was forthcoming, as the Board of Directors minutes of 8 
June 1932 indicate an indebtedness that had been reduced to $104,000 after a $25,000 
payment on 1 June.  A plan was approved to pay $590 weekly on the balance of the 
corporation’s debt to Universal (Griffith Box 5 Vol.1).  This debt to Universal was again 
renegotiated 26 March 1934 as corporate documents indicate.  The new agreement 
included a two-year extension on promissory notes valued at $109,335.55 with one-third 
of the total owed to the Universal Theatrical Chain and the balance owed to Universal 
Studios.  The agreement included a seven percent interest rate and the agreement to pay 
quarterly “all net cash receipts” after maintaining a balance of $20,000 (Griffith Box 5 
Vol. 1).  Although this arrangement might seem counterproductive to any continued 
expansion of the Griffith holdings, the incorporation of Consolidated Theatres in 1929 
complicates the picture.4
With the brothers holding stock in both Consolidated and Griffith Amusement, 
along with former theatre owners or current theatres managers as major stockholders, if 
an expansion avenue was blocked for one organization, the other board of directors could 
act.  The 1939 departure of R. E. and H. J. to form their own companies may well have 
been less about removing themselves from the shadow of L. C. and more about 
complicating the corporate tangle and antitrust charges.  In a personal interview, Paul 
Liebmann, a Griffith relative and employee, indicated that Universal hoped to acquire the 
holdings of both Griffith Amusement and Consolidated.  If Universal terminated the 
agreement before the end of ten years, Griffith held first rights to buy out the studio’s 
shares, and Liebmann believed Universal underestimated the circuit’s ability to gain 
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financing.  He noted that the First National Bank of Oklahoma City provided funding for 
the Griffiths, blocking a possibility of a Universal takeover in 1934. 
One final mention of Universal Chain Theatres occurs in the Griffith materials.  
On 11 December 1934, the board of Western States Theatres, a corporate entity 
established to purchase all stock held by Universal, approved that transaction; Universal’s 
holdings were valued at $225,000 (Griffith Box 2 Vol.6).  At that time, Western States 
had cash on hand in the amount of $122,000; selling additional shares of Western States 
raised the remainder of the purchase price.  The four directors of this corporation were 
also major shareholders in Griffith Amusement, and former employee Roger Rice 
indicates that Griffith Amusement then purchased this stock from Western States.  Very 
few documents for Western States are included in the Oklahoma Historical Society 
collection, and no mention is made of this sale or the dissolution of this corporation in 
documents for Griffith Amusement or Griffith Consolidated, but by 1934 it appears 
Universal no longer had any holdings in the Griffith theatre businesses.5
Little has been written about Universal’s venture into film exhibition.  Howard 
Lewis, in his analysis of the motion picture industry in Harvard Business Reports, offers 
the most coverage indicating that the studio had ill-defined goals and began theatre 
acquisitions much too late; several historians agree that Universal’s expansion plans were 
belated.  Other studios already controlled important first run theatres in the major cities 
around the country.  Many film historians have documented the internal disagreements 
within the production arm of the corporation.  Thomas Schatz, in The Genius of the 
System, describes in some detail the conflict between Carl Laemmle, happy with the 
status quo of low budget films, and Carl Laemmle, Jr., and Irving Thalberg’s hopes to 
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upgrade studio output with high budget “quality” films.6 At about the same time that 
Universal began buying into theatre circuits, production costs were rising for the more 
prestigious feature films and to his dismay Laemmle, Sr., found himself shut out of the 
studio he had founded.  Schatz views Universal’s retreat from exhibition as a wise 
decision that helped the studio survive the Depression with better results than most 
studios (Genius of the System 82, 97).  Douglas Gomery believes that the success of 
Universal’s “Woolworth’s products” in the early 1920s caused the studio’s late entry into 
exhibition.  He also notes that this studio did not have the capital necessary to install 
sound equipment into the 315 theatres owned in Canada and the United States; the bulk 
of those theatres were located in Oklahoma, Texas, New York, and Ohio (Hollywood 
150).  In History of the American Film Industry, Benjamin Hampton paints a rosier 
picture, noting, “Universal’s careful cultivation of the humble exhibitor trade gave the 
corporation a healthy annual balance-sheet for many years” (321).  Gomery’s data 
indicates that by 1930 Universal was bleeding red ink until 1934, the year in which the 
Griffith brothers purchased the studio’s holdings; Universal would not see its next 
profitable year until 1939 (Hollywood 148).  Mae Huettig, writing prior to the 1948 
Paramount Decision, in her work, Economic Control of the Motion Picture Industry,
views Universal’s low investment in theatres as an industrial disadvantage.  Her statistics 
indicate that by 1939 Universal’s real estate holdings (primarily theatres) equaled 
approximately 14% of the studio’s net worth as compared with Paramount’s 50.7% 
investment.  A Hollywood booster, she wrote in 1944, “Competition does exist in the 
motion picture business.  True, it is a special kind of competition adapted to the form of 
the industry.”  Huettig identified the importance of exhibition to the studio system, 
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writing, “The majors derive most of their incomes from their theatres, and production is 
less important as a source of revenue than exhibition.  In fact, the chief advantage of 
continued control over production and distribution is that it enables them to maintain 
their advantageous position as favored theatre operators” (68, 145).  She may be 
downplaying the role of production and distribution but that advantage in exhibition is 
precisely the cause of the discontent that led independent theatre owners to seek judicial 
correction.  Film runs and clearances imposed by distributors guaranteed that studio-
owned theatres always held a booking advantage.  The beginnings of these legal battles 
will be explored in the next chapter.  Although Universal retained few theatres, 
Thalberg’s studio was not unaffected by litigation. 
The tales of theatre expansion as outlined in Ramsaye and Hampton are much 
more colorful than the businesslike accounts of Lewis or Gomery but all provide some 
insight into the ragged and rugged beginnings of the motion picture exhibition industry.  
With high popular demand and limited film output, storefront theatre owners started 
many of the earliest production companies.  Later, production companies and distributors, 
including film exchange salesmen like L. C. Griffith, realized the profitability of movie 
exhibition and entered this branch of the industry.  Sometimes there was a partnership 
between equipment inventors or developers and theatre owners.7 Hampton describes the 
early expansion of theatre holdings in a clandestine light describing Adolph Zukor’s early 
“plan of theatre conquest” around 1920:  “He quietly purchased a foothold in the Stanley 
Company, the Saenger Amusement Company, and the Black-Gray-Gordon corporations 
in New England, thus acquiring not only theatres and booking-offices, but interests in 
corporations owning three memberships in First National” (Hampton 254).  This gave 
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Zukor a foothold into and information on the activities of the largest alliance of the most 
important exhibition chains in the country that also controlled regional distribution.  
Stephen E. Lynch, southern circuit owner of more than twenty-five theatres approached 
Zukor with a plan “to secure control of theaters throughout the entire south.”  One of the 
prime targets of these takeover plans was E. H. Hulsey “the owner of the First National 
franchise for Texas and Oklahoma.”   As Hampton indicates, Lynch’s techniques spanned 
from friendly competition by advertising construction of a competing theatre to more 
rough persuasion.  “His emissaries soon became known as the ‘wrecking crew’ and the 
‘dynamite gang,’” although none of the historians have provided evidence of any real 
violence.  Lynch and his employees seem to have been masters of intimidation (254-55).  
The threat of new competition for customer dollars is evident in 1926 Stillwater.  Once it 
became known that the Griffith brothers were planning an expansion into this town the 
local papers reaped the rewards long before the circuit broke ground or purchased any 
theatres. 
By the end of 1926, the Tulls, father and son, increased CAMERA advertising in 
the Gazette indicating their determination to keep their theatre competitive.  These 
advertisements featured First National releases, the company Zukor raided.  A. M. Abbott 
increased his ABBOTT THEATRE advertising in 1925, perhaps already having been 
approached by Griffith representatives who purchased this theatre in April, 1926.  Prior 
to 1926 movie advertisements had appeared in the Daily Press, a newspaper catering to 
the Stillwater “city” dweller but in that year the Gazette, a weekly publication 
emphasizing farm news and targeting readers with less leisure time, began to sell much 
more advertising space to the movie theatres.  Griffith documents indicate that money 
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probably spoke louder than threats, and the circuit shows a history of a facile ability to 
win financial support from Oklahoma City bankers while issuing large dividends to 
shareholders.  Unlike Lynch’s “wrecking crew,” sale to the Griffith brothers usually 
included a stockholder’s share in the profits, which was sometimes accompanied with 
employment as local theatre management.  The Griffiths acquired the properties they 
wanted and the previous owners had an opportunity for continued personal gain.  And, of 
course, this strategy developed a continuity of management to reassure the small-town 
movie-going public.  Another factor that seems unique to the young state of Oklahoma is 
the perception that new businesses of any kind or any infusion of capital into a 
community could be seen as progress for the large town or small city.  For a city like 
Stillwater and many of the other Griffith locations movie theatres drew from well outside 
city limits.  The numbers attending the Opera House opening in 1901 are evidence of the 
importance of becoming a regional commercial hub.  New movie theatres on Main Street 
benefited every nearby merchant, since it was possible that once in town, moviegoers 
would do their weekly shopping as well. 
The community’s perception of the cultural and economic importance of new 
movie houses separates this Oklahoma history from those that describe the growth of film 
exhibition in metropolitan cities like New York or Chicago, or from smaller towns well-
established long before the Indian Territory was opened for settlement in 1889.   This is 
key to understanding the impact of the Griffith circuits locally.  Audiences in New York 
had many movie choices but in newer towns the presence of even one movie theatre 
could boost the economy and the prosperity of the mercantile community.  Movies 
brought business to Main Street and film exhibition became part of a symbiotic 
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relationship with the merchants of the area.  Before the Griffiths built or purchased 
theatres—or while planning a move to a particular town—representatives spoke to 
meetings of local civic groups like the Rotary Club explaining the importance of the 
movies for commercial success.  The Griffith brothers were exceedingly aggressive in 
their business expansion, although there is no documentation that they were as cutthroat 
as a Zukor or Lynch.  The rapid growth of the Griffith circuits nevertheless drew 
complaints from independent theatre proprietors like the Tull family, owners of the 
Camera theatre on Main Street in Stillwater.  The next chapter will look at the early 
antitrust complaints as well as more local concerns about the moral effects of motion 
pictures in towns like Stillwater. 
 
Notes: 
1 Alfred S. Black is quoted in Hampton, History of the American Film Industry from its Beginnings to1931 
(New York: Dover, 1970) 253. 
2 R. E. later operated his theatres from offices in Las Vegas.   
3 Apparently Delaware was the ideal location for incorporation.  Dennis McDougal describes it as “a state 
famous for protecting corporate secrecy and taxing lightly” (35). 
4 In 1940 this company became Griffith Consolidated Theatres, Inc.  and is not to be confused with the 
Consolidated Amusement Company of Ardmore, a regional theatre group acquired by the Griffiths in 1927.  
In 1940, Griffith Southwestern Theatres was formed to negotiate the purchase of theatres and properties 
owned by a Tulsa, Oklahoma partnership.  This company was merged with Griffith Consolidated in 1945.  
Earlier, in 1936, Griffith Consolidated Realty was incorporated to hold Griffith real estate and take 
responsibility for property maintenance.  Revenue for this company came from renting theatres to the 
Griffith exhibition companies.  Griffith Consolidated also held a 51% share in the Tad Screen Advertising 
Company.  A concessions company was also established.  All of these concerns were operated out of 
Griffith’s Oklahoma City headquarters.  At its peak, this conglomeration of theatre businesses supported 
almost 2,000 employees (Rice 8). 
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5 Western States is not named in the antitrust case begun in 1939 implying that this corporation was 
dissolved prior to that litigation. 
6 The motion picture business was often a family business with the Warner brothers being the most obvious 
example.  “’Pop’ Laemmle had early shown considerable tendency to employ as many of his family as 
possible” (Fernett 239).  Likewise, the Griffith brothers got their start from their father, as did Claude 
Leachman, longtime theatre manager in Stillwater, and his brothers Ralph and Oakley.  These young men 
began their film exhibition careers funded by their father Dr. T. C. Leachman in 1919; they partnered with 
the Griffith brothers in 1926. 
7 One of the most fascinating accounts of early filmmaking and exhibition is Two Reels and a Crank 
written by film pioneer Albert E. Smith with the help of Phil A. Koury, a reminiscence published in 1952.  
The passage of time may have embellished this narrative of James Blackton and Smith but it certainly 




Local Attitudes on the Movie Business and Early Federal Antitrust Litigation:  
Local Attitudes and National Scrutiny (1939-1941) 
 
TALKIES FACE TRUST CHARGE IN U. S. COURT 
State Movie Firms to Be Accused 
 
The federal government focused its drive against monopoly on the southwest 
Thursday and plotted action against four theater chains and major producers in 
Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico with Oklahoma City as the setting.—Daily 
Oklahoman 28 Apr 1939 
 
The rapid expansion of the Griffith chains, particularly after the Universal 
Theatrical Chain was incorporated, drew the attention of Thurman Arnold, antitrust 
attorney for the federal government in 1939; antitrust proceedings against the studios 
were initiated a year earlier, in 1938.1 The movie business, since its earliest days, had 
garnered scrutiny from both moral and social arbiters, and the legal community.  An 
entertainment that grew in popularity so rapidly and that delighted such large audiences 
drew suspicion from many quarters, often because local culture brokers saw their 
influence eroding.  As Daily Oklahoman articles reveal, the Griffiths were not strangers 
to local court battles, especially the ten-year litigations brought by A. B. Momand of 
Shawnee.   The film industry’s history includes continuous litigation from the patents 
wars beginning in 1900 to antitrust cases in the early 1920s.  Senators like Matthew M. 
Neeley (D-WV) tried to legislate block-booking policy out of existence, while churches 
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and organization like the National Board of Review, the National Council of Women, and 
the National Congress of Parents and Teachers sought to protect children from what were 
perceived to be the morally deleterious effects of the picture shows.  Sociologists hoped 
to measure scientifically those effects but personal moral prerogatives often got in the 
way of the science in studies such as the Lynd’s Middletown report in 1929 and the Payne 
Fund Studies in 1933.  Scientists sometimes used moral tales to support their findings 
while social and religious organizations employed statistical data to support their 
objections to the movies.  Defining the industry as the motion picture business, the 1915 
Supreme Court decision in Mutual Film Corp.  v.  Ohio ruled that movies were “business, 
pure and simple . . . not to be regarded as part of the press of the country or as organs of 
public opinion.”  Movies were thus legally viewed as product rather than as a medium of 
protected expression; “simple statutory authority” at any level of government could 
regulate the perceived harmful effects of film on consumers, particularly children (qtd in 
Randall 432).   
Without the protection of the First Amendment, state and local governments were 
free to institute controls on the film industry that best reflected community standards, 
which sometimes reflected political rather than moral issues as a Columbia Law Review 
summary indicates (Notes).  Police officers or representatives of civic organizations like 
the Women’s Club or the PTA might staff film review boards at the local level; some 
screened films before theatrical release in their towns, while others only acted in response 
to community complaints.  The first state board was established in 1911 in Pennsylvania; 
Ohio and Kansas followed suit in 1913.  In 1939, a state censorship bill was defeated in 
Oklahoma (Notes 1384, 1390).  Although clergy or civic leaders occasionally called for 
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the reform of motion picture content, government intervention lacked support in most 
Oklahoma municipalities.  In Griffith towns, as in most small towns across the country, it 
was the theatre manager who dealt with patron complaints about the movies.  Because the 
manager was also an active participant in community life, he monitored the films for 
topics or scenes that his town might find objectionable.  Because of block- and blind-
booking, the local showman was often seen as a victim of the Hollywood industry, rather 
than a corrupter of the town’s moral fiber.  Trade publications often carried letters from 
small town theatre owners complaining of film content.  In a letter writing campaign in 
1946, Griffith managers flooded Eric Johnston’s in-box as the successor to MPAA head, 
Joseph Breen.  David Palfreyman, of the MPAA Theatrical Services office, noted that 
these were voices to be taken seriously; Griffith business was important to the industry. 
 Occasionally the problem of protecting women and children from the dangers of 
motion pictures made the local newspapers in Stillwater.  In 1941 one editorial blamed 
parents for poor supervision if children suffered ill effects from comic strips, radio 
programs, or movies (Gazette 23).  This columnist failed to note that both the radio and 
the funny papers enjoyed First Amendment protection; the movies did not.  An advice 
columnist chastised one parent for not making use of the Pacific Coast Women’s Club 
film reviews available at the public library.  Richard Testa describes the influence of 
local women’s clubs on film exhibition in Providence, Rhode Island, the state capital, 
where Paramount controlled most of the movie houses.  The first censorship laws went 
on the books in 1909 in this large New England town, giving the police department 
control of theatre licensing and the power to ban “dangerous films.”  This community had 
an active Congress of Mothers to advise the city’s censors.  Other local groups, including 
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the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) communicated frequently with the 
National Board of Censorship in New York City (Testa 101-05).  Likewise, Waller 
describes the efforts of the WCTU and the Women’s Clubs of Central Kentucky to 
control what movies reached local audiences by banning a film outright, “suppressing a 
film already shown or restricting the audience for a particular film” (Main Street 140).  A 
Chicago commission of 1919 emphasized “incitement to crime” as a major problem with 
moving picture shows (Jowett 143).  One case of dreaded copy-cat behavior was reported 
in Stillwater on 16 December 1938.  A twenty-three year old young man, after a summer 
in Missouri as an extra on the film Jesse James, committed armed robbery; he received a 
five-year prison term for his two-dollar holdup (Gazette).  This is hardly a ringing 
validation of Payne Fund researchers Blumer and Hauser’s findings that movies could 
influence criminal behavior “through the display of crime techniques and criminal 
patterns of behavior; [or] by arousing desires for easy money and luxury” (qtd in Jowett 
224).2 A film induced crime wave was not reported in either the Stillwater or Oklahoma 
City newspapers.3
And, it seems that local women could take care of themselves.  On one 
Wednesday in 1936, six men reported themselves as victims of a pickpocket with losses 
totaling more than fifty dollars.  Because “it was practically impossible for them to pull 
the billfolds from their pockets without notice,” it was determined that a woman had been 
part of the felonious team (Gazette 27 March).  In 1940, a movie masher got more than 
he bargained for with his inappropriate advances.  “The irate female doubled up her fist 
and landed a hard punch off the farmer’s mouth.  Then she grabbed his necktie and led 
him up the aisle to the box office and asked that the police be called” (Gazette 25
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October).  Occasionally Stillwater’s elected officials were called upon to uphold 
community standards as in the case of an anonymous complaint in 1930.  Mayor 
Thompson and theatre manager Claude Leachman determined that “the actions of Miss 
Lois Wilson, . . . movie star, in hoisting her shapely leg in the general direction of the 
north star while reclining in front of the Mecca was not indecent, though certainly 
unladylike” (Gazette 20 June).  Unlike the efforts undertaken by women’s groups or city 
fathers in other locales, no information has surfaced to indicate that any formal attempt at 
censorship occurred in Stillwater.   
Periodically, The Oklahoman reported on legislation to control movie content but 
nothing seems to have come of those proposals.  In 1917 “a state censorship of ‘movie’ 
films, to be know as the ‘Commission for Educational Motion Pictures’ [was] introduced 
in the house.”  This commission was to be charged with the responsibility of determining 
if a movie was “educational or merely entertaining and harmless.”  Members would also 
be asked to “disapprove all pictures or parts of pictures as in their judgment are indecent, 
immoral or otherwise debasing” (Oklahoman 8 February 1917).  No follow up article 
indicates this commission was ever formed.  The next mention of state censorship 
appears in 1925.  State Senator Tom Anglin of Holdenville introduced a bill that 
narrowly received approval for debate with a vote of twenty for discussion and eighteen 
opposed.  As Senator Jed Johnson argued, small town theatre owners were forced “to 
accept the pictures they [the circuit owners] send them” (Oklahoman 5 February 1925).  
As with earlier attempts at state censorship, it appears this bill was rejected on the 
grounds that community women’s groups could serve to screen films for objectionable 
content; a state board or commission would unduly expand government intervention into 
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local matters (Oklahoman 19 June 1921).  John Thomas, in his study on Knoxville, 
Tennessee film exhibition argues that this small town fought being labeled a “hick town.”  
For that community, censorship was seen as “another hick-like response from religious 
fundamentalists living on the fringes of the city or in the middle of the country” (94).  
Knoxville wanted to shed its rural past to be accepted as an up-to-date town.  Perhaps 
Oklahomans, too, wanted to project a more sophisticated, urban image to the country 
beyond the state’s borders.   Although it seems many local politicos and state 
representatives were reluctant to take a stand on the movies, at least one minister decried 
the evils of the motion picture business in Stillwater. 
 The Stillwater Gazette gave extensive coverage to the 17 April 1930 sermon of 
the Reverend Virgil G. Nalley of the First Christian Church.  Titled “What I Think of the 
Movies,” Nalley was tactful in his attack on Hollywood; rather than blaming local owners 
or managers for film quality in the city’s movie houses he targeted the California studios.  
This pastor took exception with film content, block-booking practices, false 
advertisements, and the production code and its administrator, Will Hays.   His dislike of 
Sunday shows was implicit in his remarks, “Moving pictures show to audiences four 
times as large as the audiences reached by the church and they provide the most effective, 
educational agency in the world today.”  This minister had no desire to face such 
competition on Sundays.  He explained that the theatre managers’ hands were tied by 
block-booking and blind-booking resulting in the objectionable quality of many films.4
Nalley believed theatre owners had only two choices—bad films or darkened 
auditoriums.  Using Party Girl, a film screened in Stillwater the previous week, he stated, 
“I would not have produced such a picture . . . but we would get nowhere by attempting 
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to ban its production in Stillwater.”  Turning to advertising, he complained that “lurid 
posters often indicate a ‘terrible’ show when in reality, it contains nothing objectionable.”   
The advertising, in full view of any passer-by could actually be more titillating than the 
featured film.  Finally, he excoriated Will Hays, charging that neither the 1921 code nor 
that of 1930 produced more acceptable films.  He closed his comments to the packed 
sanctuary with a call to action to join the international efforts of “the Federal Council of 
Churches, the Christian Century and Christian Herald magazines to campaign “for better 
movies” (Gazette 17 April 1930).  This was a rallying cry from a lone clergyman in 
Stillwater, but soon local ministers banded together in ecumenical distaste when Sunday 
movies were put to the popular vote later that year.   
 Petitions circulated among Stillwater residents in the summer of 1930 to bring the 
issue of Sunday movies to the voting booth.  On 1 August, petitions for each side were 
presented to the city commission with more than fifty percent of local residents signing.  
Local ministers proffered signatures of 824 residents who opposed opening theatres on 
the Sabbath.  The petition presented by local theatre owners boasted 1,045 proponents of 
Sunday shows, with the majority of this support from local businessmen.  The city 
commission nixed the idea that this issue could be put on the scheduled 12 August run-
off ballot because the commissioners believed this issue to be a weighty decision 
requiring more time for voters to consider their position (Gazette).  On 8 August Mayor 
G. M. Thompson was interviewed about the upcoming vote.  Noting that he personally 
favored the existing blue laws because he felt Sunday openings would “be harmful for the 
college and the churches,” the mayor expressed concern that a special election would be a 
costly $300.  Thompson also made it clear that he had “the highest regard for those men 
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who operate them [the theatres].”  With a mayoral election coming the following spring, 
Thompson tried to strike a balance in his comments, emphasizing that he had been 
elected to serve the will of the people who would be voting on the issue (Gazette 1
August 1930).  Despite the concerns about expense, the Sunday movie question did not 
appear on the 4 November general election ballot; instead it was announced for a 12 
December polling (Gazette 3 October 1930).  Proposition 5 “for the repeal of the city 
ordinance prohibiting Sunday moving pictures resulted in the largest number of votes 
being cast on a single question, 1,871 voters participated in solving the question” and 
“814 voted in favor of opening the movies and 1,057 against.”  The Gazette reported 
“Movie Question Foremost”: 
the spotlight of the entire campaign was focused on the Sunday movie 
measure, the two opposing forces being led by Stillwater Council of 
Churches, against change, and Claude Leachman and R. S. Russ, 
manager[s] of local theaters, principal backers of the proposition.  The 
Sunday movie drive reached its climax Thursday with both sides turning 
loose a barrage of advertising on the subject.  Throughout the day of 
voting both sides turned efforts towards getting voters to the polls.  
(Gazette 12 December 1930)5
It appeared the clergy had won the day; they had won the battle, but as the spring mayoral 
race proved, the war was not yet decided. 
 Sabbath movies became the hottest issue even though a total of eight men were 
campaigning for the mayor’s seat.  The Gazette believed, “As the campaign grows 
warmer, it appears that the Sunday movie question has become the most popular point of 
79
discussion.”  To keep the readership well informed, a reporter quizzed each of the 
candidates about the “movie question.”  Incumbent Thompson restated his position 
against Sunday openings, remarking that he was “convinced that the parents of A. and M. 
college students do not desire them,” and that the special election had indicated his stance 
had been supported by local vote.  He did, of course, pledge to uphold the will of the 
electorate.  Six mayoral hopefuls demurred that they would enforce the current ordinance 
until the people decided on this issue.  Frank Jardot, descendant of the founding Jardot 
family who once owned the OPERA HOUSE, came out in favor of Sunday picture shows.  
The Gazette commentary indicated that all eight candidates expressed “considerable 
anxiety . . . toward the vote to be cast by students of Oklahoma A. and M., believed to be 
largely in favor of Sunday movies in Stillwater.  . . . Student politicians are known to 
have interviewed each of the candidates .  .  .to find a platform suited to student desires” 
(13 March 1931).  These comments indicate the dilemma of city leaders in communities 
around the country.  Constituents enjoyed their movies, attending several times a week, 
and surely would patronize a showing on Sunday afternoon, yet as elected officials they 
carried the responsibility of protecting the city’s citizens, particularly the younger folk.  
Without a clear public consensus on Sabbath shows, office-seekers were reluctant to 
commit to either side.   A heavy voter turnout produced the closest mayoral race in city 
history, produced in large part to the debate on Sunday movies.  Two votes separated the 
candidates who were therefore to compete in a runoff election.  Thompson placed out of 
the running, demanded a recount, and became the first mayor ever to win reelection (20 
March 1931).  With his victory it appeared that the will of his constituency had silenced 
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the Sunday film issue and no further articles appeared in the local newspapers for quite 
some time.   
 However, the controversy heated up once again in December 1933.  Stillwater 
theatre owners chose to break the law on Sunday, December 21.  The Gazette headline 
the next day announced:  “ARRESTS ARE MADE IN MOVIE SHOW TEST CASE—
Three Local Movies Run Programs Sunday; Short Interruptions Occur During Matinees.”  
Five were arrested for violating the city ordinance prohibiting Sunday shows:  theatre 
managers Leachman and Russ, as well as the three projectionists on duty at the time—
Clark W. Abbott, Glen Blackridge, and Fred Turner.  All were quickly released on their 
own recognizance.  At their Monday court appearance, a continuance was granted.  The 
coverage of the police crackdown continued: 
Each of the three shows had nearly completed the first program before 
officers made their appearance with warrants.  Theater men, anticipating 
the action had relief workers ready and as one group of employees was 
removed another set took their places.  The Aggie machine never stopped, 
the Mecca and Camera for about a minute.  Officer Ashmore caused a 
slight commotion at the Mecca by announcing the show was over, but as 
patrons began to file from the theater they were turned back by show 
employees and the program continued.  (22 December 1933) 
By mid-afternoon Monday, the Stillwater Council of Churches had made no comment, 
and, although the Stillwater Ministerial Alliance held its regular Monday morning 
session, no announcements were made to the press about the showings.  Both groups had 
been forewarned of the Sabbath shows; the theaters had previously advertised their 
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Sunday programs.  Clearly, the events of the previous day indicated to these clergymen 
that movies seven days a week had been voted into practice at the box office. 
 Unlike the silent religious leaders of the community, the district court responded 
quickly on appeal, ruling the current city ordinance banning Sunday shows was illegal 
because the $25 maximum fine exceeded the $20 limit the city court could legally 
impose.  With equal speed, the city commission repealed the old ordinance, approved a 
new one, and then passed a resolution that the voters at the next general election would 
resolve the Sunday movie issue if a petition bearing 200 names was received.  Believing 
the new ban conformed to the public sentiment expressed in the 1930 vote, the 
commission drafted an ordinance that complied with the $20 ceiling on fines while 
limiting prosecution to the theatre managers or owners.  No theatre employees could be 
arrested.  “A majority of the commissioners expressed the opinion the shows should be 
allowed to run if they so desired but the vote was for enforcing Sunday closing until the 
citizens should vote otherwise.”  This unofficial acceptance of Sunday screenings left the 
opportunity for theatre owners to violate city statutes with only a $20 fine levied for their 
transgressions, a small price to pay for full auditoriums on a seventh business day 
(Gazette 29 December 1933).  As Kathryn Fuller points out, theatre operators around the 
country “rated Sunday one of their most profitable business days; they continually fought 
to stay open, incurring fines and even jail sentences” to continue Sabbath shows (46).   In 
the following January, the Gazette reported the new ordinance had not been properly 
enacted, making Sunday shows legal (3 January 1934).  The absence of any additional 
news coverage indicates a failure to gather 200 signatures for a new petition.  Stillwater 
now legally enjoyed movies every day of the week. 
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Around the state, battles flared and then quieted on the controversy of Sabbath 
shows.  On the one hand, opponents insisted that Sunday should be a day of worship 
while others made an equally strong argument that for some hardworking Oklahomans 
this was the only day available for personal entertainment.  Generally the state’s 
clergymen led the fight to block movies from the day of worship, but occasionally 
crusading city officials joined the battle.  The Oklahoman periodically reported on 
attempts to ban Sunday movies with an early article appearing 11 June 1918.  That article 
noted that “ if Street Commissioner Butts has his way Enid will become a ‘perfect-lady-
of-a-town”’ . . . [with] all the pool halls in the Garfield county capital . . . closed every 
day of the week and that the moving picture shows should not open on Sunday.”  The 
reporter noted that no bans on Sunday movies presently appeared in Oklahoma City 
ordinances (11 June 1918).  By 1920, religious leaders were ready to take up the issue of 
Sabbath shows.  An Oklahoman article of 5 October 1920 outlined the activities of the 
Protestant Ministerial Alliance.  It “placed its official stamp of disapproval on Sunday 
movies . . . [with] a formal resolution to inaugurate a state-wide campaign against Sunday 
movies . . . [through] an effort . . . to swing public sentiment in favor of such [blue law] 
legislation by getting all ministers in the state to preach against Sunday amusements.”  
The ministers felt that churches were in competition with the movies, particularly for the 
“‘luke-warm’ class [which] would go to church if there were no movies.”  The ministers 
described this situation as “in tune with the general tendency toward moral disintegration.  
. . .threatening the world.”   In counterpoint, DREAMLAND THEATRE manager Dudley W. 
Tucker believed the “movies compete in doing good.”  He pointed out that: 
 Many of the ministers have automobiles and can ride along the boulevards 
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or go down to the river bank for their Sunday recreation.  But the poor 
man who works hard all week and whose home environment is none too 
pleasant has no other recreation, or other enjoyment, but a good movie.  I 
believe in giving the other fellow a chance and, it looks like selfishness to 
me when those who have the facilities for recreation and enjoyment want 
to take away what little the poor man has.  (Oklahoman 5 October 1920) 
Tucker continued by noting that “there is no harm in the pictures that are shown these 
days,” asking “which does the most good when it comes to teaching morality, the church 
or the movie?” (Oklahoman 5 October 1920).  On 7 November, an Oklahoman article 
reported the response from the pulpit by the Rev.  Schaul of the Second Presbyterian 
church in Oklahoma City.  He admonished that “A full church means a safe nation.  .  .  
.those who honor God are a greater protection than all our armies.”  He also referred to 
recent reports of increased “social and contagious diseases” and “a great wave of juvenile 
crime” without specifically blaming picture shows for these current ills (1920).  Pastor 
Schaul had good reason to worry; this was an era of shifting values from flappers to the 
activities of the KKK.  The debate had grown to include national security, crime, and 
pestilence, yet the movies had many champions including Judge Bird ruling on the appeal 
of a Billings theatre owner who had been charged as “a public nuisance” for showing 
Sunday movies.  The judge ruled in favor of Harry Grubbs stating, “The picture shows 
are what the operators or owners make them . . . .  In this case the show seems to have 
been conducted orderly and with clean pictures, not making of it a nuisance . . . .  Picture 
shows do the public much good when rightly conducted” (Oklahoman 27 February 
1921). 
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By May 1922; Commissioner Butts had achieved a victory.  After a contentious 
campaign to install blue laws, Enid voted approximately two to one to ban Sunday 
movies.  Oklahoma City “trade trippers” unwittingly paraded into the conflict drawing 
the ire of local clergy.  One banner displayed the message “If you can’t go to a motion 
picture show here, come to Oklahoma City” (Oklahoman 13 May).6 A byline article 
assessing the new law in Enid found that sentiments remained strong on the rectitude of 
closing the movie houses on the Sabbath.  However, the author noted that the local 
theatres had lost some 6,515 admissions each Sunday they were closed and that hotel 
business had suffered as traveling salesmen now avoided spending a weekend in the 
town; on the other side of the ledger, church attendance did increase (Oklahoman 21
January 1923).  Enid’s blue laws remained in effect until 23 September 1930 
(Oklahoman).  The state convention of Christian Churches appointed a committee to draft 
“a bill to close Sunday night shows in Oklahoma.” 
Another important topic of this convocation was “Youth and the Communion 
Service.”  Young people had ceased attending church services in the belief that their 
appearance at Sunday school was sufficient.  No connection was made to moviegoing and 
no follow-up articles indicated that any bill had reached the legislature (Oklahoman 14
January 1925).7 Other blue law debates from around the state were infrequently reported, 
usually with a tone of urbane condescension.  An article outlining the history of blue laws 
as an eighteenth century practice described the shift from an agrarian society to an 
industrial urban one.  Although some 26 states still had blue laws on the books, the 
reporter indicated that in most cases both merchants and state prosecutors ignored the 
laws (Oklahoman 12 December 1931).  Sunday movies were considered a local matter.8
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Giuliana Musico, in his study Hollywood’s New Deal, argues that rather than 
pressures from small, independent exhibitors, “the fiercest opponents of [block-booking] 
. . . were civic groups, who initiated the legislative projects” (130).9 In Stillwater, it was 
a clergyman who called for an end to this practice, not the owner of the independently 
owned CAMERA THEATRE on Main Street.  In May 1938, the United States Senate passed 
the Neely Bill to the delight of Paul Harrup, the state YMCA chair of Motion Pictures 
and Visual Education for Oklahoma parents and teachers, who wired his news home from 
Washington.  He hoped to rally local residents to begin a letter writing campaign to the 
House of Representatives to urge the companion Petengill Bill out of committee for a full 
vote (Gazette 27 May 1938).  The bill remained in committee well into 1940, but a new 
legal battle with the film industry had already begun.    
 Griffith historian Roger Rice called 1939 the beginning of “dark days” for the 
chain, yet there is no mention of the litigation in the extant corporate records.  And local 
Stillwater editors found nothing newsworthy in the anti-trust allegations; no articles 
appeared on the prosecution until the 1948 federal conviction of the Griffith companies.  
There are, however, some clues that the circuit understood the threat of impending 
prosecution.  The Griffiths and their shareholders had established a network of theatre 
corporations and a separate real estate concern, all of which complicated tracking the 
business transactions within the Oklahoma City office.  Generally meetings dealt with the 
sale or purchase of theatres, but neither the minutes of shareholder or board of directors 
meetings spoke of film booking arrangements; a “rubber stamped” vote to approve the 
rentals selected provided no information on rental agreements.  No details on which 
movies had been chosen or with which studios contracts had been made were included.  
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But, in 1935, company records began to include studio names and the years to be covered 
for each.  For example, on 28 March 1935, board minutes list an agreement with RKO 
Distributing Corporation for three film seasons from 1935 to 1938 (Griffith Box 1 Vol. 
6).  In 1939, contracts for film service included Twentieth Century Fox Film Company, 
Loew’s Incorporated, Warner Bros.  Pictures Incorporated, Republic Pictures, Paramount 
Pictures Distributing Company Incorporated, United Artists Corporation, Universal Film 
Exchange Incorporated, Vitagraph Incorporated, and Columbia Pictures Corporation 
(Griffith Box 1 Vol. 6).  The 22 October 1940 minutes record that “The chairman [L.  C. 
Griffith] further stated that he deemed it advisable to discuss each [booking] contract 
separately” (Box 6 Vol. 7).  Steps were being taken to build a defense against the charges 
of the federal government. 
This justice department case was first reported in The Oklahoman 28 April 1939 
in an article that listed the defendants as “Griffith Amusement Co., which operates in 
Oklahoma and Texas; Consolidated Theatres Inc., operating in the same states; R. E. 
Griffith Theaters Inc., operating in Texas and New Mexico and the Westex Theaters Inc., 
operating in Oklahoma and Texas.”  This press coverage continued by noting that 
Thurman Arnold, known for his trust-busting activities for the federal government, 
“sought to have the corporations dissolved, and the properties rearranged as independent 
corporations which would create, as he said, competitive conditions.”  Arnold added that 
“the action dovetailed” with prosecutions brought against studio production and 
distribution companies.  “In fairness to the defendants in this particular proceeding . . . it 
should be said that there are many chains of theaters in the United States whose situation 
is similar,” Arnold advised a Washington correspondent.  The Griffith case was going 
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forward because the investigation into this circuit’s activities had been “completed first.”  
The author of this article saw an additional reason for moving forward on these charges; 
Holmes Baldridge, local born and a graduate of the University of Oklahoma law school 
was chief of the Justice Department’s trial section (Oklahoman 28 April 1939).  
Additional coverage into early 1941 tracked briefs being filed and other requests leading 
up to a trial date that remained unannounced.  In December of 1941 the importance of 
any antitrust proceedings was overshadowed by the American entry into World War II.  
The nation and the movie men began gearing up for the war effort.  The numerous 
wartime contributions of the Griffith theatres will be discussed in the next chapter before 
returning to the post-war continuance of federal prosecution. 
 
Notes: 
1 Ironically, Arnold expressed an interest in prosecuting Will Hays of the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America (MPPDA) citing the film industry’s self-censorship as restraint of trade 
(Oklahoman, 27 Sept 1938). 
2 As Jowett and others have indicated much of the scientific conclusions of the Payne study were 
undermined and misrepresented by the publication of Our Movie Made Children by journalist Henry James 
Forman, as an attack on the film industry (225). 
3 Criminals did find their way to Griffith box offices.  In March of 1927 a robber remained hidden after an 
evening performance at the AGGIE, smashed the cash box and escaped through a rear window with $47.70 
(Gazette 25 March).  The Oklahoman reported the robbery of the BISON theatre in Shawnee.  The manager, 
subsequently bound and gagged along with the cashier, was forced to open the safe, handing over $1,000—
the receipts for the BISON and the CRITERION which were both owned by Griffith Amusement (24 
November 1930). 
4 The practice of block-booking required theatre men to agree to rent a group of films in order to get 
perhaps only one or two desirable movies for their community.  Blind-booking meant that although a 
featured actor or actress may have had star power, the local owners had no information on subject matter or 
plot before signing a rental agreement.   
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5 The Gazette also reported that propositions to increase the salary of the mayor and city commission, as 
well as a plan to “increase the duties, power and authority of the [city’s] general manager” were defeated. 
6 Trade trippers were civic boosters who traveled to neighboring cities, states, and sometimes other 
countries to promote and expand local trade.  They were sometimes sponsored by the Chamber of 
Commerce and sometimes by private businesses.  The “trippers” often used parades to capture attention. 
7 Also during this conference plans were set in motion to establish “a department for teaching bible courses 
in the state universities at Norman and at Stillwater . . . with instructors paid out of a budget of $150,000 
from the Phillips endowment crusade fund of a million dollars” (Oklahoman 14 January 1925). 
8 Copying the habit of state legislatures to stop the clock if extra time was needed, a mayor in Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania suggested theatre owners should be allowed to stop their clocks on Saturday nights 
(Oklahoman 27 January 1934). 
9 Musico provides an excellent analysis of the relationship of Hollywood and Washington in the years 





Contributions to the Home Front War Effort: Activities of Hollywood,  
L. C. Griffith, and the Griffith Theatres (1941-1945) 
 
Early on, FDR recognized the special importance of the movie- 
house in American culture and publicly endorsed it as a  
“necessary and beneficial part of the war effort.”  In many  
American towns, the local Bijou was more of a locus for  
community than the church or city hall.—Doherty 
 
After the news of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the relationship between the 
federal government and the movie industry quickly shifted from an adversarial one to a 
cooperative, although sometimes contentious, partnership.  On 18 December 1941, 
President Roosevelt voiced his understanding of the importance of the cinema, saying, 
“The American motion picture is one of our most effective mediums in informing and 
entertaining our citizens.  The motion picture must remain free in so far as national 
security will permit.  I want no censorship of motion pictures” (Jowett 311).  Antitrust 
litigation became at least temporarily unimportant at the Justice Department and, surely, 
studio and circuit defendants hoped that public service during wartime might close the 
books on prosecution.  Much to the chagrin of isolationist Congressmen, Hollywood had 
begun antifascist propaganda films long before war was declared by the United States 
with Hollywood nemesis Senator Gerald Nye (R-ND) initiating an investigation into 
movie motives before an Interstate Commerce subcommittee in October 1941 (Doherty 
90
40).1 As Robert Fyne notes, as early as 1937, Republic’s B-Westerns were incorporating 
menacing Nazi-like villains into the standard range war plot (15).  Warner Bros.  began in 
1939 to bring anti-Nazi and World War I themes into their feature films as cautionary 
tales of what the American future could hold.  After the premier of the first of these films, 
a New York Times critic wrote, “Warner Bros.  formally declared war on the Nazis at 8:15 
a.m.  with the first showing of their Confessions of a Nazi Spy at the Strand” (Fyne 16).  
It might be easy to view Hollywood’s wartime activities with cynicism as calculated 
cooperation to increase dwindling box office receipts while gaining good will with the 
government (the former proved true; the latter not).  Michael Birdwell’s book length 
discussion of the Warner Bros.  anti-Nazi campaign eloquently demonstrates the 
conviction and courage of the studio.  Gerald Nye (R-ND) announced, “Go to 
Hollywood.  It is a raging volcano of war fever.  The place swarms with refugees [and] 
with British actors” (Birdwell 155).  In addition to drawing the ire of isolationists and 
Nativists, but also German Americans who burned a Milwaukee moviehouse in protest of 
the 1939 opening of Confessions of a Nazi Spy. Harry Warner was undeterred; he 
continued patriotic short films although by “March 1940 they had lost $1.25 million” 
(Birdwell 25).  Thomas Doherty reminds his reader that many studio moguls and film 
directors, who had achieved the American Dream, were of immigrant stock from the 
countries Hitler terrorized; many lost family members living or serving in Europe; many 
who suffered that loss were Jewish.  Film industry leaders had many reasons to join the 
war effort wholeheartedly as movie organizations and government agencies soon began 
to define how the conflict was to be presented to the American movie-going public.   
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The Hollywood studios enthusiastically participated on the home front and many 
noted individuals in the business of filmmaking vigorously took action as well; much less 
has been written about local film industry figures.  Biographers frequently celebrate the 
wartime contributions of movie stars and directors both at home and overseas.  Frank 
Capra, John Ford, John Huston, and Darryl F. Zanuck all worked for either the Office of 
War Information (OWI) or the War Department, producing powerful documentaries, 
effective training films, and short subject movies for home front audiences.2 In addition 
to the celebrity participation, “according to the final report of the War Activities 
Committee (WAC), some 7,000 studio employees or about ‘one-third of the men 
normally employed in the motion picture industry’ entered the military” (Doherty 60).  
Most film historians make at least a brief mention of the mutual efforts and shared 
frustrations of the studios and federal agencies although more study has been given to the 
films produced at that time from newsreels to feature films.3
While the movies and their messages are important, what is often overlooked is 
that the studio-dominated oligopoly the government had sought to disassemble provided 
the infrastructure necessary to meet the national wartime need of efficiently 
disseminating information and propaganda.  The studios had at their disposal production 
facilities that could turn out higher quality movies more quickly, an organized 
distribution network that could transport films from studios to theatres rapidly, and 
exhibition sites with management ready to screen those movies.  Circuits like Griffith 
Amusement, although lacking production capabilities of any measure, also had an 
effective distribution team and a large number of theatres ready to screen wartime films.  
Monopoly now represented a practical means of reaching the American public 
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effectively.  Additionally, in June 1940 as issues of war-preparedness grew more critical, 
Hollywood leaders created the “Motion Picture Committee Cooperating with National 
Defense” (MPCCND) to produce film shorts.  This industry organization, ready to 
participate in war efforts, became the “War Activities Committee—Motion Picture 
Industry” (WAC) immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.   The movie studios were 
in many ways better prepared than the government agencies and departments they would 
be dealing with during the war.   
A report begun by the War Records Section of the Bureau of Budget in 1946 at 
the request of President Roosevelt, and completed with the support of President Truman, 
outlines the fractious reorganization of several information agencies into the Office of 
War Information (Bureau of Budget).  Prior to the establishment of the OWI, the Office 
of Censorship, the Office of Facts and Figures, the Division of Information of the Office 
for Emergency Management, and the Office of Government Reports had overlapped in 
jurisdiction over the flow of federal information.  Because the Office of Government 
Reports (ORG) was the first agency to initiate cooperation with the MPCCND, Lowell 
Mellett, once the editor of The Washington Post and then director of the ORG, was 
appointed Coordinator of Government Films on 18 December 1941 (Bureau of Budget 
227-28).  As Koppes and Black discuss, Mellett’s ambition to be the sole contact between 
the government and the moviemakers soon created bitter internal power struggles with 
other public information officers in the War Department and other agencies (57).  By July 
1942, OWI was reshaped into three internal branches with the “Domestic Branch” to 
work with the film companies; Mellett became head of the Bureau of Motion Pictures 
(BMP).  Rather than better defining roles, conflicts grew more contentious and by early 
93
1943, Congress, offended by some of the print materials in distribution, began slashing 
budget appropriations, reducing the OWI “Domestic Branch” to a clearing-house to 
coordinate programs and projects in other departments (Bureau of Budget 229-30).4 As 
OWI director Elmer Davis reported:  
The domestic Branch of OWI was a cocktail shaken up out of three very 
dissimilar ingredients—predecessor organizations which differed widely 
in their objectives as well as their techniques.  It took almost a year, until 
June, 1943, to create a blend that was reasonably satisfactory to the 
executives of the agency; and about the time that this was accomplished, 
Congress poured most of the contents of the shaker down the drain 
(Larson 435).   
The studios, with the well-established pecking order of the “Big Five and Little 
Three,” were better organized and continued producing three types of film shorts for 
military training (so-called “nuts and bolts” shorts), theatrical screenings for the general 
home front audience, and “incentive” films shown to workers in war production plants 
(the “smokestack circuit”) throughout the internal agency battles (Doherty 61-62).5 With 
the exception of roadblocks sometimes thrown up by the branches of the United States 
military, the studios managed to steer clear of major conflicts with the OWI guidelines, or 
rather OWI questions for self-examination by the filmmakers.6 Experienced at 
circumventing Production Code rules and regulations, Hollywood producers successfully 
found ways to defend their movies as meeting government criteria.7 The film industry 
could point to Mellett’s communications indicating “the motion picture industry’s 
voluntary cooperation,” a precedent set in FDR’s speech of 23 February 1942, when he 
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called on “the industries concerned . . . [the press and radio to] volunteer their services” 
(Doherty 47, Bureau of the Budget 204).  And, most importantly, the studios had control 
of theatres in the largest areas of population and had distribution agreements with many 
other exhibitors (including the Griffith companies) out of a total of approximately 16,500 
screens across America (Doherty 81).  In spite of the conflicts within the system, a 
government film of up to one reel was released to theatres biweekly to a theatre 
attendance of approximately ninety million (Larson 438).8 The movies could reach a 
large American audience. 
Arguably, the air waves could be identified as the greatest wartime influence on 
the American public’s perceptions of the conflict aboard and the home front demands 
with around fifty million radios in 1940s households; radio had an advantage in getting 
news to its listeners much more speedily than any production team could ever hope to get 
film footage into the theatres (Samuel 48).  Movie theatres sometimes interrupted the 
evening’s feature to type “news flashes on mattes for projection on the screen” and on D-
Day, 6 June 1944, exhibitor’s broadcast Roosevelt’s radio address in their theatres.  
However, Doherty makes a strong case for the power of motion pictures and more 
specifically newsreels to provide meaning to the reports printed in the newspapers or 
heard but not seen through radio reports.  “The newsreels made sense of things” (Doherty 
231).  Newsreels were important to movie houses beginning with World War I and 
specialized newsreel theatres, usually in urban locations near transportation hubs, 
survived until television broadcast news began airing around 1949.  In March 1937, the 
Trans-Lux chain (partnered with RKO) opened its tenth newsreel theatre four blocks 
from the White House.  Newsreel Theatres, Inc. owned ten exhibition sites including one 
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near Radio City Music Hall.  Second-run theatres in Seattle, Portland, Oregon, Buffalo, 
Denver, Minneapolis, Sacramento, Los Angeles, and Houston were converted into 
newsreel theatres during World War II (Gomery, Shared Pleasures 145-52).  Patrons of 
both these specialized theatres and feature film exhibitors sought out moving images to 
understand the radio commentary and the still photography of the daily newspapers.  
“‘No one can honestly state to what extent [the newsreel] acts as a direct stimulus to 
grosses, but try cutting it out of the program and the patrons will immediately start 
beefing,’ warned Motion Picture Herald.” Reportedly, women, hoping to spot a loved 
one deployed overseas, were a large portion of the audience for newsreels (Doherty 239, 
240).  In addition to combining sound and motion to news reports heard but not seen, 
movie theatres provided an impetus to act upon government requests to donate scrap 
materials to the war effort.  Radio listeners might think about items that they could drop 
off at a collection center and never act on that momentary resolve.  The promise of a free 
movie, however, often moved them to act.  One-reelers screened at local theatres 
continually reinforced the patriotic need to contribute to the war effort and to support 
rationing measures.  Feature films provided more subtle but similar messages.9 However, 
the most important home front role of film exhibitors and the Hollywood community 
centered on war bond sales.   
Asking Americans to purchase Defense Bonds to finance the nation’s war 
preparedness beginning on 1 May1941 ushered in a new approach with significant 
differences from the earlier Liberty Loans of World War I. Secretary of the Treasury, 
Henry Morgenthau took a populist approach to the World War II bond campaigns, 
establishing three types of securities instead of only one offered during the previous war.  
96
By offering stamps, as well as Series E, F, and G bonds, sales would not be limited to 
large businesses or investment groups; instead, any American, even a school child, could 
participate in bond purchases.  Unlike the Liberty Bonds, interest rates were fixed, 
offering private investors more financial safety.  Secretary Morgenthau hoped his plan 
would work on several levels.  Bond purchases would provide a secure investment at a 
time when many desirable consumer goods were not available.  Extra dollars could earn 
interest for postwar spending while curbing the current threat of rampant inflation.  At the 
same time, with bond denominations set from as low as twenty-five to fifty dollars, more 
Americans could demonstrate their patriotic support.  Savings stamps allowed even 
citizens with the lowest of incomes to invest slowly, building to the time when their 
stamps, totaling $18.75 could purchase a $25.00 war bond (Samuel 17).  On 30 April 
1941, President Roosevelt, Morgenthau, and the postmaster general announced the Series 
E bonds on radio, emphasizing the democratic inclusiveness of the new war bond plan.  
Morgenthau described the new bond program in these words: 
Defense Savings Bonds and Stamps are not for the few; they are for the 
many.  . . . They are for the great mass of the people—for the laboring 
man, the skilled mechanic, the office worker, the employer, the housewife, 
the retired businessman—even children can save their pennies to buy 
stamps.  . . . Let this be clear: your government is frankly seeking the 
current, regular savings of the people—all the people.  . . . It is not asking 
you to buy one bond or one set of stamps and let it go at that; it is inviting 
you to save regularly and systematically by putting your money in the 
soundest investment on the face of the earth—the United States.  Why 
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does your government want the savings of the people?  Obviously, there 
are faster and simpler ways for government to raise money.  Why has the 
Treasury Department taken this more difficult course?  . . . First, . . . your 
government wants to give every one of you a chance to have a financial 
stake in American democracy—an opportunity to contribute toward the 
defense of that democracy.  . . . Secondly, your government wants to 
encourage the habit of thrift in all the people—to prevent a spending spree 
of the kind that accompanied the last war—to provide a check against high 
prices—to safeguard and stabilize the current American standard of living.  
Finally, your government wants to provide each of you with a cushion 
against the post-war period when, inevitably, adjustments of employment 
will be made.  . . . There are to be no quotas—there is to be no hysteria—
there is to be no appeal to hate or fear.  The Defense Savings Bonds and 
Stamps are presented as an opportunity . . . for each citizen to buy a share 
of America.  (Blum 301-02) 
Although this enterprise ultimately succeeded in raising 185.7 billion dollars from May 
1941 to January 1946, Americans did not embrace Morgenthau’s plan as quickly or as 
unanimously as he had hoped.  War bond sales did not meet government expectations 
after the first exuberant month of purchases totaling approximately $450 million (Samuel 
xiv, Blum 304).  L. C. Griffith became an important contributor to the success of later 
bond drives, encouraging the efforts of his theatre managers locally and serving at the 
state and national level to increase bond purchases. 
98
A Gallup poll of October, 1941, indicated that ninety-seven percent of the sample 
population had heard of the new “defense” bond drive.  The Treasury Department hoped 
to reach “all the people” but, although surveys showed a high public awareness of the 
bond program, sales could not keep up with the rising national debt.  Even though sales 
remained strong through the end of 1942, the national debt had risen to $17 billion.  With 
only half of the $6 billion purchases during the first year sold as Series E bonds, it 
appeared that as in World War I, only large institutions or the personally wealthy were 
fully taking advantage of the new Defense Savings Bonds (Samuel 26).  To boost sales 
the Treasury Department took several steps beginning in July, 1942:  a national quota of 
$1 billion per month (10% of national income) was set, efforts to promote payroll savings 
plans increased, and, most important for this study, national bond drives were initiated, a 
measure reluctantly taken since drives created spikes in bond investment rather than the 
steady, monthly purchases Morgenthau had envisioned (Samuel 30-31).  Prior to these 
decisions the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) conducted a survey of 4,736 adults 
around the country to discern, as the document is titled, “Public Reaction to the Sale of 
Defense Bonds and Stamps.”  The findings of this study indicated that in a majority of 
American households at least one member was purchasing bonds or stamps (59%) but 
these purchasers tended to be from urban, well-educated families.  Twenty-eight percent 
of companies around the country had payroll deduction plans and, not surprisingly, where 
these plans were in place, worker purchases were highest.  The lowest regional 
participation numbers occurred in Southern states; rural communities across the nation 
participated less with only 36% of farm families purchasing bonds (Office of Facts and 
Figures 2, 10).  These figures are significant to war bond sales in Oklahoma. 
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As a state in which over one third of its population was employed in agriculture 
according to the 1940 United States Census Bureau report, Oklahoma’s citizens, not 
surprisingly, did not purchase war bonds in sufficient numbers to meet Treasury 
Department quotas.10 Morgenthau and his numbers-crunchers hoped for a steady-paced 
purchase of Defense Bonds, but they failed to consider that farmers did not have a 
constant source of income; agricultural profits were seasonally earned as crops or 
livestock matured and went to market.  There were still reminders of the Dust Bowl 
Depression era around the state with almost 600 abandoned farms reported as of the 1940 
census.  Oklahoma farm families had several reasons to be cautious in tying up funds in 
Series E bonds.   
In Payne County, it was not until Stillwater movie theatres began promoting war 
bond sales that the mandated 10% quotas were met.  “The [studios’] exhibition sector 
was primed to help tub-thump for war bond sales because it already had the fundraising 
infrastructure set up through its involvement with the Motion Picture Industry’s Infantile 
Paralysis Drive, better know today as the March of Dimes” (Littleton).11 Film exhibitors 
in the Griffith organization were skilled in fund-raising for the civic good as well.  In 
addition to local activities to support schools, youth organizations, and civic groups (as 
described in Chapter Three), the circuit’s theatres contributed time, facilities, and cash to 
state charitable campaigns.  An Oklahoman headline of November 1934 congratulated 
the Griffith theatre employees for “oversubscribing its quota by 150 percent” for the 
Community Fund.  To aid a statewide Salvation Army drive to collect blankets for those 
left homeless after air raids in England, all Griffith theatres held “blanket matinees” with 
free admission to each donor (Oklahoman 13 November 1940).  To support the United 
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Service Organization (USO), the Griffith theatres joined “national theatrical and 
amusement groups to provide an additional budget of $3,500,000 for soldier recreation 
clubs (Oklahoman 31 August 1941).  In 1939, L. C. Griffith established Tent No.  22 of 
the national “Variety Club,” a charitable group begun by eleven men in the entertainment 
business.  After finding a baby abandoned in a theatre nursery on Christmas Eve 1928, 
these organizers vowed to provide help to underprivileged children.12 The Oklahoma 
“tent” moved quickly, and by June of 1941 built a $55,000 health center to house 
agencies offering free care to the needy (Oklahoman 29 June).13 In 1942, Griffith board 
members approved funds to aid in establishing a similar clinic as “a charitable health and 
humanitarian service to the poor and indigent negroes of Tulsa who are in need of 
medical care” (Griffith Box 3, Vol. 21).  The Griffith organization and its theatres were 
well prepared to create successfully the promotions needed to sell war bonds in low-
performing areas around Oklahoma. 
By September, 1942, two months after local quotas had been established, both the 
CAMERA and AGGIE theatres announced special events to promote war bond sales 
(Gazette 15 September).  As Robert Fyne has noted, “audiences now had two reasons to 
watch a double feature: a night out at the show was both entertaining and patriotic” (13).  
The high school band performed, as a war bonds booth was inaugurated at the AGGIE on 
17 September, with manager Claude Leachman announcing a special movie showing 
scheduled for 23 September for bond purchasers only.  In addition to offering a free 
show, a six months pass would be awarded to the highest purchaser; the second, third, 
and fourth high purchases would receive three month, two month, and one month passes 
(Gazette 18 September).  Payne County exceeded the $87,500.00 quota that September, 
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with Stillwater theatres “given a lot of credit for that last of the month buying spree” 
(Gazette 9 October).  In February 1944, the Stillwater theatres again geared up with 
special events to spur sluggish bond sales.  With the city facing a short-fall of $135,636 
of the $330,000 quota, Leachman announced plans for gala premiers of Madame Curie, a
1943 prestige release from MGM starring Greer Garson and Walter Pidgeon, at both the 
MECCA and AGGIE theatres.  In addition to the film, a stage show by the Will Rogers 
Army Airbase Troupe, comprised of professional entertainers, was to open the evening.  
The group featured a dancer, the Hungry Five band, as well as a pianist and baritone 
vocalist.  Prior to the scheduled program, the Rogers group would give a brief sidewalk 
performance while bonds were being purchased (Daily Press 8 February).  A third show 
was added due to customer demand, with attendance reaching almost 1,300 bond 
purchasers in a two-day period (Daily Press 11 February 1944).  Later that year, the 
CAMERA hosted a free bond show featuring the British documentary entitled Desert 
Victory, billed as the “most remarkable film of the entire war” (Daily Press 7 July).14  
Acting as a district chairman for the Sixth War Loan Drive, Leachman provided two 
official war films, The 957th Day in the Pacific and Just for Remembrance for a dinner 
meeting of the Business and Professional Women’s Club in October, 1944 (Daily Press 
27 October).15 The Daily Press reported on 12 December 1945 that “a total of $45,000 
worth of E bonds represented the house for the [recent] Victory bond show at the Aggie 
theatre.  The year ended with “a perfect record for Stillwater in the war bond and Victory 
loan drives .  .  .the city never failed to invest or go over its quota” due in large part to the 
efforts of local showmen like the managers of the Griffith theatres.16 
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In Oklahoma City, L. C. Griffith, the “Skipper,” was as personally active as his 
theatres.  On 4 July 1941, he was named “director of the central coordinating office of the 
civilian defense” for the city.  After his appointment by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, 
FDR’s appointee as director of the Office of Civil Defense, Griffith traveled to New York 
for training and became a “$1 year man” (Gazette).  After serving at the state level, 
Griffith’s work was recognized with an invitation from “the National War Activities 
Committee of the Motion Picture Industry in 1943 to head up the campaign in behalf of 
the Third War Loan drive” (Rice 12).  Certainly, the Skipper’s many previous leadership 
roles in civic activities around the state recommended him for this position.  After 
moving to New York, Griffith “arranged for over 3,000 movie theatre bond premieres” 
and mobilized over 200 stars of stage and screen for a special bond sales tour.  He 
arranged: 
a triumphal tour of a company known as the Hollywood Cavalcade, a 
group of 16 top flight motion picture stars and all the personnel necessary 
to accommodate  such a group traveling in a 20-car special train, which 
visited 15 principle cities across the country.  Celebrities included Greer 
Garson, Betty Hutton, Jose Iturbi, Harpo Marx, James Cagney, Judy 
Garland, Mickey Rooney, and the Kay Kyser band.  The Hollywood 
Cavalcade was credited by the treasury department with assisting in the 
sale of one billion, seventy-nine million dollars worth of war bonds.   
(Rice 13) 
Roy Hoopes, in When the Stars Went to War, adds Fred Astaire, Kathryn Grayson, Paul 
Henreid and Dick Powell to the roster of participating celebrities (128).17 Many of these 
103
stars were popular from the silver screen and from radio appeals for Defense Bond 
purchases.  Soon after the 1941 launch of the Defense Savings Bond campaign, a weekly 
program aired on CBS radio entitled “The Treasury Hour,” introduced by a special Irving 
Berlin composition, “Any Bonds Today?”18 The program featured stars such as Mickey 
Rooney and Judy Garland, and musical numbers spanned the gamut from jazz and blues 
to military marches and Mendelssohn as suggested by Morgenthau (Blum 304).19 The 
Third War Loan Campaign reached total sales of $1,909,889,196.  The 8,000-mile 
Cavalcade tour contributed $1,079,586,819 to that final figure.  In addition, War Bond 
premieres in theatres around the country sold $319,618,721 in bonds (Daily Press 29
October 1943).  As Ronald Brownstein points out, in addition to star power on the screen, 
‘The war provided the best evidence . . . that the stars could influence public opinion 
through personal appearances and endorsements” (80).  The motion picture industry—
from Hollywood studios to regional circuits to local theatre managers—provided valuable 
service during the Second World War but once the conflict had ended, hostilities between 
the federal government and the studios and large theatre chains soon returned.  In the next 
chapter, Griffith Amusement again faces prosecution for antitrust violations; service to 
the country is quickly forgotten by the Justice Department. 
 
Notes: 
1 In April 1941, Hollywood notables such as Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., Helen Hayes, Samuel Goldwyn, 
Darryk Zanuck, Walter Wanger, and Warner Bros. established “The Fight for Freedom Committee,” 
promoting intervention in Europe (Shull and Wilt 14). 
2 Frank Capra will be remembered for his Why We Fight series (1942-1945); see biographers McBride, also 
Maland and Capra’s autobiography.  Wounded during filming, John Ford shot The Battle of Midway 
(1942), after joining the Navy; see biographies by his son, Eyman, McBride, and Davis.  John Huston 
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provided a grim look at battle in The Battle of San Pietro (1945); see Kaminsky’s biography or Huston’s 
autobiography.  Biographies on Zanuck include works by Mosley and Gussow.  Darryl Zanuck’s motives 
and patriotism were questioned by a Senate investigation. 
3 The often-cited work of Doherty gives the most detailed discussion of this era in film history.  Koppes’s 
work covers movies within the context of the Hollywood/Washington collaboration.  For a study of the 
representations of gender, race, and ethnicity in World War II films, see O’Brien and Parsons’s anthology 
which grew out of the NEH funded “Lest We Forget” project (October 1991-December 1992).  The best of 
the books on World War II films is probably the work of Fyne but others who have done detailed analysis 
of movies of the era include the self-described “exhaustive filmography” of Shull and Wilt, and the work of 
Manvell.   
4 Larson indicates that the OWI budget was cut from $1.3 million to a mere $50,000. 
5 The Big Five studios included Warner Bros., Loew’s.  Paramount, RKO, and Twentieth Century Fox—all 
with large holdings of first-fun theatres.  The Little Three—Universal, Columbia, and United Artists—had 
no theatre holdings with the exception of Universal’s brief venture into exhibition. 
6 Studios were asked to consider seven questions:   
1. Will this picture help win the war?   
2. What war information problem does it to seek to clarify, dramatize, or interpret?   
3. If it is an ‘escape’ picture, will it harm the war effort by creating a false picture of America, 
her allies, or the world we live in?  
4. Does it merely use the war as the basis for a profitable picture, contributing nothing of real 
significance to the war effort and possibly lessening the effect of other pictures of more 
importance?  
5. Does it contribute something new to our understanding of the world conflict and the various 
forces involved, or has the subject already been adequately covered? 
6. When the picture reaches its maximum circulation on the screen, will it reflect conditions as 
they are and fill a need current at that time, or will it be outdated?  
7. Does the picture tell the truth or will the young people of today have reason to say they were 
misled by propaganda? (Koppes and Black 66) 
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7 For a detailed study of studio response to the 1927 Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America 
(MPPDA) list of 36 subjects labeled the “Don’t and Be Carefuls” and the 1930s production code, see the 
work of Leff and Simmons. 
8 Theatres screened OWI films at no cost and film-shorts production costs were kept very low.  A theatrical 
release came in at about $4,000.  per reel while 16mm films for non-theatrical release, i.e.  one-reelers 
screened for civic organizations and church audiences, cost about $2,000.  (Larson 440). 
9 Shull and Wilt quantify these messages, citing 113 Hollywood features from 1942-1945 that included 
bond, blood, and scrap drives in their plotlines, as well as other charitable work.  Home front factory 
production figured in 216 films, while rationing and the shortage of consumer goods were included in 313 
movies.  Many film narratives underscored the negative effects, both national and personal, of trading for 
goods on the black market (255,258, 264, 267).   
10 The 1940 census lists the total population of Oklahoma at 658,739 with 156, 323 (33%) reported as 
employed in agricultural pursuits.  In Payne County 11,787 (33%) of the total population of 36,057 were 
enumerated as agriculturists (United States Census Bureau).   
11 The Stillwater Gazette reported on 31 March 1944 that local theatres had collected over $52,000.00 for 
the current Infantile Paralysis Fund. 
12 Also in 1939, the board of directors established a “sinking fund” because they viewed “the economic 
conditions [as] . . . unsettled caused by world war conditions and other factors affecting both business and 
government” (Griffith, Box 1, Vol. 6) 
13 Organizations housed there free of charge included “the Salvation Army’s dental clinic, the Maternal 
Health Center’s prenatal and postnatal clinic, the Junior League’s child health clinic, nutrition and home 
nursing classes taught by the Red Cross, city hospitals and the Oklahoma Tuberculosis and Health 
Association and health classes for girls and women to be taught by several organizations.”  There were 
plans to add “an ear, nose and throat clinic, cancer clinic, mental hygiene clinic, emergency clinic and 
social hygiene clinic for children” (Oklahoman 29 June 1941). 
14 For an analysis of this British Ministry of Information film of 1943, see the article by Rollins. 
15 Sixteen-millimeter films, to be screened at schools, war plants, and civic meetings, were an important 
part of Hollywood’s contribution to the war effort.  Projector owners were encouraged to volunteer their 
services as 16mm Minute Men through a direct mail campaign for the Fifth War Loan drive.  For the Sixth 
War Loan drive, the Treasury Department estimated that there were “eighty-seven thousand showings to 
23.5 million people” (Samuel 61). 
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16 Similar War Bond promotions were recorded in The Oklahoman. For example on 7 September 1943, this 
newspaper announced a special event to include visiting Hollywood celebrities William Boyd (Hopalong 
Cassidy), Mary Brian, Preston Foster, and Grace Bradley.  In 1945, the Griffith theatres sponsored 
appearances by Edgar Bergen, Charlie McCarthy, Don Ameche, Joan Merrill and the Edgar Bergen Troupe 
(Oklahoman 21 May). 
17 Much of Hoopes’s work offers a behind-the-scenes look at life on the road rather than efforts by the stars 
to sell war bonds.  His work is a colorful narrative. 
18 The refrain to this Irving Berlin song encouraged bond purchases as an investment in freedom: 
Any bonds today? 
Bonds of freedom 
That’s what I’m selling 
Any bonds today? 
Scrape up the most you can 
Here comes the freedom man 
Asking you to buy a share of freedom today 
19 Robert K. Merton conducted a highly detailed study of one particular bond sales effort in 1943—an 
eighteen-hour radio event aired by CBS with Kate Smith speaking regularly throughout the entire 
broadcast.  Her celebrity power and audience sympathies as her voice grew weaker by the hour netted 





Renewed Antitrust Prosecution: 
The Supreme Court Rulings and Consequences (1945-1949) 
 
Like so many of the problems dogging the movie industry during  
The 1940s, the government’s antitrust campaign took on a new  
intensity after the war.  The Justice Department had eased its  
trust-busting efforts during the war, and in fact the only significant  
antitrust decision against the film industry had involved not the  
studios but the large unaffiliated theater circuits.—Kindem1
Although wartime activities kept every level of the film industry busy from 
Hollywood’s production of training films and home front entertainments to the exhibition 
of newsreels and war bond sales in local theatres, antitrust legal battles never disappeared 
completely.  The studios, maintaining the status quo of block- and blind-booking, 
continued industry policies established under the earlier protection of the 1933 National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) even though the Supreme Court ruled the NIRA 
unconstitutional in May 1935.  Ironically, the Antitrust Division of the Justice 
Department, also established in 1933, spent its first years enforcing industry agreements 
that Thurman Arnold and his successors later sought judgment against.2 After several 
drafts, the Big Five Hollywood studios and the Justice Department signed a consent 
decree on 29 October 1940.  Essentially “a no-contest plea and an implicit admission of 
guilt,” this agreement changed the movie business very little.  Block-booking would 
continue but those blocks were reduced to packages of five film; blind-booking was to be  
108
eliminated through tradeshow screenings; theatres would no longer be required to rent 
film shorts or newsreels; disputes would go to arbitration; and none of the Big Five 
studios were allowed to expand theatre holdings (Schatz, Boom 20).3 Thurman Arnold 
quickly recognized that the 1940 studio consent decree would prove to be ineffectual and 
in Oklahoma the courts continued hearing lawsuits from exhibitors.   
 Acting on the complaint of A. B. Momand in 1931, the attorney for Pottawatomie 
County, Clarence Tankersly brought suit against L. C. Griffith and Griffith Amusement, 
as well as film exchanges and local theatre managers on violations of Oklahoma antitrust 
laws in (Oklahoman 26 May, 19 July 1931).4 Tankersly argued that the defendants had 
sought to eliminate all theatre competition in the state and called for the sale of all the 
circuit’s theatres with the profits to go to the Sooner state.  If, however, the county 
district court did not approve this measure, then Tankersley suggested a fine to be paid to 
the state.  In either case the district attorney sought “a further order . . . permanently 
restraining and enjoining the said defendants, and each of them, from pursuing, 
performing, or carrying out any of the said unlawful acts and combination in violation” of 
the state’s antitrust laws.  The defendants’ reply to charges of controlling film leasing in 
Oklahoma was based upon the belief that Oklahoma law had no effect because the movie 
business was a part of interstate commerce.5 The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court ruling that, under state law as of 1908, antitrust complaints could only be 
filed with the state’s Supreme Court.  Because the county had no jurisdiction, the case 
was dismissed on 26 March 1935 (Tankersley).  A. B. Momand continued his fight 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s against both the Hollywood studios and Griffith 
Amusement.  In 1932, Momand’s case went before Judge Edgar S. Vaught in Federal 
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District Court where he “charged that certain film companies [were] … monopolizing 95 
percent of the motion picture business” and sought $4,950,000.00 in damages.  This case 
was dismissed “without prejudice” when the plaintiff was unable to provide “more 
definite” charges against the nineteen film companies he had named in his suit; this left 
open the possibility of another appeal (Oklahoman 10 July 1936, 31 August, 18 January 
1937).6 By 1938, A. B. Momand had renewed his appeal, adding Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film to his complaint.  Arguing that he had once owned 18 theatres in 10 cities, his total 
claim for damages rose to $6,636,632.00 (Oklahoman 20 March 1938).  Vaught heard 
another Momand case (this time the plaintiff was Mrs.  Loretta L. Momand) begun in 
1935.  Mrs.  Momand’s claims against nine studios included:  first, these film companies 
would not provide current films unless her Shawnee theatre, the ODEON, discontinued 
double features; second, the companies no longer provided free passes for advertising 
purposes, and finally that she was forced to raise admission prices from 10 to 15 cents to 
rent film (Oklahoman 11 December).7 Momand’s persistent litigation and appeals in 
Federal District Court occurred as Thurman Arnold aggressively expanded the Antitrust 
Division, increasing his staff from eighteen to several hundred.  Also, “regional offices 
were established throughout the country to uncover, investigate, and prosecute antitrust 
violations with an eye and ear to what was going on both locally and nationally” (Waller, 
“Antitrust Legacy” 569).  Although federal prosecution targeted Stillwater, Enid, and 
Chickasha, Momand’s complaints surely caught the ear of regional federal antitrust 
attorneys.8
Little over a year after A. B. Momand began his 1938 appeal, it was announced 
that Federal District Attorney Charles E. Dierker would file under the direction of 
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Thurman Arnold an injunction suit against the Griffith companies.  Arnold, as quoted in 
The Oklahoman, sought to prove four concurrent abuses: first, independent theatre 
owners were being forced out of business; second, the possibility of building new theaters 
was hindered; next, independent filmmakers were being shut out of distribution; and 
finally, independent theatre owners were blocked from renting films suitable for local 
preferences.  He noted that “local monopoly could be just as stifling to competition as 
national monopoly, and much more disorderly” (Oklahoman 28 April 1939).  Arnold’s 
criteria echo the complaints that Momand had pursued for almost a decade.  Griffith 
Amusement now faced two lawsuits in Federal District Court; the circuit quickly sought 
and was granted delays in responding to both after the Momand case was shifted to the 
court of Alfred P. Murrah allowing Judge Edgar Vaught to preside over the larger, federal 
prosecution (Oklahoman 21 May 1939).  For several months, debate ensued on the 
propriety of defending against charges in concurrent cases, particularly since allegations 
in both addressed unfair, monopolistic business practices.  Each time Murrah deferred to 
the case before Vaught, Momand filed a new suit shifting his charges from price fixing to 
run discrimination (even third run films were unavailable to his theatres) and to product 
entirely withheld.9 The federal case proceeded into 1941 but during World War II, the 
Antitrust Division directed its attention to war-related abuses.  As in the earlier NIRA era, 
national concerns outweighed antitrust prosecutions; war industry excesses and profit-
taking undermined pursuit of federal cases.  Thurman Arnold shifted his attention 
primarily toward international business relationships between American and European 
companies.10 
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Therefore, from 1942 through 1944, the dogged Momand had the opportunity to 
pursue new lawsuits in the courtroom of Federal District Court Judge Bower Broaddus.  
In January 1943, attorneys for Momand spent three days entering contractual evidence 
into the record.  L. C. Griffith and Horace Falls were the first witnesses to be called to 
testify.  The Oklahoman reported on 26 January 1943, that Momand had been on the 
witness stand for three days and had only reached business events of 1927.  With Griffith 
Amusement owning eleven theatres that had once been owned by Momand, testimony 
implied that the circuit had acted with the studio exchanges to force the plaintiff out of 
business.  This Shawnee theatre owner described his futile attempts to negotiate for better 
films even after offering “to convert his class A theaters into second-run shows.”  He also 
noted that a particular First National film renting to other movie houses for $70 was 
priced to him for $375.  In 1927, after purchasing a theatre in Alva, Momand advised 
Paramount that he would not honor the former owner’s rental agreement unless prices 
were lowered.  He quoted the studio representative as saying that the studio’s policy was 
“to ‘put in competition’ in a town where they couldn’t get an established theater.”  This 
trial lasted six weeks, producing a transcript of 3,800 pages.  Judge Broaddus ruled, in his 
188 page opinion “that there was no evidence to support the charge that there had been a 
general conspiracy by the defendants.”  He did identify “a ‘local conspiracy’ between 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., and a local Wewoka movie exhibitor” and awarded treble 
damages plus attorney’s fees totaling $44,500.  Griffith Amusement was ordered to pay 
$6,900 for “overbuying available pictures for its Shawnee outlets” (Oklahoman 2 August 
1943).11 Never one to give up his fight, Momand joined forces with Oklahoma Theaters, 
Inc.  and the owners of single units in Picher and Vinita to begin a new suit against 
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Griffith and thirteen film distributors with plans to add more independent theatre owners 
(Oklahoman 4 February 1944).  Evidently this effort stalled when prosecutors 
reinvigorated the pending federal case.    
In 1949, A. B. Momand published a book describing his eighteen-year legal battle 
against what he labeled “a colossal criminal conspiracy” (6).12 His foreward insists that 
“All citizens of the American Republic should read this absorbing book, in fifty-two 
breathtaking pages and an Appendix of twenty-two pages . . . for the purpose of a 
knowledge of the real state of the Union, the present status of our government.”  As his 
title and opening indicate, Momand identified not only a tangle of movie businesses but 
also those in the judicial system as opponents to his numerous lawsuits.  He first attacked 
the Hays Office as an organization of co-conspirators controlled by the “Big Eight,” 
Momand’s term for the Big Five and Little Three.  Although he wrote long after the 1940 
Consent Decree had been overturned and even longer since NIRA policies had been 
found unconstitutional, he charged that the “Hays Office conspirators” continued to 
conduct business as they had since the 1930s: 
They [the conspirators] subjected theatre owners to compulsory 
arbitration in their own “kangaroo” courts, in which they made decisions 
that disposed of the property of theatre owners.  Their credit committees 
required reports that enabled them to ascertain the most valuable money-
making theatres throughout the land.   
They withdrew and withheld their pictures to the extent that 
theatres desired by them could not be operated by their owners.  They 
harassed the owners of theatres desired by them in every conceivable way 
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that they could devise to discourage them and put them out of business, 
whereupon they “took over” their theatres.  (Momand 4-5)13 
He argued that when the studios carved up the nation, “Universal was awarded 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, and certain other parts of the United States” (5).  This 
assertion probably grew out of the brief partnership with Griffith and Universal.  Yet, as 
Griffith documents indicate, the regional circuit was never a dependent subsidiary 
controlled by the studio as Momand believed.  Additionally, Universal’s late entry into 
theatre acquisition belies the image of the “Hays Office conspirators” secretly hunched 
over a map of the country in some smoke-filled room.  However, the Griffith 
organization did purchase two lots in Shawnee in 1927, contracting for construction of a 
new theatre with Gates Corgan, the circuit’s usual builder.  In 1929, Griffith leased the 
CRITERION THEATRE for ten years from Seminole Amusement, one of Momand’s 
operating companies (Griffith Box 2, Vol. 1).  Griffith Amusement records for the 
stockholder’s meeting of 1939 describe the sale of personal property, i.e.  furnishings and 
equipment for the STATE and CRITERION theatres in Shawnee from Seminole Amusement 
(the STATE THEATRE was to be closed) but there is no record of an accompanying sale of 
real estate indicating that Griffith Realty had already purchased the properties or A. B. 
Momand had leased and not owned the theatre sites (Griffith Box 4, Vol. 6).14 
Had Momand pursued his grievances in a suit against Warner Bros.  his case 
might have better dovetailed with the Paramount Decision since that studio owned all the 
first run theatres in Oklahoma City—at least until 1940 (Bertrand, Evans, and Blanchard 
11).  Instead, this Shawnee theatre owner focused his litigation on the Universal Film 
Exchange.  The 1947 decision on Momand v.  Universal Film Exchange, Inc.  (72 F. 
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Supp. 469) is often cited as precedent in later private treble damage antitrust cases.  One 
of Momand’s many complaints about the judicial system, or more specifically those 
sitting on the bench, grew out of Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.,’s ruling in this trial to 
overturn jury awarded damages.15 On the face of it, Momand would seem justified in 
crying foul when a jury had found in his favor and his book emphasizes that his victory 
was unfairly reversed.   
With the stroke of a pen, Judge Wyzanski, contrary to law . . . and the 
controlling decisions of the circuit courts and the United States Supreme 
Court, the evidence and the verdicts of the jury, wiped out the Plaintiff’s 
achievements of a lifetime, unless he could invest additional years and 
another sizeable amount of money in retrieving his estate.  (Momand 39) 
By Momand’s estimations including interest accrued after the jury verdict, he was owed 
at the time of writing $2,165,558.28—much less than the over $6 million he had sought 
in 1932.  Wyzanski, in a Harvard Law Review article, “A trial Judges Freedom and 
Responsibility,” recalled this as the only time he had overturned a jury decision.  He 
believed the jury’s award of over one million dollars to be a result of  “the generality” of 
his instructions before deliberation; because he had not given proper directions, he felt 
compelled to reverse the jury’s findings (Wyzanski 1289). 
 After losing on appeal, Momand filed a Writ of Certiorari seeking a hearing 
before the Supreme Court with an Amicus Curiae brief from the Department of Justice.  
At the time his book was written, a petition to the Supreme Court to reconsider his Writ, 
a last ditch effort since traditionally very few are ever accepted for a hearing.  In his 
resubmission he wrote: 
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The Plaintiff asserts his right as a citizen of the Republic to point out to 
Congress and the Department of Justice, and to the people, that if our 
government has deteriorated to the extent that the United States Supreme 
Court may turn deaf ears and blind eyes, with thumbs down, upon a 
mortally wounded Citizen-Plaintiff, who, in an eighteen year battle against 
the many times convicted Hays Office conspiracy, and certain United 
States district and circuit court judges, has added another conviction to the 
long list of convictions of the conspiracy . . . and refuses to review the 
corrupt conduct of the district and circuit courts . . . while the Department 
of Justice sits supinely refusing to participate in an administration of 
justice, that unless heroic action is swiftly and decisively taken, to protect 
the lawfully returned verdicts of the jury, the American democracy may be 
in the evening of its life as a democracy of free people.  (50)16 
A.  B. Momand, despite the urging of his counsel refused to settle, writing, “The 
Plaintiff has declined all such offers of settlement because of the public interest involved 
and his deep conviction that he is entitled to be compensated” (9).  With a knowledge of 
his many lawsuits, his advocacy for the general public might ring false but this protection 
of the film consumer was a common argument for abolishing block- and blind-booking 
(film exhibitors were forced to rent movies unsuitable for their local audiences) and, of 
course, antitrust laws were designed with the expressed purpose of protecting the 
purchasing power of the public.  His unwillingness to “settle” may also indicate that he 
rejected offers from the Griffith brothers to sell his theatres to the circuit in exchange for 
corporate stock, a frequent arrangement in other purchases. 
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In something over seventy pages, Momand not only outlined his grievances and 
his multiple lawsuits, but also attacked the integrity of each judge who has tried his cases, 
including Wyznaski, Massachusetts District Court; Edgar S. Vaught and Bower 
Broaddus, Oklahoma District Court; and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.17 As 
for the Griffiths, Momand wrote, “R. E. and L. C. Griffith decisively contradicted and 
denied, under oath, the truthful testimony of the Plaintiff relating to certain conversations 
with them.”  Implying divine retribution, he continues, “R. E. Griffith fell dead in 
December of that same year (1943) and the following year L. C. Griffith suffered two 
strokes . . .  .  Both men were in the ‘prime of life’ and enjoying the fruits of colossal 
‘success’” (Momand 22).18 Although he produced evidence that Griffith Amusement had 
overbought from the majority of studio distributors, his documentation also indicates that 
the circuit had carefully avoided contracts with every studio in any given year.  
Therefore, at least theoretically, some “Big Eight” product was available to Momand’s 
theatres as well as films from smaller independent producers.  This information does 
indicate that he would be forced to third-run status or a program of only “B” movies.  
Momand offers but one more piece of evidence to prove a conspiracy between Griffith 
Amusement and the studio distributors—a photocopied letter from Griffith booking 
agent, H. R. Falls to Republic Pictures dated 7 July 1937.  This letter informs the 
Republic representative that a second-run theatre under construction in Norman would be 
opening in September coincident with “the time we negotiate our deal with you for your 
service on the balance of the circuit” (Momand 13).  To the independent theatre owner’s 
eyes, this letter meant that Republic was threatened with losing the circuit’s business 
unless the Norman moviehouse was included in negotiations.  But for two companies 
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with prior dealings, it could be a simple declaration that construction was moving 
forward on schedule.  Although Momand located a conspiracy within the Big Eight, 
Republic was a smaller independent producer/distributor of “B” movies offering little 
incriminatory proof of a sinister cabal in Hollywood; John Wayne began his career 
starring in Republic Westerns.  Momand may never have won the millions of dollars in 
damages that he sought, but evidence he gathered aided in federal cases.  “The Plaintiff 
supplied the Department of Justice . . . a large volume of the evidence with which the 
conspirators were convicted in actions relating to Standard Contract-Arbitration and 
Credit Committee conspiracies” (15).  His long legal journey did help fellow independent 
exhibitors and may have also served in the larger federal case against Paramount, and 
others. 
From 1939 to 1941 much of the federal case was taken up with requests by the 
numerous defendants to delay court dates or to explain the charges in the suit.  In July 
1939, three months after litigation was first announced, Griffith Amusement asked Judge 
Vaught to approve a motion requiring the prosecuting attorneys to be more specific in 
their charges, to provide a bill of particulars on the alleged anti-trust violations, and to 
clarify definitions of terms in the accusations including “first-run,” “clearance,” and “first 
class pictures.”  The circuit also requested an accounting of the number of feature films 
distributed by each studio from 1934 to 1939 (Oklahoman 20 July 1939).  Nine months 
later Judge Vaught ruled that the government should provide more detailed information 
on fifteen points concerning the charges being pursued and denied eighty-five points 
including Griffith’s request to learn of individual locations, dates, and names of alleged 
conspirators acting as agents of both the circuit and the film distributors (Oklahoman 5
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April 1940).19 Griffith and the other defendants finally filed answers to the complaint in 
July and August 1940 but the case did not go to trial until 1945.  Judge Vaught noted in 
his comments in 1950, when the case was returned to his district court for injunctive 
remedies by the Supreme Court, that “all of the continuances .  .  .were at the request of 
the government based upon the fact that many of the government attorneys in the 
Department of Justice were engaged in war activities” (Federal Supplement, Vol. 94, 
749).  After six long years, the trial finally began on 7 May 1945. 
Judge Vaught heard testimony and arguments for three weeks in May and 
continued the trial from 10 September through 2 October 1945 for a total of thirty days.  
“Evidence was introduced relating to 243 theatres in 93 towns.  In that trial there were 
3668 pages of typewritten record and 761 exhibits were introduced, numbering 2873 
pages” (Federal Supplement, Vol. 94, 749).  The Stillwater papers did not cover these 
proceedings, but The Oklahoman regularly reported on courtroom activities.  Former 
Griffith employee and the prosecution’s star witness testified that he had sold his 
Plainview, Texas theatre when he was unable to book films after Universal Films 
declined to renew his contract in 1935; the case covered the years 1933-1938 
(Oklahoman 9 May 1945).  As indicated in Chapter Four, partnership between Griffith 
and Universal had ended by 1928; Dennis Scaling’s testimony as to a time after the 
dissolution of the circuit/studio relationship could only imply a possible collusion of 
these businesses.  Wendell Bearden, former owner of the TECH THEATRE in Lubbock, 
Texas, quoted Griffith representatives as intending to “control Lubbock.”  He then 
described the circuit’s efforts to do just that by placing signage across the street 
announcing new theatre construction in 1938.  When Bearden declined to sell out at the 
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value offered, a Griffith theatre was built two blocks from the TECH. He later sold his 
interests in the business to his partner, P. E. Smith (Oklahoman 15 May 1945).  Whether 
good business or illegal activity, Smith partnered with the Griffiths for eighteen years and 
the Tech came under the circuit’s control (Rice 64, 136).  C. B. Akers surprised the 
prosecuting attorneys when he announced that wax recordings had been made of Bearden 
and James Bennett of Drumright when they traveled to Oklahoma City to discuss the 
possible sale of their theatres.  Bearden looked less a victim after Akers described the 
audio evidence (Oklahoman 14 September 1945).20 Both L. C. and H. J. Griffith testified 
that they never discussed competitor contracts with studio distributors, which they 
corroborated, adding that there were towns where competitor rentals excluded Griffith 
Amusement’s theatres (Federal Supplement, Vol. 68,180; 188-89).  After considering the 
evidence before him.  Judge Vaught found that nothing in the Justice Department case 
had been proven. 
In his thirty-eight page ruling on United States v.  Griffith Amusement Co.  et al 
(Civil Action No.  172), Judge Vaught began with a description of the film exhibition 
business in general and then remarked on the history of the Griffith brothers as showmen, 
writing, “The Griffith brothers are shown to have been exceptionally good theater 
operators, keeping constantly abreast of the development of a rapidly growing industry.  
Their accounts were naturally coveted by the producers of moving pictures” (Federal 
Supplement, Vol. 68, 180; 185).  Vaught contended that the distributors and not the 
exhibitors initiated franchise agreements of one to three years; therefore, Griffith 
Amusement could not be at fault.  In examining with whom Griffith had contracted, the 
trial judge noted that during any year under consideration “at least six of what is termed 
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the major distributors had no franchise with the defendants” (Federal Supplement 
Vol.68,180; 191).  Vaught went on to rule that there was no evidence of any “pooling” 
arrangements in Chickasha, Enid, or Stillwater and no proof of any move to control 
regional film exhibition (Federal Supplement, Vo.  68, 180; 193, 196).  He rejected the 
prosecution’s arguments that the Griffith situation was equivalent to either the Schine or 
Crescent cases or that the large number of Griffith theatre holdings could establish intent 
to become a monopoly through the circuit’s buying power.21 Vaught concluded with 
more praise for the Griffith brothers: “The defendants went into the open market and 
bought their product from the distributors in the same manner as was open to all 
competitors.  The defendants were alert and progressive and took such advantages only as 
were natural in the industry” (Federal Supplement, Vol. 68, 180; 196, 197, 199).  On 25 
October 1946, Vaught issued his final decree ruling that no violation of the Sherman 
antitrust act had been proven. 
Not surprisingly, with the success they had in prosecuting the Crescent and 
Schine circuits, Justice Department attorneys appealed this case to the United States 
Supreme Court.  This appeal came before the court on 15 December 1947 and the court 
handed down a decision on 3 May 1948 with Justice William O. Douglas delivering the 
ruling and Justice Frankfurter dissenting.  Douglas first outlined the growth of the 
appellees’ companies from 1934 to 1939, noting an increase from 53 towns to 85 towns 
with a rise in closed towns from 51% to 62%.  While these figures indicate that the circuit 
operated in more closed towns, there is no comment on whether the additional towns 
previously had a movie house.  The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the 
precedents established in United States v Aluminum Co.  of America, as well as United 
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States v Crescent Amusement Co., both of which Judge Vaught had found inapplicable to 
the Griffith case.  On the basis of these previous findings, Douglas explained that it was 
“not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in 
order to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated” and that the “laws are as much 
violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction . . . when the buying power 
of the entire circuit is used to negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed 
towns” (U.S. v Griffith).  Although Vaught’s decision had been overturned on appeal, 
Douglas noted: 
What effect these practices actually had on the competitors of the appellee 
exhibitors or on the growth of the Griffith circuit we do not know.  .  .  .On 
the record as we read it, it cannot be doubted that the monopoly power of 
the appellees had some effect on their competitors and on the growth of 
the Griffith circuit.  Its extent must be determined on a remand of the 
cause.  We remit to the District Court not only that problem but also the 
fashioning of a decree which will undo as near as may be the wrongs that 
were done and prevent their recurrence in the future.  (U.S. v Griffith)22 
There is no mention of Judge Vaught’s ruling or the reversal by the Supreme Court in the 
minutes of either the Griffith Board of Directors meetings or the Annual Stockholders 
meetings throughout the many years of prosecution.  The only mention of litigation 
addressed the “demands of August 11, 1948, for an audit prepared by attorneys, Sargoy 
& Stein, of New York City on behalf of” each of the eight Hollywood studios named in 
the Paramount Decision.  The board voted to deny the request and instead asked that each 
studio provide an independent auditor with no “checking local towns;” only corporate 
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records would be examined.  Further, the “officers were directed to cease routine six 
month, three year, and five year destruction of records as long as these demands for audit 
or litigation concerning same were pending” (Griffith Box 2, Vol. 14).  The Griffith 
organization had kept the paper trail a short one, but the new hearings in Judge Vaught’s 
courtroom would again be lengthy—“43 court days” and another “5398 typewritten 
pages of testimony and 682 exhibits, amounting to 2531 pages” (94 F. Supp. 755, 753). 
 The Oklahoman began reporting that new court actions would begin on 1 July 
1948 to “hear suggestions from attorneys for the government and the Griffith concerns on 
what further proceedings should be held.”  After Judge Vaught revealed that he would 
announce his decision on 20 September, the government requested delays and expanded 
the case to include Theater Enterprises because this organization had purchased Westex 
Theaters and all previously owned theatres by the now deceased R. E. Griffith 
(Oklahoman 10 June, 2 July, 11 August, 17 October, and 2 November 1948).  As with the 
earlier case heard by Vaught, the federal prosecutors requested the delays.  By the time of 
new hearings, the structure of the Griffith organization wisely had been modified creating 
the appearance of independent companies no longer headed by all the brothers.  In 
addition to changes in corporate structure resulting from R. E.’s death, Griffith 
Amusement had been liquidated with movie houses sold to Griffith Consolidated and 
Griffith Metropolitan Theatres (Federal Supplement, Vol. 94, 755, 751).  Justice 
Department attorneys introduced testimony beyond the scope of the original trial 
including theatres in additional towns purchased after the five-year period examined in 
the initial complaint.  Exhibitors from around the state aired their grievances against the 
Griffith organization: a Sand Springs owner was unable to obtain any first or second run 
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films from any major distributor; a former Blackwell exhibitor was shut out by Columbia 
and Warner Bros. even after he offered to pay more for their films (defense attorneys 
countered that he had tried to book out of season); a Picher theatre owner turned farmer 
charged that he was driven out of business; another complained that the only first run 
movie he was able to book was Snow White (Oklahoman 2, 4, 6, and 11 December, 
1948).  The most well prepared witness turned out to be R. H Russ, owner of the 
CAMERA in Stillwater who arrived with small notebook in hand.  Vaught overruled 
defense objections, allowing Russ to read from his notes.  He testified that RKO 
distributors told him “it would mean a big loss . . . to sell to independent operators.  . . . 
They said it would antagonize Griffith.  . . . It would interfere with Griffith.”  A 
Paramount representative told him that plenty of films would be available for rental, only 
to learn they were all third-run movies (Oklahoman 7 December 1948).  Witness for the 
prosecution Ralph V. McGinnis surprised the court when he announced that “he was on 
‘friendly terms’ with the theater chain” who when asked about his grievances replied, 
“None in particular that I know of” (Oklahoman 1 February 1949).  After thirty-four 
independent exhibitors testified for the government, the defense began to call their 
witnesses on 12 February 1949 asking hundreds of pre-written questions provided to the 
Justice Department attorneys in advance (Oklahoman 26 April, 1949).  Cross-
examinations of all witnesses concluded in June and Judge Vaught announced his ruling 
9 October 1949.  Vaught failed to find conclusive evidence that independent owners who 
had sold out or simply walked away from their theatres had been forced to do so by the 
Griffith organization.  The judge saw distributor practices as a natural desire to exhibit 
films in the theatres that would be most profitable.  Vaught wrote: 
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Throughout this case we have been confronted with competition between a 
defendant’s theatre, which in practically every case was an up-to-date 
theatre with modern furnishings and the latest in operating equipment, as 
against a converted store building or building that had prior thereto been 
used for some other purpose, with inferior equipment.  (Federal 
Supplement, Vol. 94; 755, 753)  
Vaught declared that “no evidence was introduced in the second trial showing the extent 
to which any individual competitor was affected or damaged by these licensing 
agreements which the Supreme Court held constituted illegal exercises of monopoly 
(Federal Supplement, Vol. 94, 755, 754).  Once again this District Court judge was 
unconvinced by the government’s case, although he did call for booking films on a 
theatre-by-theatre basis.  In response to the Justice Department’s request that the Griffith 
circuit divest itself of theatres in a majority of towns where theatres were located, Vaught 
wrote, “In other words, the government insists that these corporations, so far as their 
operations are concerned in the theatre business, be destroyed.  This certainly would be a 
most drastic punishment when the suit was filed in 1939” (Federal Supplement Vol. 94, 
755, 754).  Other than the new booking arrangements, no action was taken against the 
Griffith organization.  After ten years of court proceedings nothing really changed since 
despite the mandate to secure films theatre by theatre, as Judge Vaught surely knew, the 
distributors would still cater to the larger theatre chain.  The Justice Department failed to 
impact the operations of the circuit; it would be other circumstances that brought 




1 Kindem is the editor of an anthology which explores industry issues; The American Movie Industry: The 
Business of Motion Pictures (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1982) 313. 
2 Thurman Arnold was sworn in as head of the Antitrust Division on 21 March 1938 after attacks from the 
press and in the United States Senate based on his book, The Folklore of Capitalism, which was criticized 
by both conservatives and liberals (Waller, “Antitrust Legacy” 575, 577). 
3 Almost immediately the problems of this agreement became apparent.  Small, independent theatre owners 
had neither the time nor the resources to travel to advanced screenings and therefore were forced to 
continue booking blind.  Arbitration boards, established under the NIRA, continued to be heavily weighted 
toward the interests of the studios and the larger exhibition circuits.  For example, the group established to 
hear grievances for the Theater Owners of Oklahoma included: four studio distribution exchange 
representatives, corporate officers of three theatre circuits (including Griffith Amusement), and three 
theatre managers (one from the Griffith circuit and one who would come under the Griffith umbrella in the 
1940s) as reported on 22 February 1934 (Oklahoman).  The “Big Five” refers to these studios which owned 
movie theatre chains—Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount Pictures, RKO Radio Pictures, 20th Century 
Fox, Warner Brothers 
4 A. B. Momand was not a stranger to court proceedings and his experiences illustrate the litigious nature of 
the film industry at the local level.  In 1932 Consolidated Amusement sued him for non-payment of film 
rental for a showing of Josephine Barlow Revue (Consolidated Amusement Co.).  Momand and the 
Okmulgee Theatre Company were sued for nonpayment on Western Electric sound equipment installed for 
a theatre purchased in 1930.  The court ruled that the plaintiff was due $1,223.32 (Electrical Research 
Prods).   
5 While this defense was useful on the state level, introducing the idea that the federal government held 
jurisdiction over the local movie business as interstate commerce opened the door for prosecution of 
Griffith Amusement in Federal District Court  
6 In 1933, Griffith Amusement owned two theatres competing with Momand in Shawnee.  By 1938, two 
more Shawnee theatres were under Griffith control (Rice 138). 
7 Film distributors opposed double bills because more income on a percentage of box office could be 
earned if movies were screened individually. 
8 Momand v Universal Film Exchanges [172 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir.  1948)] is cited as precedent for private 
treble damage antitrust cases.  The Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “The degree of certainty required of a 
plaintiff in proving causation of damage is necessarily elastic . . . Particularly in an antitrust suit, covering 
126
as it must many imponderables, rigid standards of precise proof would make a plaintiff’s task practically 
hopeless” (Cassady 27-28). 
9 See reports in The Oklahoman on 17 June, 6 September, and 30 September 1939.  Momand argued that 
booking agents conspired with Griffith to put the ODEON into a position of showing only fifth run or B 
movies.  Federal prosecutors based much of their case against the studios on the fact that the Big Five 
controlled seventy percent of the first run market earning larger profits on higher admissions.  As noted in 
Mrs.  Momand’s suit, film exchanges had dictated an increase in admission price to gain better film; 
distributor’s contracts commonly included admission price agreements.   
10 Arnold’s most notable case of this period, United States v.  Standard Oil Co., charged that this American 
company willfully agreed to limit synthetic rubber production in combination with I. G. Farben of 
Germany.  With pressure from the War Department, Arnold was forced to accept “a consent decree which 
freed up some patents, but required only the payment of a $50,000 fine.”   When Arnold tried to prosecute 
the railroads, including Union Pacific chairman Averell Harriman, Arnold was “promoted” to the Federal 
Appeals Court and Harriman was named ambassador to the Soviet Union (Waller, “Antitrust Legacy” 604-
07).   
11 For a fuller discussion of the trial proceedings see The Oklahoman reports of 14 and 26 January, and 4 
and 24 February 1943.  Hampton’s work attests to the possibility of such threats as Momand described.  
Paramount’s rapid theatre expansion in the 1920s was in part due to the efforts of agents who came to be 
labeled “the wrecking crew” or “the dynamite gang” because of their methods of persuasion.  If an owner 
did not sign an exclusive contract with the studio, competing theatres were purchased or new movie houses 
were built, effectively driving the independent exhibitor out of business (Hampton 255). 
12 Momand’s book carries the explosive title, Help Wanted, Male & Female or The Great Motion Picture 
Conspiracy, Condensed. The Oklahoma Baptist University Press published this work in Shawnee.   
13 Momand also noted the personal toll such practices took on local showmen.  “Several theatre owners 
within the acquaintance of the Plaintiff met death tragically, including suicide, among them the late Harry 
Crandall . . . whose hand clutched a note: ‘I miss my theatres oh so much!’ . . . [Another] filed an anti-trust 
action against the Conspiracy but broke down several years later, before he could advance the action to a 
trial on the merits” (5).   
14 The STATE THEATRE is not listed as a Griffith exhibition site in Rice’s listings (138).  This may be one of 
the properties that the organization converted to commercial property as Momand complained of in his 
book (15).  Griffith records indicate theatre ownership in all towns where Momand had theatre interests, 
namely Shawnee, Guthrie, Oklahoma City, Wewoka, Clinton, Holdenville, Pawhuska, Alva, and Maud. 
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15 Momand’s counsel ignored his client’s request to seek disqualification of Wyzanski because before being 
elevated to the bench, he had been attorney for many large corporations in Boston, some of which had been 
prosecuted by federal attorneys (35). 
16 To add insult to injury soon after he petitioned the Supreme Court a second time, Momand received a bill 
from the Treasury Department demanding back taxes on the small, as he called them “token” judgments 
from Griffith and Paramount.  He contended that monies awarded as damages were not taxable income 
(Momand 52). 
17 Alfred P. Murrah escaped accusations by being promoted to the Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver 
before ruling on Momand’s suit.   
18 Momand’s memory inaccurately dates L. C. Griffith’s debilitating strokes; they occurred in 1946. 
19 Henry Griffing, lead defense attorney for the Griffith concerns labeled the case a “suit against bigness” 
during a conference of attorneys representing ten Hollywood distributors and Assistant Attorney General 
Holmes Baldridge held before Judge Vaught on 16 November 1943 (Oklahoman).  This was the last local 
press coverage of the government’s litigation until 1945. 
20 Other testimony for the defense included theatre managers from El Reno and Stillwater; both had sold to 
Griffith, becoming stockholders in the corporation (Oklahoman 15 and 18 September 1945).   
21 The concluding chapter will compare the situations of the three circuits prosecuted, namely, Griffith, 
Crescent, and Schine, and the Paramount Decision. 
22 Although Stillwater was named in the federal suit, local papers carried no coverage of the proceedings in 
District Court but on 7 May 1948, the Gazette featured front-page articles on both the Griffith conviction 
and on the Paramount Decision and on 11 July of that year this newspaper reported that the case was being 
reopened.  Because there was no local press on the litigation, there is no record of what complaints R. H. 
Russ, the owner of the independent CAMERA THEATRE, harbored until the case was remanded to Judge 
Vaught.  For a brief period (September 1931 to May 1932) the Camera was a part of the Griffith circuit 





Change in the Griffith Organization: 
Post-War and Post-Prosecution (1949-1960) 
 
“Four wall” theaters in the United States declined from, 18,719 in 1946  
to 14,509 in 1956 a drop of . . . 22.5 percent.  However, a new drive-in . . . 
opened for each theater closing.  One 1956 survey indicated the net results  
of industry changes on the theaters.  . . . with more than half of the U.S.   
theaters unable to earn profits, it was estimated that on a consolidated basis,  
all U.S theaters were showing a net loss of $11.8 million.—Michael Conant1
The post-war years brought profound changes to the movie industry both in 
Hollywood and Oklahoma.  “Between 1946 and 1956 the industry lost almost half of its 
customers, with the average weekly attendance at theaters declining from 90 million to 46 
million.  . . . This defection on the part of consumers occurred during a period of rising 
expenditures on most other goods and services, so that the industry’s share of total 
consumer purchases was reduced from 1.15 percent to 0.49 percent in ten years (Stuart 
257).  After enjoying steadily rising admissions income from 1941 through 1946, 
Hollywood studios, now beginning divestiture of exhibition sites, as well as independent 
theatre owners, searched for the means to maximize box-office returns.2 For the studios, 
selling theatres proved difficult; as sales slumped so to did the value of theatre properties.  
“Declining revenues and the very high cost of remodeling theaters for conversion to other 
uses impeded their salability.  Few people wished to enter the theater business when 
television was becoming popular, and its full impact could not be predicted” (Conant 
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111).  The effects of both the 1948 Paramount Decision and the advent of television enter 
any discussion of the drop in studio revenues but other factors were equally important, 
particularly when examining the late 1940s and 1950s movie business in Oklahoma and, 
more specifically, film exhibition and other opportunities explored by the Griffith circuit 
faced with lower profits.  For Hollywood studios, the loss of theatre income meant shifts 
in film production and explorations of opportunities in the television business, both of 
which affected the independent theatre owner.  For the Griffith organization, corporate 
leaders looked to diversification into not only television but also other enterprises 
peripheral to, but capitalizing on, changes in consumer spending habits.  For any 
exhibitor of this period one possible business avenue was the drive-in movie theatre, a 
direct response to the mobility of auto ownership of the post-war audiences, who moved 
to the suburbs creating a housing boom.  The baby boom affected moviegoing habits, as 
well; the cost of a babysitter now factored into the price of an evening out.  After World 
War II, consumers had more products and pastimes from which to choose.  Such 
activities as furnishing new homes with modern appliances, buying lawn mowers to care 
for newly landscaped yards, taking in a night game at a local ball field, enjoying a few 
frames at a bowling alley, or attending night-school on the GI Bill competed for dollars 
that might have once been reserved for a night at the movies or a matinee for the kids.  In 
addition to these problems shared by every film exhibitor, the Griffith organization 
experienced unexpected tragedies which affected the continuity of circuit leadership. 
A.  B. Momand may have viewed the debilitating strokes of L. C. Griffith as some 
form of karmic punishment for prevarication on the witness stand, but for Griffith 
Amusement the loss of the Skipper’s hand at the helm launched a transformation of the 
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business.  Roger Rice who, as an employee at the Oklahoma City headquarters, knew L. 
C. well, describes the loss of the company leader: 
In September 1946, L. C. Griffith suffered a stroke while visiting a 
barbershop in downtown Oklahoma City.  The cerebral 
hemorrhage caused loss of powers of coherent speech, 
incapacitating him to a point of no longer being able to direct the 
business of his theatre estate.  He remained in serious condition at 
Saint Anthony Hospital in the city for several months before 
becoming ambulatory.  (11) 
Although L. C. Griffith lived to be 80, he required constant care until his death in 1971.  
After almost 30 years of direction from this company founder, the need for a new 
standard bearer with an intimate knowledge of all the numerous business concerns of the 
circuit arose.  The entrepreneurial Griffith era had ended and the corporate Griffing era 
was ushered in with many changes for the organization.  Henry S. Griffing, long-time 
circuit attorney and executive vice-president of Griffith Consolidated, officially took 
charge in 1949 after long-time partner and Vice-president Harry M. Lowenstein died in 
August of that year.  For several years officers listed on board and stockholder reports 
continued to include L. C. Griffith as president.3 Earlier in the year at an 18 June board 
meeting, company officers had been given titles for specific areas of responsibility.  Even 
before L. C. Griffith’s incapacitation, a more structured (and professional) division of 
labor began to be introduced.  Prior to this time company records indicate that decisions 
were either made by L. C. or through a general discussion of all the principals of the 
organization.  From the early “rubber stamp” approvals in Griffith records, it appears that 
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L. C. often exercised his personal “executive order.”4 By 1950, quota systems had been 
put in place to better track performance and profit from the Oklahoma City main office to 
each of the local theatres.  Profit quotas measured the success of the company’s film 
bookers for each group of theatres as well.  For example, the income quota for the 
Stillwater theatres for the second quarter of 1950 was set at $118,744.62 (over 25% of the 
sales quota for the five city division).  J. King, who booked films for Ada, Norman, 
Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Stillwater, was given a target of $450,971.13.  The quota for 
the entire organization for this quarter totaled $1,897, 949.70 (Griffith Box 4, Vol. 29).  
A system to track sales was put in place after one of many changes in the corporate 
structure of the circuit.   
Several incorporations occurred during Henry Griffing’s tenure to enable merger 
or purchase of other theatre companies.  In 1947, the Oklahoma Metropolitan Theatres 
Company was established and then renamed as Griffith Metropolitan to acquire the 
Delman Theatre Corporation, which added four first-run Tulsa theatres to the circuit 
(Griffith Box 2, Vol. 13).  Stock and property exchanges among Griffith Amusement, 
Griffith Consolidated, Griffith Realty, and Griffith Metropolitan Theatres, as well as with 
other independent exhibitors, regularly occurred from 1946 to 1952.  One sale was of 
particular importance in the aftermath of the Supreme Court ruling—all theatres owned 
by Griffith Amusement were sold to Griffith Consolidated in 1947.  At the stockholders 
meeting on 4 February, liquidation of Griffith Amusement was approved with the 
corporation to cease business on 15 February; by 1 December “all of the assets of every 
kind and nature belonging to said corporation, except reasonable reserve for taxes and 
expenses, [were to] be distributed in kind or in cash to the stockholders of record on said 
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date of distribution” (Griffith Box 2, Vol. 13).  Although the majority of the stockholders 
in each corporation were virtually the same, Consolidated had not been named in U. S. v
Griffith. Thus should divestiture be ordered, Griffith Amusement no longer owned the 
theatres covered by the government’s complaint, or rather no longer owned the theatre 
furnishings and equipment, since at this time the Griffith Realty Company owned the 
actual buildings and lots from whom the Griffith exhibition companies leased their 
theatres. 
 The most important of these corporate shifts grew out of L. C. Griffith’s express 
wishes to reward loyal employee-stockholders when he reached his retirement.  Three 
years after his enfeebling stroke, and after Harry Lowenstein’s death, the remaining 
group decided to act upon lease agreements he had begun constructing.  On 29 October 
1949, representing themselves as officers of Video Independent Theatres, C. F. Motley, 
C. O. Fulgham, K. C Blackledge, W. T. Turk, P. C. Cornwell, Henry S. Griffing, C. R. 
Guthrie, and Louise Wesson submitted a plan to the Griffith Consolidated Theatres board 
to lease theatres in 48 towns in Oklahoma and Texas for a 10 year period for a monthly 
rental of $34,583.33 or a maximum of 15% of box-office receipts from Griffith Realty.  
This agreement included approximately 105 four-wallers and 20 drive-in theatres.  The 
petitioners also tendered their resignation from Consolidated (Griffith Box 4, Vol. 15).5
This plan was ratified on 1 December 1949; Griffing became president of Video 
Independent with Fulgham and Motley named vice-presidents and Guthrie becoming the 
secretary-treasurer.  Video now owned all of Consolidated’s theatre furnishings and 
equipment (Rice 16).  For the first time since 1915, the Griffiths were no longer directly 
involved in the film exhibition business; Consolidated now sold concessions in the 
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lobbies of Video theatres.  This situation was short lived; by 3 February 1950 Griffith 
Consolidated began subleasing theatres from Video Independent.  By October of that 
year Consolidated was operating 3 four-wallers and 15 drive-in theatres (Griffith Box 4, 
Vol. 27).  Unlike the Hollywood studios, ordered to divorce their production and 
distribution activities from any exhibition businesses, the Griffith/Video relationship 
overlapped in both theatre interests and corporate officers.  Video’s board and 
stockholders aggressively pursued the drive-in movie business begun by Griffith 
Consolidated with the hope of trading the declining box-office on Main Street 
moviehouses for the growing popularity of the ozoners, as drive-ins were called in the 
industry.  For the Oklahoma moviegoer, the drive-in was more a novelty and a 
convenience for local families and less about avoiding travel from the suburbs to the 
heart of a metropolitan area to visit a picture palace.  For the newly formed exhibition 
chains growing out of court-ordered divestiture, the drive-in offered a way to counter 
slumping sales.  In both cases, closing unprofitable moviehouses rather than investing in 
renovation costs seemed wise as attendance began to shrink.  In one way, the tough 
antitrust attorneys forced both studio chains and independent circuits to rethink their 
theatre holdings just as admission incomes were declining after the 1946 boom year in 
movie attendance.  As the Big Five divested theatres, the newly organized companies 
jockeyed to keep their beloved movie palaces, despite gloomy profit margins, and trends 
that indicated the “nabes,” the less-plush neighborhood theatres, were outperforming 
downtown sites.  They did, however, have the opportunity to shed non-metropolitan 
locations that were becoming unprofitable (Schatz, Boom 294).6
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The drive-in also offered a solution to changing Hollywood production practices 
after losing their considerable income from the exhibition platform of vertical integration.  
Feature film production declined from a high of 379 in 1941 to 234 in 1949 (Schatz, 
Boom 463).  Studios like Universal retreated from “high-quality” films to lower budget 
bread-and-butter productions like its series of Abbott and Costello films, which received 
favorable audience reception.  As Garth Jowett points out, as box office numbers 
declined, studio heads began to study who actually made up their audience rather than 
relying on “intuition.”  To their surprise, “while the number of paid admissions had 
exceeded four billion, according to industry statistics [in 1949] this in fact broke down 
into a probable thirty million separate moviegoers, mainly under thirty, and who went 
several times a week.  A further refinement revealed that a mere thirteen to fifteen million 
individuals actually saw the basic Hollywood staple—the ‘A’ feature film” (343).  Lower 
budget films would satisfy a large percentage of frequent moviegoers, and “B” movies or 
subsequent runs became the staple of the new drive-ins.  Quoting a prophetic Richard 
Hollingshead from a 1933 Business Week article, Gomery writes, “that patrons ‘would 
enjoy movies where they could dress as they please, smoke, talk, and eat supper at the 
same time’” (Shared Pleasures 91).7 Jowett describes a “‘Lost Audience’—that group 
between the ages of thirty-one and sixty who comprised only 35 percent of movie 
patrons” (343).  To recapture that audience studios turned to production of a few large 
budget films each year promoted with higher advertising costs for traditional theatre 
presentation.  Despite litigation by drive-in owners, the studios resisted releasing these 
mega-pics for first run showings in the “ozoners,” preferring to “road show” the deluxe 
movies with advanced ticket sales and distribution agreements of 70/30 on gross receipts.  
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Only the largest theatres could accept the 10% profit off the 30% gross from admissions 
(Whitney 181).8 While drive-ins may have been shut out of the first-run markets, they 
offered a much lower start-up cost than traditional theatres.  Variety figures indicated that 
in 1956, an investment of $300,000.00 could yield a 1,000-car drive-in.  Conant 
calculates that this would add up to 2,500 patrons but fails to recognize that admission 
was often charged by the carload and not per person (147-48).9 As with theatres today, 
snack and candy concessions added significantly to profitability.   
An article from 1948 notes that 10% of profits in a traditional theatre came from 
concession sales and that nine of every ten cents on soda sold from a drink-dispensing 
machine would be profit (“What’s Playing” 205, 209).  By 1956 patrons were spending 
as much for popcorn and other refreshments as they paid for admission (Taylor 247).  
Unlike the cost of film rental, the investment in food inventory created a larger profit 
margin.10 As with other drive-in owners, Video Independent officers were concerned 
with concession sales and charged Louise Wesson in 1952 to analyze the effects of 
cutting prices on candy, ice cream, and hot dogs to boost movie attendance at test 
locations.  Comparing income in 1950 and 1951 when prices were lowered, she found 
that although more food was sold, attendance figures still declined from the previous 
year.  Hot dogs became a loss-leader particularly when averaging in the cost of counter 
wait-staff.  She also cautioned that once prices were lowered, customer resistance to 
future increases could lower attendance.  In her final analysis, Wesson reported that “the 
convenience of location and the picture attraction are the determining factors at the box 
office and not prices at the concession” (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 36).  The movie business 
had grown much more complex since the 1915 theatre purchase by the Griffith brothers.  
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The quality of both theatre facilities and movies improved, and, by 1949, any exhibitor 
that wanted to stay profitable needed outdoor theatres with family friendly facilities 
including a concessions stand.  11 
From 1949 through 1960, Video built or purchased 63 drive-in theatres in 
Oklahoma and Texas; in smaller towns the company kept the four-wallers and did not 
expand into additional ozoners.  In Stillwater, in addition to the three Main Street theatres 
and one near the university, Video added one of its first drive-ins, the Moonlite, in June 
1949 (in 1966 and 1968 two more drive-ins were built) as indicated in Rice’s theatre 
chronology (134-38).  During the same period, the circuit sold 35 theatres.  1952 was a 
watershed year for Video to reconsider theatre holdings and expansion into more drive-in 
sites.  In minutes from 28 October 1952, sales of commercial buildings, manager’s 
homes, and city lots earned $250,000.00 but this record also indicates that $300,000.00 
was needed to remodel two existing drive-ins which may have included installing new 
equipment (Griffith Box 5, Vol.38).  To lure audiences away from television sets and 
back to the theatres, Hollywood tried many new technologies to make the moviegoing 
experience unique.  Some like 3-D films, were a brief novelty; others, like Cinerama, had 
only a few special exhibition venues.  Other innovations like wide-screen CinemaScope 
changed the industry standard.  As these new systems were introduced, theatre owners of 
both traditional four-wallers and drive-ins tried to determine the cost benefits of installing 
new screens and other necessary equipment to offer their audiences the latest “invention” 
from Hollywood.  Debuted in 1953 with the Twentieth Century-Fox film, The Robe,
CinemaScope required a curved screen with a new length/height ratio (2.5 to 1) and four 
track sound for maximum effect.  Other systems competed for large screen use, notably 
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Vistavision, a Paramount offerings; Todd-A.O., promoted by MGM; and some also-rans 
like Vistarama, Cinepanoramic, Camerascope, Vidoscope, and Delrama (Stuart 298).12 
With falling attendance and therefore falling profits, the decision to invest in the cost of 
equipment and installation must have kept many a showman up at night.  Griffith records 
show that at a 25 May 1953 stockholders’ meeting plans were in place to install the new 
technologies: 
 3-D and CinemaScope remodeling policies: 
a. One theatre in each town, except Wink, should be prepared for 3-D 
and wide-screen operation.  A screen should be custom built for each 
theatre . . . present screens should be utilized where they will fit 
requirements; cancel all present orders not in conformity with this 
policy. 
b. Order all Cinemascope and wide-angle lens upon which it is possible 
to obtain commitments. 
c. Plan to circuit the seven sets of Stereophonic sound equipment, with 
installed speakers remaining stationary. 
d. Proceed with conversion of all drive-in theatres to accommodate 3-D. 
(Griffith Box 5, Vol. 38) 
These decisions followed serious concerns about tackling the conversion of theatres to 
accommodate the new technologies from Hollywood.  The minutes of a 3 March 1953 
board meeting addressed changes in the circuit’s theatres, particularly for the future of 
drive-ins.  Various 3-D systems were discussed, but the primary concern was two-fold.  
First, the polarization required for both glasses and screens reduced projection light by 
138
almost one-half.  To elevate the 3-D effect, stereophonic sound would be needed but in-
car drive-in speakers were not designed for stereo.  Cinerama and Cinemascope also 
raised problems for the film exhibitor.  Screens in every drive-in would need to be 
replaced to meet the new dimensions.  Company engineers feared that if these technical 
developments became the industry standard, drive-ins would “become obsolete” (Griffith 
Box 5, Vol.35).   Given the Griffith tradition of upgrading as new furnishings or 
technology became available, it is not surprising that the directors cautiously approved 
these expenses, however, unlike in earlier years, capitalization and profit margins were a 
larger concern.   
Interoffice memos demonstrate that Henry Griffing hoped to establish better 
methods for tracking profit and loss.  In a memo dated 2 January 1952, he outlined 
specific criteria to consider for theatre closings because “in the past when we have closed 
or abandoned a theatre, this has been marked by debate and criticism due largely to 
consideration as to whether the theatre was making or losing money.”  In seeking a 
formal accounting before a closing Griffing delineated exactly what would be considered 
income, emphasizing net profit on concessions.  He also noted that rent would only be 
considered an expense if the theatre was not owned by a subsidiary [i.e.  Griffith Realty].  
On 21 January 1952, Griffing presented a detailed, twenty-page accounting of Video 
assets and liabilities with profit ratio computations for each theatre and property for the 
nine-month period from March through November 1951.  This financial statement 
outlined an investment of over $70,000.00 on property for future construction of drive-ins 
plus almost $81,000.00 for playground equipment for existing drive-ins.  Investment in 
traditional moviehouses for remodeling and the purchase of two sites totaled a little over 
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$150,000.00.  Expenses for both types of film exhibition were almost equal but Griffing’s 
concern was that “in 1951 the ratio of profit (before income tax) to capital invested in 
conventional theatres was 44% - in drive-ins 10.7%,” yet he acknowledged that “drive-in 
theatres were absolutely necessary for the survival of the company.”  Total capital in 
conventional theatres in operation came to $1,948,000.00 and for drive-ins 
$1,525,000.00.  Including additional real estate and commercial buildings, assets in 1951 
totaled $6 million with an 11% profit ratio.13 Recommendations for improved profits 
included a general admonition to limit new building and to keep renovations down to 
those required due to obsolescence or to maintain operating standards.  One very specific 
directive ordered a discontinuation of “construction of ‘Kelley Type $50,000’ drive-ins 
for protective purposes.  Protective drive-ins are seldom profitable.  Devise plans for 
$20,000 ‘B’ type drive-ins.”  Consideration of the purchase of a $175,000 drive-in in 
Oklahoma City was vetoed (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 36).  C. F. Motley in a memo dated 7 
November 1952 listed three strategies for the coming year; “effective exploitation, 
advertising, and concession sales” and “sale of surplus property,” seem sensible but his 
third directive “EXIST BUT DON’T IMPROVE” (caps and underline as in the original 
document) indicates just how serious the profit decline had become (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 
35).14 As the corporate records indicated, Griffing and other officers of Video had reason 
for concern—much of the capital was borrowed from Oklahoma banks and insurance 
companies.  A memorandum of 25 January 1950 called for fiscal austerity and liquidation 
of all debt by December 1954 (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 36).  At this time the circuit included 
“115 conventional and 42 drive-in theatres . . . in 48 towns.”  Video also owned 22 closed 
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houses (Rice 18).  Although drive-in investment was essential, over-expansion threatened 
Video Independent’s survival.15 
In addition to the normal business of theatre operation, Video branched out into 
other investments.  This film exhibition enterprise went into the business of miniature 
(putt-putt) golf courses trying to tap into one post-war recreation craze.16 Apparently 
these were not as lucrative as the directors had hoped.  Company records indicate they 
sold these businesses with regularity through the 1950s.  Although the nation was 
motoring-mad, car washes also proved unsuccessful.  Retail shops offering confections 
and gifts did not remain in business a full year.  A request for a wholesale liquor license 
was denied.  “ In 1960 it [Video] acquired a part interest in Frontier City USA 
amusement park in Oklahoma City .  .  .but dropped from the partnership the following 
season” (Rice 19).  Tele Hi-Fi was successful in eleven towns in Oklahoma and Texas, 
providing Muzak-franchise background music.  Many applications were made for FM 
radio station licenses but the company failed to actually follow-up with broadcast 
operations with the exception of one Tulsa station, which was sold in 1961 (Rice 19, 
Griffith Box 5 Vol.40).  While Roger Rice viewed these forays into uncharted territory as 
innovative ideas, considering the financial health of the organization, desperate might 
better characterize these attempts to find profit outside the movie business. 
 One move beyond theatre exhibition mirrored the early optimism of Hollywood 
that television could be useful to the film industry.  As early as 1939 the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) had studied the possibilities of 
television for the industry.  The primary view of a television/movie alliance envisioned 
by that organization centered on “theatre television,” i.e. paid admissions broadcasts aired 
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in the moviehouse.  Courtland Smith, author of a report on the new media for the movie 
industry, cautioned the MPPDA members, “We should never let the idea become 
generally accepted that television means pictures in the home instead of pictures in the 
theater” (Schatz, Boom 425).  By 1940 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
had begun hearings to establish technical standards for the new medium sparking heated 
debate between Paramount, with investments in DuMont Laboratories, and RCA, a rival 
in television development.  RCA fought against a Hollywood presence in television 
production on two levels: first, RCA emphasized radio’s past service to the public, 
insinuating that the studios had only profit motives in mind; second, RCA charged that 
the movie producers’ interest in television masked attempts to impede the growth of 
possible competition (Schatz Boom 428).  World War II temporarily silenced this war of 
words until the FCC authorized thirteen VHF channels in 1945.  As the studios scrambled 
to control regional broadcast television, the FCC ruled, “that it would not grant a 
television license to any corporation convicted of monopolistic practices” ending the 
hopes of Hollywood producers to dominate television after the 1948 Paramount Decision  
(Gomery Shared Pleasures 231).17 Balio describes the Hollywood attitudes on television 
with three industry refrains:  in the earliest days, studio heads said “They’ll [the public] 
get tired of it soon enough” but by the 1950s in an effort to bring audiences back they 
said, “We’ll give them something television can’t” (3-D, Cinerama, etc.).  Finally by 
mid-decade, the movie producers were saying, “If you can’t whip ‘em, join “em” (321-
32).  The studios began production of television programming and earned needed capital 
by leasing sound stages to other television production companies.  Some brokered high 
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rentals for popular films from the past while others eventually sold entire libraries to 
television companies.   
 For the Griffith chain, or more accurately Video Independent, with no product to 
sell television broadcasters, venturing into this new medium suggested other paths.  
Video Independent for a time held a share in KWTV, Channel 9 in Oklahoma City, and 
in 1954 sponsored a weekly series called “All-American Football.”  Later that year and 
into 1955, Video advertised coming attractions on Sunday program featuring “Hollywood 
News.”  As was the case in other areas of the country, rural communities had limited 
access to television broadcasts or suffered extremely poor reception until companies 
independent from the networks began Community Antenna Television (CATV).  Signals 
were transmitted via microwave towers and then sent through coaxial cables to individual 
subscribers.  Video had entered the CATV market in 1952 with investments in three 
companies in Oklahoma City, Ardmore, and Duncan, Oklahoma.  In a financial report 
dated 21 January 1952, Video’s treasurer cautioned: 
Community Television is an experiment and should be conducted at the 
cheapest possible cost.  The original cost estimate, including film studio, was 
$100,000.00.  The estimate has now increased to $160,000.00.  This includes 
studio building and projection equipment of $62,500.00.  The studio portion 
of the experiment should be postponed until the TV experiment is made.  It 
seems we have nothing to lose by postponing this part of the experiment.  
(Griffith Box 5, Vol. 36). 
Corporate records beginning in 1954 indicate that this television subsidiary, the Vumore 
Company, drained resources from Video regularly.  In 1955 a $300,000.00 loan was 
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negotiated with the First National Bank in Oklahoma City.  At a board of directors 
meeting of 13 September 1957, records show that Vumore owed Video Independent 
$322,664.43.  The board voted to “mark ‘satisfied’ all indebtedness” in that amount with 
the agreement that Vumore would assume payments to various Video creditors equal to 
the forgiven debt.  In 1957 at another directors meeting, Video voted to assume payment 
on unspecified Vumore debts to Graybar Electric.  In January 1958, Video directors 
voted to pay $95,000.00 to Entron, Inc.  for Vumore.  In a report on the value of Vumore 
common stock dated 30 November 1959, advances to the CATV company totaled 
approximately $700,000.00.  The report optimistically predicted a net profit over five 
years of $910,168.20.  (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 33).  Although some CATV projects proved 
successful around the country, several problems commonly arose.  To run coaxial cable 
from towers to subscribers, these cable companies generally contracted with the region’s 
telephone service providers to use their existing poles.  Often if a CATV began to 
prosper, the phone company would increase charges.  In the case of one Vumore project, 
called Telemovie, the company paid to build the coaxial cable system, sold it to 
Southwestern Bell, and then leased that cable at $10,000.00 per mile (Rice 20).  In 
addition to the disadvantageous agreement with the phone companies, local television 
stations aggressively campaigned against CATV, which had the ability to deliver network 
programming from larger cities, threatening the livelihood of smaller regional stations.  
And, film and television producers denounced CATV for paying no copyright fees on the 
programming (Singular). 
 The Telemovie project became known in the cable industry as the “Bartlesville 
Telemovie Experiment”; unfortunately for Vumore it was notable for its failure.  
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Although unsuccessful, this was one of the first pay-per-view cable operations.  The plan 
was to offer three movies per week at a cost of $9.50 per month.  Even after cutting the 
price to $4.95 and adding continual news, weather, and time with musical 
accompaniment, this venture folded.  Singular reports that this experiment failed for 
several reasons.  Cable competition spurred local channels to improve programming and 
subscribers wanted a choice in what movies they could view.  And, perhaps most 
tellingly, viewers believed “TV shows were more alive and spontaneous than what 
Hollywood was currently producing.”  Video Independent almost went into production.  
In August 1960, “the development of a plan for the production of motion pictures for 
theatrical release” with American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres was discussed.  
Expansion into areas outside film exhibition failed to provide the turn-around that Video 
needed.  Throughout the 1950s, corporate documents show more sales of property and 
fewer theatre lease agreements, which may have meant that Griffith Realty was also 
operating in the red.  Every meeting included a list of resignations from the company, 
which might reflect a change in documentation from earlier years, but it may also 
indicate that even long time employees were concerned that the company would not 
survive. 
 With the loss of L. C. Griffith’s leadership and in spite of Henry S. Griffing’s 
efforts to control expenses on the theatre level while attempting to capitalize on new 
business opportunities, Video and Vumore faced serious difficulties by 1960.  On 16 
August of that year, Griffing was scheduled to fly his family home from an African 
vacation in his Cessna 182 Skylark.  Leaving from Teterboro, New Jersey, Griffing failed 
to arrive in Oklahoma City as scheduled.  After a week-long search, it was discovered 
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that the plane had crashed into a Pennsylvania mountaintop.18 A seven-person 
emergency “Operating Committee” was put into place in September.  The committee had 
limited powers to continue previous business agreements but was forbidden from moving 
on new projects and could not approve any expenditures over $10,000.00 (Griffith Box 5, 
Vol. 34).  Company documents demonstrate that decision by committee proved 
ineffective on numerous occasions; plans were tabled to a later date.  By November of 
1960, RKO General, a subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber, which had purchased RKO 
studios in 1955, approached Video Independent, primarily with an interest in the Vumore 
cable operations.  Directors meeting minutes of 18 January 1961 note that RKO General 
had been given permission to examine corporate records (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 40).  By 31 
August 1961, Video stockholders had approved the sale of Video and a new corporation, 
Triarko, Ltd.  was formed.  In 1962, General Tire approved the change from Triarko back 
to Video Independent but Thomas O’Neil of General Tire and John B. Poor of RKO now 
headed the organization (Rice 24).  In 1964, Video Independent owned 130 theatres.  
Video was sold to Capital Cities Communication in 1981, but this corporation was 
interested only in cable rights; Capital immediately began to search for a buyer for the 
theatres still left.  In 1983, Carmike purchased the circuit’s remaining 85 theatres.  
Carmike CEO Mike Patrick described this, his first acquisition: 
Video was owned by a company, which had bought Video for its 
cable rights.  In the mid-1970s the management was killed in an air crash 
[Patrick is incorrect].  I went up and talked to the guy in charge.  He told 
me the parent company wasn’t interested in theaters. 
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The circuit had a lot of singles and some drive-ins.  We borrowed 
$1 million as a down payment and the parent accepted a note for the 
remainder due in three equal yearly installments.  Right off the bat, we 
sold two of the drive-ins for about $1.5 million and immediately paid back 
the down payment.  We used the cash flow from the remaining theaters to 
meet the installment payments and the depreciation to rebuild the circuit.  
(Kramer and Taylor) 
The Carmike strategy in 1995 continued on much the same philosophy, targeting circuits 
that “may have reasons to sell.”  Patrick continued, “I am the number one person who 
follows companies’ financial situations and I have a pretty good idea of which ones are 
going to be in financial trouble.”  Had L. C. Griffith lived to see the dissolution of the 
powerful circuit he had once headed, he would have been saddened on the occasion of its 
sale but in agreement with Patrick’s methods.  Griffith located theatre owners willing to 
sell out in small towns around Oklahoma and Texas, and as Patrick did, L. C. offered a 
place for dispossessed managers within the circuit.  Like the experience of the Hollywood 
studios, the family business became a subordinate entity within a larger corporate 
structure, but the evolution of the Griffith theatres offers lessons not learned from studio 
system histories or reminiscences of early independent exhibitors.  The final chapter will 
consider the lessons such a history can provide. 
 
Notes: 
1 From Conant’s study, Antitrust in the Motion Picture Industry: Economic and Legal Analysis (Berkeley: 
U of California P, 1960) 148-49. 
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2 Divestiture was a slow process.  “By autumn of 1954, two years after the last consent decree had been 
entered, none of the five circuits had completed its divestitures, and it was not until 1957 that the last 
divestitures were completed” (Conant 111). 
3 L. C. Griffith continued to make an indirect contribution to the organization.  Minutes from 15 August 
1951 indicate that $120,000 had been borrowed against the founder’s life insurance (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 
37).  In a director’s meeting of 6 June 1968, an additional six life insurance policies for L. C. were assigned 
to the First National Bank and Trust of Oklahoma City as collateral for the purchase of a drive-in in 
Cleburne, Texas (Griffith Box 5, Vol. 33).   
4 Directorships included C. F. Motley, Theatre Attractions; C. R. Guthrie, Finance; C. B. Akers, 
Assignments of Property; Kenneth Blackledge, Public Relations; and H. R. Halls, Theatre Operations with 
three divisional directors under him. 
5 See Appendix for a copy of the Video Independent letter listing all the towns included in this proposal. 
6 Production company expansion into theatre holdings began as insurance for outlets to screen studio 
product but became a matter of pride and ego.  The picture palaces, once the top grossing theatres, 
remained as symbols of studio wealth and power long after they no longer turned a profit. 
7 Gomery, in Shared Pleasures, situates the opening of the first drive-in at Camden, New Jersey in 1933, 
accommodating four hundred cars (91).  Jowett credits Hollingshead as the owner of this drive-in with a 
patented ramp design for the car park (352). 
8 Rental fees generally were raised after the Paramount Decision with fewer “big” pictures and studios 
relying on income from rental agreements with independent, competitive bidding theatres. 
9 Downs contends that “at least half of the new drive-ins built immediately after World War II were put up 
by entrepreneurs who were not previously in the theater business” (123). 
10 By 1989, “At some theaters [the concessions] account for 90 per cent of the profits” (Paul 287). 
11 Amenities at drive-ins in some areas included a full-service laundry for the harried housewife and warm 
milk and free diapers for the frazzled mother. 
12 Jowett points out that the industry briefly experimented with AromaRama and Smell-O-Vision (359). 
13 Although the CAMPUS and the MOONLITE theatres in Stillwater were losing money, the profitability of the 
other three theatres resulted in a return of $34.70 on every $100.00 invested. 
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14 As a rule of thumb in the theatre business, keeping facilities up-to-date and in good condition was a 
priority; a worn carpet would have been unacceptable.   
15 Balancing the budget would become more difficult when in 1951, L. C. Griffith sold 3,000 shares of 
common and preferred Griffith Consolidated stock to Video Independent for $1,659,422.77.  $459,422.77 
was due at signing with $500,000 due the following year.  The balance was to be paid within 25 years with 
a 5% interest charge (Griffith Box 4, Vol. 27). 
16 Ironically in 1995 Michael Patrick, president and CEO of Carmike Cinemas, commented on an industry 
trend to build “entertainment centers” that included “game rooms and other businesses in a miniature-mall 
type setup.  .  .  We’ve looked at putt-putt’s, go-carts and theaters together” (Kramer and Taylor). 
17 Paramount had laid claim to New York and Washington D.C.  through its alliance with DuMont.  
Twentieth Century-Fox sought to own stations in Los Angeles, New York, Boston, Seattle, Kansas City, 
and St.  Louis.  Warner Bros.  hoped to establish itself in Los Angeles and Chicago while Loew’s looked to 
markets in New York, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C.  (Gomery, Shared Pleasures 231).  As in the 
earlier days of movie exhibition, the studios looked to dominate the larger cities, leaving smaller markets 
for the independents.   






The Rise and Fall of the Griffith Theatre Circuit (1915-1983) 
 
“Explaining” a film historical event involves specifying the relationships 
between cinema (economic, aesthetic, technological, cultural) as well as 
relationships between cinema and other systems (politics, the national  
economy, other media of mass communication, other art forms).  Assigning 
“causes” within an open system becomes a challenging task for the film  
historian because relationships among elements in that system are mutually 
interactive not linear.—Robert C.Allen and Douglas Gomery1
In the case of “explaining” local film exhibition, extant studies generally 
chronicle the success of entrepreneurs in well-established urban, if not metropolitan, 
settings and, in most cases, these theatre circuits are incorporated into larger studio chains 
by 1930.  Although Douglas Gomery emphasizes the need for more study of local movie 
business history, his fine work focuses primarily on Balaban and Katz circuit which 
dominated Chicago exhibition until joining Famous Players (later Paramount) in 1925.2
Unlike the Griffith chain, which briefly aligned with Universal, the majority of local 
exhibition histories outline a shift from independence to studio ownership.  The Griffith 
story is unique in that it was never a studio-dominated circuit, yet it became large enough 
for antitrust prosecution.  As Allen and Gomery’s comments indicate, the nexus of 
various disciplines complicates film history.  Film art advanced through technological 
political or legal forces.  As with most film histories, this one does not attempt to analyze 
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each of these factors.  And although Allen Gomery point out that these intersections do 
not occur in a neatly linear pattern, this study has been shaped as a chronological 
narrative with the understanding that, although not fictive, history tells stories that 
interpret the past.   
The most popularly engaging film histories are the biographies of the studio 
moguls with an emphasis on their colorful, clever, and sometimes-lucky “rags to riches” 
stories.  Just as film criticism has studied movies within a masterpiece template or 
through auteur theory, the history of movies has sometimes been told through the 
narratives of the “great men” of the cinema.   The romance of the movie business was not 
limited to the screen, as film historians like Ramsaye or Hampton reveal in their work.  
There is a certain element of the Griffith story that appeals to nostalgia for an Alger-like 
past that rewards honest hard work and determination.   The rise of the Griffith circuit 
often parallels the story of the family businesses of historic Hollywood with the added 
charm of developing a business in the very young territory and state of Oklahoma.  The 
Griffith history also offers a look at the growth of film exhibition outside the vertical 
integration of the studio system and challenges Gomery’s model in Shared Pleasures of
exhibition as a chain-store-styled business, a model that works in some ways but proves 
problematic in others.  Finally, Griffith Amusement, along with the Crescent and Schine 
circuits, suffered federal prosecution for antitrust violations.  The outcome of the Griffith 
case proved to be very different from the other chains, yet all three cases set precedents to 
convict the studios.  Therefore, the Griffith history both illustrates and goes against the 
grain of previous film histories.  The rise and fall of Griffith Amusement contains the 
romance of the movie business, while demonstrating a more industrial model of business 
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practices than has been previously considered.  The prosecution of those practices 
directly affected the 1948 landmark Paramount Decision.   
In its infancy, the moving picture industry provided opportunities for many from 
humble beginnings to enter the world of business with a very low capital investment.  
Hampton writes, “ Many recruits to the exhibiting branch of the new industry came from 
New York’s East Side, where scores of ambitious young Jews were restlessly searching 
for ‘access to the sources of wealth and power’” (26).  Marcus Loew and Adolph Zukor 
were fur salesmen; William Fox, a garment worker; Carl Laemmle a Wisconsin store 
manager who moved to Chicago to find his fortune.  Jack and Harry Cohn left their jobs 
as office boys to enter the movie business.  Samuel Goldfish (later Goldwyn) found 
motion pictures more enticing than life on the road selling gloves to regional retailers.  
Fortune Magazine described the first generation of studio owners as “fur peddlers, 
secondhand jewelers, and nickelodeon owners” with the exception of Louis B. Mayer 
who had the distinction of working in his father’s ship-salvaging business (265).  These 
young men convinced family and friends of the investment rewards ready for the taking 
in exhibiting the new novelty of moving pictures.   
Family support, and, often, family sweat-equity launched young men into 
entrepreneurial paths.  In the brief nickelodeon era, some began lucrative careers while 
many, many more failed.  In the case of the Griffith brothers, their father purchased their 
first modest “picture palace” to give them a start in the business world.  Family backing 
launched the careers of the Leachman brothers, Claude and Ralph, with the 1919 
purchase of a theatre in Woodward, Oklahoma.  A third brother, Oakley Leachman, later 
joined the family movie business (Campus Program).3 Although many theatre businesses 
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became “mom and pop” operations, they most often began as a way for a young man to 
make his own way.  The Griffith brothers’ success can be credited to L. C.’s experience 
in film distribution as a states rights salesman and an aggressive Griffith strategy for 
growth.  Corporate records indicate they were not reluctant to mortgage one property to 
acquire another, and never reluctant to pay a dividend out of borrowed money to the 
stockholders either.4 While studio acquisitions often included retaining current theatre 
management, Griffith Amusement went one step further, bringing former theatre owners 
into the company as stockholders.  At the local level, theatre patrons hardly noticed the 
transition from independent ownership to circuit control although the quality of films 
may have improved thanks to the buying power of the chain.  Like Zukor’s Paramount 
expansion tactics in 1919, when theatre owners resisted a takeover by the Griffiths or a 
town seemed ready for another theatre, local papers heralded the plans to build a new 
modern moviehouse.5 For example, in 1926, the Griffith organization bought out the 
family-run ABBOTT THEATRE and began building a new one as well.  Soon after, 
competitor F. M. Tull scrapped plans to build a theatre and sold the CAMERA to local R. 
H. Russ; Russ and the Griffiths were in head-to-head competition for years to come.  The 
Griffiths were quick to purchase land in new oil-boom towns but equally swift to sell 
property if a strike did not pan out.  And their expansion often took them into county 
seats.  They may not have had first-run moviehouses in large cities but they knew how to 
target locations in smaller towns where audiences for movies would grow rapidly or 
where patronage was assured because they were local government sites drawing from 
other smaller communities.  In some ways the romance of the get-rich-quick oil industry 
both mirrored and boosted the success of the Griffith circuit.  They had something of the 
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wild-cat oilman’s optimism, a bit of the wild west spirit of unlimited possibilities, and 
they tried to include others in their success.  But as A. B. Momand’s tale tells, if an owner 
refused the Griffith “generosity,” the circuit would prevail.  The Griffith history 
combines the romance of the movie business and the growth of a recent western territory 
with shrewd business practices. 
Defining those business practices and the practices of the movie industry in 
general defies easy solutions.  The entertainment business earns consumer dollars  
without providing a purchase that can be carried away in hand.  Gomery likened this to a 
retail situation but does not clearly develop the connection between tangible and 
intangible products being sold (Shared Pleasures).  Carl Laemmle was astounded that 
there was a market where “people would give money for something not represented by a 
parcel .  .  .where it [was not] necessary to ‘wrap something up for the customer to carry 
away’” (Hampton 26).  The movie industry has often been described as a dream factory 
and the product the consumer buys is as ephemeral as a dream or memory.  The retail 
paradigm stands up to scrutiny until one has to establish what has been purchased.  
Gomery likens the movie business to the early twentieth-century rise of mercantile 
concerns; he compares theatre operation to the A & P grocery chain.  While correct in 
locating similar practices, Gomery fails to note that in the case of A & P, the merchandise 
offered is food staples, and not something less essential, like entertainment.  Gomery 
identifies three comparable business strategies shared by retail chains such as A & P, 
Sears Roebuck, or Woolworths.6 First, he describes what he terms “economies of scale,” 
a system of spreading fixed costs across the entire chain.  For example each store would 
share the expense of a centralized corporate headquarters with inventory control and 
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accounting functions.  “Store managers only made entries; others kept the books” 
(Gomery, Shared Pleasures 35).  Secondly, Gomery emphasizes “scientific management” 
by university-trained specialists.  His final point seems more relevant to the Griffith 
organization; “the monopsony buying power of the chain organization also kept other 
operating costs low” (Gomery, Shared Pleasures 35-36).  Film distributors were 
undoubtedly pleased to do business with a circuit the size of Griffith Amusement, 
providing the studios with more guaranteed box office return at the second and third run 
levels.  And although the Griffiths consolidated some functions within their Oklahoma 
City corporate headquarters, notably their in-house advertising department, records 
indicate that theatre managers offered important input into corporate decisions.7 It is 
clear that local management read and implemented promotions and marketing strategies 
gleaned from the industry’s trade publications such as Motion Picture Herald or Motion 
Picture News. Griffith managers did more than “make entries.”  As for university-trained 
professionals, with the exception of legal counsel, there is no indication that this regional 
chain chose education over experience.  Although some college town ushers later became 
theatre managers, their knowledge of daily operations appears to have recommended 
them for these positions rather than any degree from an institution of higher education.  
On the board of directors, membership was almost entirely representative of experienced 
showmen (and occasionally show-women).  As the circuit took on a more structured 
corporate organization, responsibilities were assigned based on the special talents of each 
staff member.  With the shift away from traditional film exhibition and into CATV, 
experts were recruited from outside the Griffith ranks, but final decision-making 
remained in the hands of the board and the stockholders, the large majority of which were 
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all former theatre owners or managers.  Gomery’s example of Balaban and Katz as stellar 
regional exhibitors bears out the same strategy; these leaders were courted and won by a 
studio chain. 
A better model for the business practices of the Griffith organization, as well as 
the studios, is one described by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in his study of the “ascendancy 
of the manager.”  His work more clearly links Hollywood unit production and the 
structure of the Griffith and studio circuits.  Chandler argues that by the turn of the 
century American industry shifted from manufacturing to a system of both production 
and marketing to boost sales.  In film exhibition, theatre owners often times became 
movie producers to insure a quantity of new attractions; studio heads who had then 
abandoned their moviehouses later found themselves reentering exhibition to guarantee 
outlets for their films, establishing both large national chains and distribution companies.  
Similarly, on the production side, particularly once original studio heads had retired or 
been ousted, a schedule of films for the year was created, budgeted, and assigned to 
directors responsible for their unit’s output.  Although a studio production head 
monitored each unit’s progress, the director and his staff were responsible for the work of 
completing each film; daily decisions on how to meet studio goals rested in the hands of 
unit production managers supervising both creative and technical staff.  This level of 
middle management characterizes the changes Chandler describes as necessary to move 
into larger sales territories.  Chandler notes that by expanding to a “high volume output,” 
an impressive cash flow . . . provided these enterprises with most of their 
working capital, as well as funds to expand capital equipment and 
facilities.  These enterprises relied on local businessmen and commercial 
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banks for both short-term and long-term loans.  . . . For this reason the 
entrepreneurs, their families, and the associates who created these 
enterprises continued to control them.  They personally held nearly all the 
voting stock in a company.  Thus, although day-to-day operations had to 
be turned over to full-time salaried managers, long-term decisions as to 
investment, allocation of funds, and managerial recruitment remained 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of owners.  (298)  
This template illustrates the operations of Griffith Amusement.  L. C. Griffith and his 
board of directors defined circuit goals and quotas, and controlled the purchase or sale of 
theatre properties but moviehouse managers were responsible for the profitable operation 
of their individual units.  Although film purchase and distribution were centralized, 
theatre operators as middle management reported on local audience preferences and 
undertook promotions that suited the communities they served.   
Through merger and vertical integration, Chandler finds “the visible hand of 
management replac[ing] the invisible hand of market forces” as companies grew 
regionally larger (315).  This model is based not on a market demand for product but 
rather on the expansion of distribution and sales to control a market, which better suits a 
business like the movies where no physical product is being sold.  This template puts a 
larger importance on the human element of business organization.  “The building and 
managing of the modern multiunit business enterprise was, then central to the process of 
modernization in the Western world.  The task placed a premium on the ability to create 
and manage large, complex human organizations.  Such abilities became the most needed 
and often best rewarded of entrepreneurial talents” (Chandler 376).  When the Griffith 
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circuit bought out existing theatres, they had the foresight to welcome previous owners as 
stockholders and to retain local managers, effectively maintaining continuity in the 
community and profiting by the experience and understanding of the local markets of 
these showmen.  Griffith directors put the knowledge of these men to use for the benefit 
of the chain, and this emphasis on people rather than product better reflects the consumer 
purchase of a moviegoing experience rather than merchandise.  Although smaller local 
retailers emphasized customer service, mass merchandisers like an A & P or Sears 
Roebuck were more likely to focus on standardized display and pricing.  Chandler also 
points out that as companies grew, a more structured hierarchy of management was 
required.  This was the case as the Griffith holdings expanded and particularly after the 
loss of L. C. Griffith’s leadership.  Booking was divided between three area managers; 
concessions became a separate department and later a separate company.  Board 
members began to supervise more specific functions within corporate operations, each 
contributing to the bottom line generated by the experience of the theatre patron.  This 
emphasis on people as managers and consumers better fits the business of film exhibition. 
As with the rise of chain store retailers, both studio-owned and regional theatre 
circuits threatened the small town businesses, pushing the local exhibitors to petition the 
courts for protection and financial remedy.  For most small, independent theatre owners 
around the country, it was the presence of studio owned moviehouses that muscled out 
the local exhibitor with unfavorable booking arrangements, as well as runs and clearances 
designed to maximize studio profits.  In the case of the three large regional circuits, 
federal prosecution established precedents to aid the government in the larger prosecution 
of the Big Five and Little Three in Hollywood.  Cassady notes that in the Crescent and 
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Schine cases written documents were entered as evidence that outlined an effort to gain 
control in cities in their regions.  Michael Conant describes the case against Crescent 
Amusement:  Nine exhibition companies in 78 towns in Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee conspired with eight film distributors to withhold film from 
smaller, competing theatres.  Both stock in sister companies and theatres were divested 
under court order.  In addition, these exhibitors were prohibited from purchasing any new 
theatres (88-89).  The Schine Circuit operated in 76 towns across the northeast; 60 of 
those towns were closed to competition.  The Supreme Court required that this theatre 
chain divest itself of moviehouses in each of the closed towns.  In addition, limits were 
put in place as to the amount of films the Schine theatres could license (Conant 93-94).  
In both cases, rulings seriously diminished the bargaining power of these companies and 
limited future expansion.   However, in the Griffith case, guilt was not so clear-cut.  The 
district court initially found no wrongdoing on the part of this chain and on appeal the 
circuit was primarily convicted on the principal that monopoly or restraint of trade could 
be established without evidence of intent on the part of the defendants.   
The Supreme Court ruled that the fact that Griffith dominated or solely controlled 
towns proved violations of the Sherman Act.  This decision undercut the circuit’s defense 
that films were not booked from every distributor in any given year.  These franchise 
agreements negotiated for from three to five years did not directly affect the Griffith case 
but were used to prosecute the studios.  “Although the majority of franchises were 
granted to independent circuits, these agreements were found in the Paramount case to 
have restricted unreasonably the opportunities of small exhibitors to license films.  . . . 
Master agreements, computing percentage rentals on circuit gross, also allowed the 
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circuit discretion to allocate playing time and film rental to its individual theaters” which 
also helped to exclude films from certain towns (Conant 64, 74).8 Although films were 
available to independent theatre owners, Griffith buying power was seen as a restraint of 
trade.  In turn, this determination left the studios more vulnerable, and Cassady and 
Cassady argue that the government sought to first complete the prosecution of the 
regional chains to create precedent to convict the Hollywood circuits.   
The studios had defended themselves with the fact that no studio produced 
enough films to keep their moviehouses open; they faced the necessity of bargaining for 
movies from competing production companies.  Although both the studios and Griffith 
appeared to negotiate for film from some but not all suppliers, and even though it had not 
been proven that these exhibitors had willfully intended to drive out competition, the 
Supreme Court moved to convict.  Michael Conant expands on this point by noting that 
the real issue was this—the “bargaining power gained by owning some complete local 
theatre monopolies (closed towns).”  As a result of those closed towns, distributors were 
forced to give “preferential access to films in towns where there were competitive 
theaters” (Conant 105).  Judge Vaught’s ruling implied that the fault lay not with the 
Griffith chain but with those distributors, citing the good business practices of the circuit. 
The judgment against Griffith also indicates that theatre divestiture was only a 
limited cause of studio declines.  Although the Griffiths were not required to sell off 
theatres, the fortunes of this regional chain declined in similar fashion to all the studios in 
the post-World War II years.  Studio-owned circuits were slowly dismantled with Loews 
the last to comply with divestiture in 1954 and the process did not remove Hollywood 
control of first run markets.  The new theatre chains, not truly independent despite new 
160
corporate names, sold unprofitable locations, maximizing the profits of the remaining 
moviehouses.  The federal decree motivated these companies to become leaner and more 
successful.  Yet, as noted earlier, both studio-connected and regional chains suffered the 
decline of movie patronage for a variety of reasons.  The independent second and third 
run exhibitors suffered the same slow-down in attendance, and divestiture did not 
improve the profit picture for these smaller owners.  Although theatres were owned by 
new, divorced corporations, studio connections persisted and, as in the case of the 
Griffiths, circuit size still affected rental negotiations to their advantage.  As with the 
1940 Consent Decree, the small theatre owner did not see any real profit from the 
Paramount decision.  Ina Rae Hark writes, “Once distributors and exhibitors no longer 
shared a common financial interest, their relationship became more adversarial, with the 
providers of films seeking to indemnify themselves against losses by imposing onerous 
conditions on the exhibitors or limiting the flow of product to such an extent that the 
theaters eventually used the films as loss leaders to ensure the profitable sales of 
concessions” (2).  Distributors demanded larger and larger percentages of box office 
receipts, squeezing marginal theatres out of existence, and, as Griffith corporate meeting 
minutes demonstrate, concessions became a much more important part of the circuit’s 
business, especially at drive-in locations.  The court battle had been won in the name of 
the independent exhibitor but little was gained in the end.  Formerly loyal movie patrons 
had discovered other outlets and avocations on which to spend disposable income. 
Movie patronage or audience analysis is one obvious area for further research 
outside the scope of this study.  Film historians like Janet Staiger have done good work 
on film and filmgoers, but movie reception is a complex topic.  Although some contend 
161
that moviegoers voted for their favorite Hollywood stars and productions with the price 
of their admissions, opponents of block and blind-booking argue that exhibitors, and by 
extension, audiences, had little choice in what would play at the local theatre.  Were box 
office records available, one could at least make some determination of what film genres 
were most popular in towns like Stillwater, Oklahoma.  But no such records appear to 
have survived.  A detailed examination of titles and runs would give some indication of 
audience preference.  With theatres changing programs three times per week, many titles 
would need tracking, particularly when double features came to be standard practice.  
Tracking play dates would also offer better information on the clearance agreements in 
place between Griffith Amusement and the studio distributors and would indicate how 
detrimental the circuit’s influence may have been to small independent owners.  Looking 
carefully at Bartlesville records might shed light on why CATV and pay-per view 
television were unsuccessful in Oklahoma while accepted in other areas of the country.   
This study does not cover the years of the circuit’s decline with the detail that 
might reveal why expansion into drive-ins did not help this failing company.  As for legal 
matters, an extensive search of state court records undoubtedly would reveal many more 
lawsuits brought against the Griffiths and the studio chains, as well as other cases 
involving the pugnacious A. B. Momand as both plaintiff and defendant.  Searching local 
archives for Enid and Chickasha newspaper accounts could offer a better explanation of 
why these specific towns were named in the federal prosecution of Griffith Amusement; 
given Momand’s dogged pursuit of treble damages, it is surprising Shawnee was not 
included in the anti-trust proceedings.  Examining, other, smaller chains in the southwest 
or government cases against Interstate, a Paramount affiliate in Texas, might also provide 
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a better understanding of the theatre business in the region.  To locate records from an 
independent exhibitor in the area would be an exciting discovery.9 Local film exhibition 
research offers many, many approaches and options.   
Studying the Griffith organization does provide insight into exhibition in 
Oklahoma, a state not attractive to the studios, a state with only two population areas 
large enough to support Hollywood first-run picture palaces.  As with the founders of the 
movie industry, the Griffith brothers saw an opportunity in a new industry and grew their 
holdings from one small picture show to become a large tangle of corporations 
dominating film exhibition in the region for decades.  There is a romance about their 
story, but there are untold tales of other independent showmen who, if not willing to join 
the Griffith organization, were driven out of business.  Although A. B. Momand’s flawed 
testimony appears overwrought and unsupported, it indicates that he persisted where 
others had neither the will nor the resources to pursue redress of their grievances.  And, 
this research certainly underscores that although well-intentioned, federal antitrust 
convictions did little to help small theatre owners; treble damage suits were rarely 
decided in the plaintiff’s favor.  Finally, this work demonstrates the complex relationship 
of film as art, entertainment, and business while emphasizing the commercial and civic 
importance of the movie theatre in small towns in the region.  The moviehouses on Main 
Street filled many needs within the community, and few patrons noticed or cared that 
control of the moviehouses was being contested.  Until the post-World War II years, the 
locals were both proud and happy to have the moving- and then talking-pictures in their 
small town; the town seemed larger, more prosperous, and part of the wider world, thanks 
to the picture shows. 
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Notes: 
1 From Film History: Theory and Practice (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1985) 214. 
2 His emphasis on Balaban and Katz in Shared Pleasures reflects his good fortune in locating primary 
materials for that chain.  The lack of archival documentation of smaller independent exhibitors undoubtedly 
hampers the study of small town theatre owners. 
3 F. M. Tull, owner of the CAMERA for four years, first operated a furniture store before establishing the 
FOLLY THEATRE, a vaudeville, burlesque, and moviehouse (Stewart 91).  Carl “Pop” Laemmle was 
notorious for supporting his family through his ownership of Universal Pictures.  Fernett suggests that 
“Pop” sometimes opened new facilities “just so he could employ more of his relatives” (329).  “Pop” 
Laemmle gave the studio to is son, Carl Jr., as a twenty-first birthday present (Schatz, Genius 82). 
4 Very few board meetings throughout the history of Griffith Amusement did not include a vote to issue a 
substantial stock dividend. 
5 Local lore indicates that signage on vacant property near Stillwater announced the coming of a new drive-
in theatre for years to discourage others from entering the market. 
6 Gomery neglects to mention that in the case of Sears Roebuck, much of the success was due to mail order 
customers (Shared Pleasures). 
7 Griffith’s advertising department often printed custom lobby cards and other materials for the circuit 
rather than relying solely on studio provided promotional packages. 
8 Griffith Amusement had a fleet of delivery vans to transport films around the circuit.  Because they had 
master agreements in place the chain could make independent decisions on when and where to screen a 
film providing an opportunity to bring in a more popular film than the competition might be showing.  This 
differs from the practice of “bicycling” because the circuit had permission from the studio distributors to 
allocate films as the chain saw fit.  The practice of bicycling was the practice of independent theatre owners 
sharing a film rental without consent of the studios.  Often, a young man quite literally transported a movie 
by bicycle to another theatre across town.   
9 Archival documents are available in Georgia for an African-American theatre owner, a project this author 
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Appendix C:  Directory of Griffith Theatre Cities 
 





or Sold Comments 
Abilene, TX 1956 1981 County Seat 
Ada, OK 1929 1983 County Seat 
Albuquerque, NM 1956 1980 County Seat 
Altus, OK 1928 1983 County Seat 
Ardmore, OK 1936 1983 County Seat 
Artesia, NM 1976 1983  
Ballinger, TX 1936 1948 County Seat 
Bartlesville, OK 1928 1983 County Seat 
Belton, TX 1936  County Seat 
Blackwell, TX 1929 1978  
Big Springs, TX 1956 Drive-In   
Borger, TX 1936 1983 Oil Industry 
Brady, TX 1935  County Seat 
Bristow, OK 1936   
Brownwood, TX 1969 Drive-Ins 1981  
Carlsbad, NM 1936  County Seat 
Chandler, OK 1936 1959 County Seat 
Chickasha, OK 1936 1983 County Seat 
Claremore, OK 1936 1983 County Seat 
Clarksville, TX 1936  County Seat 
Cleburne, TX 1936 1983  
Clinton, OK 1935 1983  
Clovis, NM 1936   
Cuero, TX  1966 County Seat 
Cushing, OK 1936 1983 Oil Industry 
Dallas, TX 1926 1937  
Decatur, TX 1936  County Seat 
Denison-Sherman, TX 1977 Drive-In 1978  
Drumright, OK 1937 1975 Oil Industry 
Duncan, OK 1927 1983 County Seat 
Durant, OK 1976 1977 County Seat 
El Campo, TX 1938   
Elk City, OK 1925 1983  
El Paso, TX 1967 Drive-Ins 1968 County Seat 
El Reno, OK 1945 1983  
Enid, OK 1926 1983 County Seat 
Eunice, NM 1936   
Fairfax, OK 1918 1957  
Frederick, OK 1935 1963 County Seat 






or Sold Comments 
Gallup, NM 1936 1947 County Seat 
Georgetown, TX 1936  County Seat 
Guthrie, OK 1926 1982 County Seat 
Henryetta, OK 1927 1967  
Hereford, TX 1936   
Hobart, OK 1928 1979 County Seat 
Hobbs, NM 1936 1970  
Holdenville, OK 1950 1968 County Seat 
Hominy, OK 1936 1958  
Honey Grove, TX 1920   
Hugo, OK 1926 1968 County Seat 
Jal, NM 1936   
Kermit, TX 1937 1973 County Seat 
Kingfisher, OK May 1937 Dec 1937 County Seat 
Lampasas, TX 1936   
Las Cruces, NM 1967 1972 County Seat 
Lawton, OK 1956 1983 County Seat 
Lubbock, TX 1930 1980 County Seat 
Mangum, OK 1937 1969 County Seat 
Mart, TX 1920   
Maud, OK 1932 1936  
Mexia, TX 1955 1978  
Miami, OK 1926 1983 County Seat 
Midland, TX 1936 1983 County Seat 
New Braunsfel, TX 1942 1982  
Norman, OK 1927 1982  
Odessa, TX 1971 Drive-Ins 1983 County Seat 
Oklahoma City, OK 1928 1977 County Seat 
Okmulgee, OK 1927 1983 County Seat 
Pampa, TX 1929 1979 County Seat 
Pauls Valley, OK  1928  
Pawhuska, OK 1951 1976 County Seat 
Phillips, TX 1940 1950  
Picher, OK 1940 1957 Abandoned 
Plainview, TX 1936 1983 County Seat 
Ponca City, OK 1948 1983 County Seat 
Portales, NM 1936  County Seat 
Post, TX 1936   
Refugio, TX  1966 County Seat 
Roswell, NM 1931  County Seat 
San Saba, TX 1936  County Seat 
San Marcos, TX 1915 Late 1920s  
Sapulpa, OK 1932 1976 County Seat 
Sayre, OK  1976 County Seat 
Seminole, OK 1936 1983  






or Sold Comments 
Springfield, MO 1940  County Seat 
Stillwater, OK 1926 1983 County Seat 
Sunray, TX 1936   
Tonkawa, OK  1926   
Tulsa, OK 1940 1981 County Seat 
Victoria, TX 1938 Mid 1940s County Seat 
Vinita, OK 1936 1983 County Seat 
Wellington, TX 1928 1971  
Wewoka, OK 1938 1955 County Seat 
Wink, TX 1927  County Seat 
Yale, OK 1917 1927  
NOTE: 
 
1 No dates are listed if company records do not clearly indicate opening or closing dates.  
Also, records are sketchy on some of the earliest theatres. 
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Appendix D:  Sherman Antitrust Act 
 
ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND GUIDELINES 
OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 1
A. STATUTES ENFORCED BY THE ANTITRUST DIVISION
1. SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 15 U.S.C.  §§ 1-7
§ 1 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 1
Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.  Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.   
 
§ 2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 2
Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, 
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if 
acorporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.  
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§ 3 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 3
Trusts in Territories or District of Columbia illegal; combination a felony
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or 
in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any 
such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with 
foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign 
nations, is declared illegal.  Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in 
any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.   
§ 4 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 4
Jurisdiction of courts; duty of United States attorneys; procedure
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent 
and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this title; and it shall be the duty of the several 
United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney 
General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.  Such 
proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such 
violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.  When the parties complained of shall 
have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the 
hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, 
the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall 
be deemed just in the premises.   
§ 5 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 5
Bringing in additional parties
Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this 
title may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought 
before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the 
district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any 
district by the marshal thereof.   
§ 6 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 6
Forfeiture of property in transit
Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any 
conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section 1 of this title, and being 
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in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be 
forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as 
those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported 
into the United States contrary to law.   
§ 7 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 6a (Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 
1982)
Conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless--  
1. such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect--  
A. on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign 
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or  
B. on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and  
C. such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of 
this title, other than this section.   
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of 
paragraph (1) (B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for 
injury to export business in the United States.   
§ 8 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 7
"Person" or "persons" defined
The word "person", or "persons", wherever used in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be 
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws 
of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the 
laws of any foreign country.   
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